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PREFACE 
 
Internationally there has been a major increase in activity within reading and 
dyslexia research over the past three or four decades. This is a reasonable 
development given that the importance of having good reading skills has grown 
ever greater in our modern society, where information and education take pride of 
place. However, that increase in research activity has not resulted in more attention 
being devoted to the fundamental questions within the field. Most branches of 
science, once they attain a certain level in their development, tend to ask more and 
more questions pertaining to the philosophy of science. This is crucial for assessing 
the quality of research and for deciding the way forward. Empirical researchers 
may well find such theoretical issues rather alien to their work, but there is in fact a 
great deal of practical benefit to be drawn from careful consideration of them. It is 
hard to imagine a Nobel laureate who has never reflected upon issues relating to 
the philosophy of science.  
 When I first embarked upon research into reading and dyslexia twenty-five 
years ago, I was uncertain where to concentrate my efforts within a field which was 
becoming more and more multifaceted. The deciding factor turned out to be my 
background – and interest – in medicine, psychology, logic and the philosophy of 
science. My PhD thesis focused on the hypotheses and findings published shortly 
before by Norman Geschwind and Albert Galaburda about the relationship 
between brain lateralisation (left-handedness), immunological diseases and 
dyslexia. I remain fascinated to this day by the creativity and boldness of those 
hypotheses, but that did not prevent me from presenting questions and critical 
objections in my thesis. In my opinion, one characteristic of good research is 
precisely that it inspires new hypotheses and new studies. 
However, describing and explaining reading and dyslexia on the basis of 
neurology alone did not seem enough to me, and nor did I think the answers 
provided by behaviourism were sufficient. This is why I enthusiastically launched 
into studies based on cognitive psychology. As time went on, though, that school 
of thought also came to feel too one-sided and too limited. I found connectionism 
to be a good way of unifying these different approaches, but after a while I instead 
started to search for the solution in the concept of ‘skill’, which I considered 
capable of bringing all of these different schools of thought together. In my 
opinion, it is fairly obvious that reading is above all a ‘skill’ or ‘procedural 
knowledge’. It represents primarily implicit – not explicit – knowledge. For my 
definition of ‘skill’, I borrowed the concept of ‘automaticity’ from behaviourism 
and that of ‘awareness’ from cognitive psychology, but it was clear to me that they 
could not be unified through simple addition or combination, so I turned to 
philosophy for a solution.  
I found it in Aristotle’s ideas about theoretical and practical activity. These 
were ideas that I had studied in the 1980s, and I quickly realised that the word 
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‘skill’ was a good fit. In modern terminology, this word is often associated with 
the performance of technical or mechanical tasks in an automatic, flawless manner. 
However, what I translate as ‘skill’ in the context of reading is something that 
Aristotle considers to be a consequence of humans having both physical qualities 
and mental or spiritual ones. Through training, people develop skills that bring 
together automaticity and awareness (compare the concept of ‘embodied 
knowledge’ used by phenomenologists and others). One obvious example of such 
a skill is swimming. From a historical point of view, reading is nothing but a more 
recent example.  
But what does this mean when it comes to explaining the causes of dyslexia? In 
my opinion, Rod Nicolson and Angela Fawcett launched an interesting hypothesis 
by claiming that dyslexics have problems with automatisation that can be traced 
back to abnormal conditions in the cerebellum. What is more, that hypothesis 
seems to be supported by empirical studies. However, I think they place too little 
weight on awareness. John Stein has contributed a perhaps even more fruitful 
hypothesis which is based on the distinction between the magnocellular and 
parvocellular systems. This hypothesis was originally linked to the visual system 
but has since been expanded to encompass the auditory system and sensory 
activity in general. As I understand it, Stein is also supported by Galaburda and 
they – including Nicolson and Fawcett – consider the cerebellum to be a key 
explanatory factor. I will explain in greater detail how these ideas can be 
connected to my own ones about automaticity, awareness and alternation between 
whole and parts. 
Not many reading and dyslexia researchers have made explicit references to the 
philosophy or theory of science. One who has – and who has been a great source 
of inspiration for me – is Usha Goswami, first in the book she wrote together with 
Peter Bryant: Phonological Skills and Learning to Read, and later in many 
empirical and experimental works, where I have found practical examples of ideas 
that I first read about, and was inspired by, in Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery. 
 Even if I have been inspired by the above-mentioned researchers – and many 
others – I have not discussed the ideas in this book with any of them. 
 As a result of my own studies in logic and the philosophy of science, I take  
a special interest in the definition of ‘dyslexia’. There are two main issues in  
this context. First, the definitions used are very unclear and highly variable.  
This makes it difficult to compare findings across studies. Second, I consider it to 
be a major problem that several definitions include causal explanations. To this 
should be added that, in my opinion, answering the question of what dyslexia is 
must be seen as one of the most important tasks of research. This means that the 
concept of dyslexia must be seen as, and treated as, a hypothesis. I have tried to 
elaborate on the ramifications of this in one of the chapters of this book. That 
chapter is based on an article that T.R. Miles encouraged me very strongly to 
publish in Dyslexia, hoping that it would stimulate the elaboration of fundamental 
definitions.  
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 Most people agree that comprehension is the most important goal of reading. 
However, since most reading research has been carried out in English-speaking 
cultures, insufficient attention has been paid to hermeneutics, which has developed 
mainly in Germany and France. Hermeneutics is an interpretive method which is 
applicable to everything from sensory impressions to the experience of existence. It 
can be seen as a parallel to the hypothetico-deductive method: the whole is 
confronted with the parts in an analogous way to how hypotheses are confronted 
with empirical data. A further similarity is that someone using either of these 
methods can never be sure of having attained the truth. Since I believe that 
hermeneutics is a useful method for reading research, I consider it better to talk in 
terms of ‘interpretation’ rather than ‘understanding’ – which implies that the 
correct answer has been found. Reading, as I see it, is above all an interpretive 
skill. 
 I have called my book Can We Read Letters? Some readers are bound to think 
that this title is too clever by half or overly polemical. In my opinion, however, it 
not only emphasises the question of what reading is, but also highlights an 
unfortunate element in the research tradition: a tendency to take an atomistic 
approach to reading. To this should be added that the subtitle – Reflections on 
Fundamental Issues in Reading and Dyslexia Research – provides more down-to-
earth information about the content of the book. 
 The various chapters of the book represent twenty-five years of work. Most of 
them are reworked versions of previously published articles or book chapters,  
but there is also some entirely new material, namely a historical overview (Chapter 
1: ‘Historical Introduction’) and a retrospective glance (Chapter 8: ‘Concluding 
Reflections’). Chapter 2: ‘Challenges in Cognitive Psychology’ is based on  
an article entitled ‘Options and Limitations of the Cognitive Psychological 
Approach to the Treatment of Dyslexia’ which was published in the Journal  
of Learning Disabilities (Sage Publications, 1999, Vol. 32(5)). Chapter 3: 
‘Defining Dyslexia’ is based on an article entitled ‘How Can We Best  
Define “Dyslexia”?’ which was printed in Dyslexia. An International Journal of 
Research and Practice (Wiley, 1998, 3(2)). Chapter 4: ‘Defining Skills’  
is a nearly unchanged version of the article ‘What Are Skills? Some  
Fundamental Reflections’, published in L1 – Educational Studies in Language and 
Literature (IAMTE, 2011, 11(01)). Chapter 5: ‘Reading Skill’, Chapter 6: 
‘Reading Fluency’ and Chapter 7: ‘Reading Instruction’ are English versions  
of chapters from a Norwegian-language book entitled Å lykkes med lesing (‘How 
to Succeed with Reading’) (Gyldendal Akademisk, 2014). I would like to express 
my particular gratitude to all of the publishers mentioned above for generously 
permitting versions of the various articles and chapters to be printed in this  
book.  
 As most of the chapters are based on independent publications, there is some 
overlap between them. They can be read separately, but I have also tried to order 
the chapters so that they make up a whole. 
 Last but not least I would like to thank the Director of the National Centre for 
Reading Education and Research, Åse Kari Hansen Wagner, who started the 
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process that has led to this book in the context of the preparations for the Centre’s 
twenty-fifth anniversary. Further, I would like to thank Professor Per Henning 
Uppstad at the Centre, who edited the selection and was in charge of relations with 
the publishers. He used to be my student, and we have had many a talk about 
matters relating to the chapters of this book. He and I have written the three 
chapters entitled ‘Reading Skill’, Reading Fluency’ and ‘Reading Instruction’ 
together. 
 
Finn Egil Tønnessen 
Professor 
National Centre for Reading Education and Research 
University of Stavanger  
Norway 
 
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First of all I would like to thank Professor Emeritus Torleiv Høien, who invited me 
into the field of reading research. Twenty-five years ago, he and I were the only 
researchers at the newly established National Centre for Reading Education and 
Research in Stavanger. Today, the Centre has about fifty employees in the fields of 
research, education, popularisation and administration. 
 Ever since our Centre was established, we have enjoyed a large network of 
contacts and collaborators both locally, nationally and internationally. We have 
participated in major collaborative projects within both reading research and 
dyslexia research. In the preface, I have mentioned some of those who have 
provided inspiration for the articles included in this book. I would like to use this 
opportunity to extend my thanks to some of our Nordic collaborators as well. 
 The late Professor Ingvar Lundberg of Umeå University – and subsequently of 
the University of Gothenburg – was a visiting professor at our Centre for several 
years. He acquainted us early on with new trends and new works in international 
research, and his broad knowledge, his great enthusiasm and his large network of 
contacts were of crucial importance to our research operations. 
 Professor Kenneth Hugdahl of the University of Bergen carried out studies of 
‘dichotic listening’ among dyslexics in the early 1990s. His findings seemed solid 
enough, but their interpretation has been controversial. Those studies were an early 
source for my ideas about the importance to good readers of automatisation, 
attention and attention shifts. I am grateful for the inspiring way in which Professor 
Hugdahl acquainted me with research in that field. 
 Later on in the 1990s, Professor Heikki Lyytinen of the University of Jyväskylä 
became an important collaborator and inspirer. He showed that a large number of 
factors may influence reading skill and that early assessment and stimulation are 
crucial to reading development. 
 Professor Pekka Niemi of the University of Turku was affiliated with our Centre 
as a visiting professor. Whenever there was a conflict between fashionable schools 
of thought, he managed to be both open-minded and level-headed. 
 Professor Sven Strömqvist of Lund University also became a visiting professor 
and made a strong contribution to the linguistic competence and interests of the 
Centre. 
 A number of other people – both from Nordic countries and from further afield 
– have contributed inspiration, help and contacts in a range of fields. 
 Important assistance not only of a linguistic nature, but also to enhance the 
clarity of my works in the English language, has been provided in the form of 
translations by and critical comments from Johan Segerbäck. 
 I would like to thank all of those mentioned above – as well as all of those that 
there is not enough room for me to mention here. Even if these colleagues have 
meant a lot to me, they have no responsibility for the present product. 
 Financial support for the publication of the book has been generously provided 
by the Reading Centre and the Research Council of Norway. 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION – 
BEGINNING AND CONTINUATION OF  
DYSLEXIA RESEARCH 
INTRODUCTION 
I here use the term ‘history of dyslexia research’, but as we will see there are 
various terms for, as well as various views of, the condition studied. While there is 
widespread agreement that dyslexia includes difficulties in both reading and 
writing, there is disagreement as regards how large those difficulties have to be, 
how prevalent they are and whether they change through development and/or 
pedagogical intervention. 
Gough and Tunmer (1986) define ‘the simple view of reading’ as follows: 
Reading = Comprehension × Decoding. They assert that dyslectics are poor readers 
because of inadequate decoding, and this is a view that has become increasingly 
common. Someone with poor decoding skills will of course also have problems 
with comprehension. The term ‘general reading difficulties’ is often used about 
those whose problems are primarily with comprehension, as a result of factors such 
as low IQ, inadequate concentration ability or a limited vocabulary. 
This brief overview is intended as an introduction to the subject for doctoral 
students in the field of special education. It is not possible to provide a complete or 
objective presentation of the history of dyslexia research. In this chapter, I have 
limited the selection of research contributions to those that I deem to have been 
particularly important. As a rule, many other researchers will have arrived at more 
or less the same findings or ideas, but if they were all to be mentioned the chapter 
would be reduced to a catalogue of names and studies. So would also be the case if 
I were to mention all those who have challenged the findings or ideas that I have 
chosen to include. 
As regards the structure of the historical presentation, the choice is primarily 
between chronological and thematic organisation of the material. The most 
comprehensive and authoritative account published so far (Dyslexia. A hundred 
years on by Miles & Miles, 2001) chose the latter option, which gives a good 
overview but fails to show how ideas have developed and influenced each other 
over time. What is more, a given theme, theory or finding may mean different 
things in different historical contexts. In this chapter, my main organisational 
principle is chronological, but I will not emphasise the ways in which researchers 
have influenced each other even though I try to convey an impression of both 
change and continuity. I have not followed strict chronological order but gathered 
material thematically to some extent, above all in the section entitled 
‘Continuation’. I have divided the history of dyslexia research into two main 
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periods – ‘Beginning’ and ‘Continuation’ (this division can and should be 
questioned, but not here) – with the transition in about 1960, when the volume of 
research increased markedly. There are a number of reasons for that increase: both 
schools, teachers and politicians became more willing to prioritise dyslexia 
research, and at the same time the ‘Sputnik Shock’ led to increased spending on 
schools, education and research in general. There was also an increased awareness 
of the importance of written-language skills for education, culture and participation 
in society. A further important development in this research field around 1960 was 
that the physicians lost their former dominant position to educationalists and 
psychologists, who progressively took on a more important role in dyslexia 
research and treatment.
The first part of the history, from about 1900 to about 1960, and the last one, 
after about 2000, are the least covered, for two reasons: During the first of those 
periods, there was relatively limited, but creative, activity. During the second, by 
contrast, activity has been more intense than ever before, but neither the creativity 
shown nor the changes occurring and the findings made have been proportionate to 
the efforts made. As the historian of science Thomas Kuhn has claimed (Kuhn, 
1970), paradigms (or fundamental circumstances) of research change relatively 
rarely. Kuhn’s term for research carried out within the framework of an established 
paradigm is ‘normal science’. This involves researchers trying to falsify or verify 
each other’s findings and making minor modifications. I would claim that dyslexia 
research has had a kind of established paradigm since the 1970s. First, this field 
has been dominated by cognitive psychology. Second, the main focus has been on 
phonological difficulties within dyslexia. These issues were clarified and subjected 
to more in-depth study over the two or three decades from 1970 onwards, and also 
supplemented with contributions from other fields, above all medicine, such as 
brain research as well as research into perception, motor skills and genetics. Then, 
for 10–20 years starting in the mid-1980s, there was a period characterised by 
creative and courageous hypotheses in these fields. In the past few years, however, 
normal science would seem to have been dominant. While the replication of other 
people’s studies is obviously important and valuable, especially when the samples 
are larger and the studies are carried out with greater methodological rigour, it is 
not likely to yield many major advances that deserve mention in a brief historical 
overview. 
In my presentation, I will focus specially on what dyslexia is and what the 
underlying causes are. By contrast, I will not devote much attention to the methods 
and tools used for purposes of evaluation, treatment and intervention. 
In the present introduction, I will otherwise stress two main points. First, it is 
often difficult to compare research findings because the definitions used are 
unclear or different. Indeed, generally speaking, definitions represent a weakness 
present throughout the history of reading and dyslexia research. This aspect has 
been neglected or assigned insufficient priority. What is more, it is open to 
discussion whether the diagnostic methods and equipment used correspond to the 
definitions. On a related point of terminology, it is a controversial issue whether 
the word ‘diagnosis’ has too medical a ring to it – perhaps it would be better to talk 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION – BEGINNING AND CONTINUATION 
3 
about ‘evaluation’ and ‘exploration’, even if those words are not entirely suitable 
either. 
The second point that I would like to stress is that, as regards explanations, it 
may be appropriate to make a distinction between causal mechanisms and 
aetiology. If, say, a person has difficulty linking language sounds to letters, this is a 
causal mechanism which explains certain symptoms in reading behaviour. Then it 
is obviously interesting to know why those abnormal causal mechanisms affect 
some people but not others. This may be due to a specific brain abnormity or 
injury, and it may also be due to genetic factors. Such neurological and genetic 
factors, then, are the aetiology underlying the causal mechanisms. In the literature, 
it is often difficult to determine whether researchers claim to have identified causal 
mechanisms or aetiological explanations. 
Finally, I would like to say a few words about why researchers should take an 
interest in the history of their discipline. Knowledge for its own sake is one reason, 
which requires no further elaboration. Some may stress the aspect of usefulness: 
learning to avoid repeating the mistakes of others or to avoid re-inventing the 
wheel. Inspiration may be an even more important aspect: seeing how one’s 
predecessors have had their victories and their defeats can be helpful in 
maintaining one’s courage in the search for solutions and answers. Personally, 
what I find even more useful is the ‘mental gymnastics’ that an encounter with 
history forces one to engage in: when one makes one’s mind follow a variety of 
lines of reasoning it has not before been exposed to, one is inspired to find and 
follow other new routes. Unlike Columbus, we may be rather well aware of where 
we have come, and we also know a little about where the roads lead from here. 
BEGINNING 
The ophthalmologist James Hinshelwood published an article in 1895 about a 
young boy who could not read despite having normal intelligence. According to 
Hinshelwood, this was due to an insufficient or inexistent ability to store visual 
impressions from print or writing. There were no shortcomings in the auditory 
field: ‘the auditory memory being unimpaired and sometimes exceptionally good 
these children have no difficulty in rapidly learning to spell and will be able to 
spell words long before they have learned to recognise them by sight’ 
(Hinshelwood, 1917, p. 106). It was controversial whether, and if so why, such a 
problem should apply mainly to printed or handwritten texts. Hinshelwood listed 
three types of reading difficulties: he used ‘word blindness’ about the greatest and 
most permanent problems; ‘dyslexia’ about minor and largely transient problems in 
beginning readers; and ‘alexia’ about those who had low intelligence – and the 
attendant problems with comprehension – in addition to difficulties remembering 
letters and written-word images. Based on the patients that he had recorded and 
examined, he asserted – as many have done after him – that the problem was the 
most prevalent in boys and men. Hinshelwood was of the opinion that the 
shortcomings of visual memory were innate, but even so he claimed that treatment 
could exert a positive impact, even though it could not entirely remove the problem 
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(cf. the treatment scheme designed on this basis and published in several versions, 
such as Gillingham & Stillman, 1969).  
Until about 1920 a series of British ophthalmologists took positions similar to 
the ones described above (e.g. Morgan). Then the centre of gravity of dyslexia 
research shifted to the United States. The US neurologist Samuel T. Orton 
influenced the direction of much of the research carried out in 1925–1950. While 
his predecessors had provided detailed descriptions of small numbers of cases, 
towards the end of his career Orton could refer to over 1,000 (there is even 
occasional mention of 3,000) children examined by himself. Like Hinshelwood, he 
considered that the causes of reading difficulties were largely to be found in the 
visual system, but he did not think the children lacked visual memory or were 
entirely ‘blind’ to letters and words. Rather, he was of the opinion that visual 
impressions were ‘distorted’ in the perceptual processing of letters and words, 
which is why he used the word ‘strephosymbolia’. This applied in particular to the 
confusion of letters such as ‘b’ and ‘d’ (which he referred to as ‘static reversals’), 
but also to changes in the order of letters, such as ‘sun’ being read and perceived as 
‘nus’ (‘kinetic reversals’). Like Hinshelwood, Orton considered that the problems 
were the most prevalent in boys and men. Further, Orton was of the opinion that 
the problems were hereditary. 
Noticing that left-handers were over-represented among children with 
strephosymbolia, Orton assumed that the problems were primarily due to an 
abnormal ‘division of labour’ between the two hemispheres of the brain. As we 
will see later, this explanation for the causes of dyslexia was further developed in 
the 1980s (Geschwind, Behan, Galaburda). However, the symptoms that Orton 
emphasised strongly (the ‘distortion’ of letters and words) have had less 
importance assigned to them by later researchers, for two reasons: it has been 
claimed that these symptoms are not particularly prevalent, and also that they are in 
fact part of normal development in many children. 
Even though Orton’s diagnostic criteria and causal explanations have exerted 
only a limited influence, he has made a lasting impact both because of the attention 
he directed towards the problem and because of the large number of children he 
examined. What is more, such courageous and creative researchers and original 
thinkers as Orton are rarely seen. In the United States, the Orton Dyslexia Society 
was founded in his memory. It has subsequently had a large importance 
internationally and is now called the International Dyslexia Association. While the 
centre of gravity of dyslexia research remained in the United States, there were 
also a few important researchers in Europe, and particularly in Scandinavia, at this 
time. Both the Swedish physician Hallgren (1950) and the Danish researcher 
Hermann (1959) have had lasting importance for the study of the heritability of 
dyslexia. 
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CONTINUATION 
Directions of research 
From the early 1960s, dyslexia was no longer primarily a concern for the health-
care services, but rather one for the schools. Educationalists and psychologists 
assumed a dominant position in dyslexia research. However, it is interesting to note 
that medicine was to make a forceful return in the 1980s. 
In the 1960s, behaviourism lost its dominant position in psychology to cognitive 
psychology (or cognitivism) through what has been called the ‘cognitive 
revolution’ (cf., e.g., Baars, 1986). Cognitive psychology started making real 
inroads in dyslexia research in the 1970s. Behaviourism had placed its main focus 
on observable behaviour and disregarded the non-observable mental aspects. In 
addition, it emphasised sanction (negative emotions) and reward (positive 
emotions) in learning. Further important aspects were association and 
automatisation. 
Cognitive psychologists, by contrast, were more interested in the mental, inner 
processes, considering that behaviourism over-emphasised ‘blind’, automatic 
learning. Instead they focused on conscious, controlled learning. ‘Metacognition’ 
became a key concept. Properly speaking, this means ‘knowing about knowing’ or 
‘awareness of awareness’; what it involves is being aware of and able to control 
one’s learning processes. 
Starting in the late 1980s, connectionism emerged as a new school of 
psychology. It is often presented as part of cognitivism, but it is probably closer 
to behaviourism or situated in between that and cognitivism. Unlike cognitivism, 
connectionism does not wish to use inner ‘representations’ or ‘images’; and unlike 
behaviourism, it does not primarily concern itself with external, observable 
behaviour. Instead, it mainly wishes to observe the neurological phenomena or 
laws entailing that nerve cells can be more or less activated (rather than just either 
‘off’ or ‘on’). Connectionists claim that repetition increases the likelihood of 
activation (which is similar to behaviourism’s theory of association). And, like 
cognitivists, they like to make charts of mental processes – but while the 
cognitivists’ charts show a one-way flow from input to output, those of 
connectionists show traffic flowing to and fro among all elements. For example, 
there is not just a single route between the image of the written word and its 
meaning and pronunciation. It is often necessary to return to the context of a word. 
This shift between the whole and the parts has many similarities to the methods of 
hermeneutics (the study of approaches used to interpret and understand texts, 
situations or phenomena in general). To this should be added that connectionism 
has developed computer programs simulating or imitating how humans go about 
learning or performing specific tasks. One example is how children learn regular 
and irregular past-tense forms of English verbs – that is, how they learn to say 
‘went’ (irregular) rather than ‘goed’ (regular). Many claim that connectionists’ 
simulations of the reading process are closer to reality than cognitivists’ 
representations using flow charts and dual-route models. 
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Definitions and subdivisions  
There have been a great many debates about the definition of ‘dyslexia’. The most 
commonly used definition was suggested by the World Federation of Neurology in 
1968: ‘A disorder manifested by a difficulty in learning to read despite 
conventional instruction, adequate intelligence and socio-cultural opportunity. It is 
dependent upon fundamental cognitive difficulties which are frequently of a 
constitutional character’ (Matejcek, 1968, p. 22). 
Taking that definition as a starting-point, the International Dyslexia Association 
(formerly the Orton Dyslexia Society) and others have taken the initiative in 
developing a new definition. Reid Lyon (1995) arrived at the following: 
‘[Dyslexia] is a specific language-based disorder of constitutional origin 
characterized by difficulties in single word decoding, usually reflecting insufficient 
phonological processing. These difficulties in single word decoding are often 
unexpected in relation to age and other cognitive and academic abilities; they are 
not the result of generalized developmental disability or sensory impairment. 
Dyslexia is manifested by variable difficulty with different forms of language, 
often including, in addition to problems with reading, a conspicuous problem with 
acquiring proficiency in writing and spelling’ (p. 7). 
The British Dyslexia Association (1993) has proposed a broader definition 
which is more strongly influenced by practice: ‘A specific difficulty in learning, in 
one or more of reading, spelling and written language which may be accompanied 
by difficulty in number work, short-term memory, sequencing, auditory and/or 
visual perception, and motor skills. It is particularly related to mastering and using 
written language – alphabetic, numeric and musical notation. In addition oral 
language is often affected to some degree’. 
The main point of disagreement as regards how to define dyslexia has been the 
relevance of including intelligence. For example, Siegel (1989) asserts that there is 
no connection between IQ and phonological skills. According to Stanovich (1991), 
rather than demanding a discrepancy or difference between reading skill and 
intelligence, the definition should include a discrepancy between listening skill and 
reading skill: if a person understands much less by reading a text than by listening 
to it, this could be seen as a sign of dyslexia. 
 In the 1960s it became increasingly common to claim that what distinguishes 
dyslexics from other poor readers is a difference in degree rather than in kind. For 
example, some have preferred using the term ‘delay’ rather than ‘deficit’. Those 
who think the difference is one in degree simply identify dyslexics as the bottom 
part of the normal-distribution curve; those who think there is a difference in kind 
claim that dyslexics instead make up a ‘hump’ towards the bottom end of that 
curve (which consequently loses its characteristic bell-shaped symmetry). Among 
those making the latter claim are Rutter et al. (1976), based on a large study carried 
out on the Isle of Wight. This distinction matters: if dyslexia is seen as reflecting a 
difference in degree, the interventions made tend to involve increasing the dose of 
regular initial instruction in reading and writing; by contrast, physicians seeing 
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dyslexia as having physical and innate causes tend to consider pedagogical and 
psychological measures as less effective. 
Critchley (1964) felt it was important to distinguish ‘specific developmental 
dyslexia’ from general reading difficulties. Later on he claimed that the best way to 
make that distinction was by using genetic analysis: ‘We owe to genetics the most 
cogent single argument in support of the conception of a constitutional specific 
type of dyslexia among the miscellany of cases of poor readers’ (Critchley, 1970, 
p. 89). The reason for general reading difficulties, according to Critchley, is weak
intelligence – above all inadequate comprehension. However, the greatest and most 
permanent reading difficulties are those caused by phonological difficulties. Such 
difficulties, to the extent that they entail problems reading words, obviously lead to 
comprehension difficulties as well, but those are not primary in the way that they 
are for people with general reading difficulties.  
The physicians dominating dyslexia research before the 1960s were mainly 
interested in finding causal explanations. The subsequent work of psychologists 
and educationalists helped bring about more detailed descriptions of dyslexics’ 
reading behaviour. This, in turn, made it increasingly common to claim that there 
are several types of dyslexia. If this is the case, then an appropriate subdivision of 
dyslexics will obviously make it easier to adjust interventions to suit the needs of 
individuals. Based on the nature of the reading mistakes made, Vernon (1957) 
claims that there are three types of dyslexia: First, visual dyslexia, which 
corresponds to the problems that medical research had focused on. Second, 
auditory dyslexia, where the mistakes made suggest that the children lack correct 
connections between sounds (phonemes) and letters (graphemes). And third, 
inadequate capacity for abstract thinking, where the children affected are unable to 
analyse words of spoken language (the stream of speech) to identify individual 
sounds. Making a distinction between visual and auditory dyslexia became 
increasingly more common in the 1960s (cf., e.g., Myklebust & Johnson, 1962). 
 Boder (1973) took this tradition further but used the terms ‘dyseidetic’ and 
‘dysphonetic’, where the main problem of those belonging to the former group is 
perceiving words as wholes while that of the members of the latter group is to 
associate phonemes with graphemes. Boder also had a third group: the ‘alexic’, 
who have problems in both areas. The Norwegian researcher Hans-Jørgen Gjessing 
asserts that he subdivided dyslexics in a corresponding way as early as in the 1950s 
(cf. Gjessing, 1977; Gjessing et al., 1988). 
Mattis, French and Rapin (1975) identified a subgroup characterised by motor 
problems. A noteworthy point here is that the subgroups are described by reference 
not only to their reading or writing mistakes but also to symptoms in other fields. 
This may be relevant if such problems in other fields share their causes with the 
reading and writing difficulties – and it may make it possible to examine whether 
children are at risk of reading difficulties even before they first start school. For 
example, Nicolson and Fawcett (1990) have asserted that it is not enough to test for 
phonological difficulties, even though it is important to gain an overview over 
them. In their opinion, dyslexics also have problems with issues such as 
automatisation, motor control and conception of time. 
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Nicolson et al. (1997), using PET scans, found dyslexics to have lower activity 
than normal readers in the cerebellum, which plays a crucial role for tasks such as 
the regulation of movement. Denckla and Rudel (1976) claimed that the largest 
subgroup of dyslexics (more than 50%) have language problems that manifest 
themselves as difficulties with rapid automatised naming (RAN) as well as certain 
motor problems; another common reference for this position is Wolf (1979, 1984). 
Those who have both phonological difficulties and problems with RAN were seen 
as having a ‘double deficit’. It was argued that having children undergo an RAN 
test before they learn to read could identify those at risk of reading and writing 
difficulties. Further, according to Tallal, dyslexics have particular problems with 
the rapid processing of information – and hence with the processing and perception 
of rapid and/or brief stimuli. Phonemes, especially consonants, require rapid 
processing. Tallal claimed that she was able to improve children’s ability to 
perceive phonemes by first artificially increasing their duration and then 
progressively making them shorter (Tallal et al., 1997). 
One interesting subdivision of dyslexics is that proposed by Bakker (1990): ‘P-
type’ (perception) versus ‘L-type’ (linguistic). According to Bakker, the right 
hemisphere of the brain primarily perceives wholes. Dyslexics making use mainly 
of that hemisphere belong to the P-type. The left hemisphere primarily perceives 
details, and those dyslexics who rely mainly on that hemisphere belong to the L-
type. Bakker asserts that good readers are able to alternate between the two 
hemispheres in an appropriate manner, such that they will sometimes focus on the 
whole and sometimes on the details. 
Another common distinction is that between ‘developmental dyslexia’ and 
‘acquired dyslexia’, the latter applying to people who have had normal reading 
ability but where this has been impaired as a result of brain damage, for example 
following a stroke (cf., e.g., Ellis, 1993; Coltheart et al, 1986, 1993). The 
symptoms exhibited by people with acquired dyslexia are much more 
heterogeneous, reflecting the complex nature of reading skill and the large number 
of things that may go wrong. Because of this diversity, there has been some 
opposition to categorising or subdividing acquired dyslexia, but even so three 
categories are often mentioned. First, ‘phonological dyslexia’, where one of the 
main symptoms is difficulty reading non-words. Second, ‘deep dyslexia’, which 
also involves semantic mistakes such as reading ‘bus’ for ‘car’. Reading abstract 
words tends to be more difficult than reading concrete ones. And third, ‘surface 
dyslexia’, where the main problem is remembering and recognising whole words. 
Since each word is analysed and treated as a new word, the resulting reading pace 
is very low.  
 Frith (1986) claims that children go through three stages in their reading 
development. The first is the ‘logographic’ stage, where they see words as images 
or wholes without identifying the component letters. Examples include trademarks 
or logos such as ‘Coca-Cola’ that children recognise before learning the letters. 
The second is the ‘alphabetic’ stage, where children read each letter before arriving 
at the whole. The third is the ‘orthographic’ stage, where children know how to 
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spell the words and have encountered them so often that they see both the whole 
and the letters. 
Phonology – language 
Alvin and Isabella Liberman, who worked at the Haskins Laboratories, were 
influential at an early stage in the school of research claiming that dyslexia is 
caused by phonological difficulties. Their colleague Donald Shankweiler has 
further developed their thinking. These researchers start not just from cognitive 
psychology but more specifically from cognitive psycholinguistics. In their 
opinion, dyslexia is primarily due to problems with spoken language – in 
particular, the ability to distinguish between and identify phonemes. As we have 
seen, earlier researchers were preoccupied with auditory difficulties that could, for 
instance, make it difficult to isolate and identify phonemes in the stream of speech. 
Placed in the context of cognitive psychology, such ideas gained new strength and 
influence. 
Even though the Libermans and their colleagues claim that reading difficulties 
are due to problems with spoken language, they also assert that spoken language 
develops much more naturally than reading skill does, explaining why fewer 
people have problems with spoken language. They emphasise that reading is a late 
feature of our evolutionary history and that it is more artificial and more culture-
specific. For example, children tend to perceive the word ‘sun’ as a whole which is 
primarily associated with a meaning. Many find it strange to break that whole up 
into the individual sounds /s/+/ʌ/+/n/. 
Vellutino (1979) reviewed earlier reading and dyslexia research, concluding that 
the importance of visual factors had been both misunderstood and exaggerated. In 
his opinion, visual mixing-up of letters or words is rare. Moreover, where it does 
occur in beginning readers, those affected can be both normal readers and 
dyslexics. The reason for this is that the children’s linguistic perception is still 
under development; if they mix up, say, ‘d’ and ‘p’, this is because the sounds are 
similar. According to Stirling and Miles (1988), unclear pronunciation is more 
frequent in dyslexics than in normal readers, which may be due to problems with 
auditory discrimination (cf., e.g., Brady et al., 1983). Snowling et al. (1986) added 
that this is also related to inadequate short-term memory. 
Cognitive psychology introduced flow charts giving visual overviews of the 
elements and structure of cognitive processes. This tool was also used by cognitive 
reading research, where one model that has become particularly widespread is the 
‘dual-route model’ (cf., e.g., Seymour, 1986). According to this model, there are 
two ‘routes’ from script to meaning and pronunciation. One of them leads directly 
from whole words to their meaning and pronunciation and is the one taken by 
good, fast readers. The other is ‘indirect’ in that it begins with a breakdown of the 
written image into individual graphemes. Then those graphemes are associated 
with phonemes, and finally those phonemes are brought together to form a whole. 
When that whole is associated with a word from spoken language, its meaning is 
perceived. At this stage, however, there may arise problems. If, say, the written 
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word ‘sun’ is broken down into the phonemes /s/+/ʌ/+/n/, it is still not certain that 
this will be identified with the spoken word ‘sun’, for example if it is pronounced 
too slowly. It should be added that, even though this ‘double route’ was formalised 
and strongly emphasised by cognitive psychology, this idea can be found more or 
less implicitly throughout the history of reading and dyslexia research. 
Morais et al. (1979) asserted that not only does phonemic awareness promote 
reading skill, but the activities of reading and writing also cause children to pay 
attention to the individual phonemes of their language. According to Goswami and 
Bryant (1990),  
it [i]s most unlikely that the progress that children make in reading is 
determined by their sensitivity to phonemes. On the contrary their progress in 
learning to read (or to read an alphabetic script at any rate) is probably the 
most important cause of awareness of phonemes. Children are not 
particularly sensitive to the existence of phonemes in words at the time when 
they begin to learn to read, and if they do not learn an alphabetic script they 
continue to be insensitive to these phonological units for some time. (p. 26) 
Here it should be noted that there exist not only units that are larger than 
phonemes, such as syllables, but also ones that are smaller. For instance, a 
spectrogram will show that the sound representing the phoneme /a/ consists of 
several elements and that those elements manifest themselves in various ways in 
different linguistic contexts and in different people; relevant factors include age, 
sex, dialect and language. Further, at an intermediate level between phonemes and 
syllables are onset and rime. For example, the word ‘strict’ consist of one syllable, 
but that syllable can be divided into an onset: ‘str’ and a rime: ‘ict’. Goswami and 
Bryant (1990) claim that these units are very important in children’s acquisition of 
reading skill: 
The important phonological units for young children are onset and rime. The 
phonological skill that they bring to reading and writing is the ability to 
divide a word into its onset and its rime, and also to categorise words which 
have the same onset or the same rime […] Our evidence suggests that right 
from the start, and perhaps with very little explicit instruction to do so, 
children learn to associate onsets and rimes with strings of letters. […] One 
of the most interesting results of this early sensitivity to onsets and rimes is 
that children make inferences or analogies about new words on the basis of 
spelling patterns in words that they already know, and that they do this as 
soon as they begin to read. (p. 147) 
The term ‘phonological awareness’ or ‘phonemic awareness’ is frequently used in 
dyslexia contexts, but what exactly does it mean? The definitions vary and are 
often unclear. The US National Reading Panel (2000) published a report called 
Teaching Children to Read based on a large selection of research projects and 
publications, which includes the following quotation on that subject: 
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 Phonemic awareness (PA) refers to the ability to focus on and manipulate 
phonemes in spoken words. The following tasks are commonly used to assess 
children’s PA or to improve their PA through instruction and practice:  
1. Phoneme isolation, which requires recognizing individual sounds in words, 
for example, ‘Tell me the first sound in paste’.  (/p/)  
2. Phoneme identity, which requires recognizing the common sound in different 
words. For example, ‘Tell me the sound that is the same in bike, boy, and bell’. 
(/b/)  
3. Phoneme categorization, which requires recognizing the word with the odd 
sound in a sequence of three or four words, for example, ‘Which word does not 
belong? bus, bun, rug’. (rug) 
4. Phoneme blending, which requires listening to a sequence of separately 
spoken sounds and combining them to form a recognizable word. For example, 
‘What word is /s/ /k/ /u/ /1/?’ (school) 
5. Phoneme segmentation, which requires breaking a word into its sounds by 
tapping out or counting the sounds or by pronouncing and positioning a marker 
for each sound. For example, ‘How many phonemes are there in ship?’ (three: 
/š/ /I/ /p/)  
6. Phoneme deletion, which requires recognizing what word remains when a 
specified phoneme is removed. For example, ‘What is smile without the /s/?’ 
(mile) (p. 2.2) 
In other words, ‘phonemic awareness’ is made into a very broad concept. The 
demands placed on the ability to concentrate and to think abstractly are great. 
Anyone who masters all of this is very likely to be good at decoding. But once the 
level of the various skills mentioned in points 1–6 above rises above a certain 
point, improvements in those skills will presumably no longer entail corresponding 
improvements in decoding skill as measured in reading pace and number of 
mistakes. To this should be added that there are very good readers who do not 
perform particularly well in those six areas. It can thus be questioned to what 
extent phonemic awareness is necessary for reading: 
[T]he utility of phonological abilities as predictors of reading development 
varies across different languages. For instance, while rhyming skill predicts 
learning to read in English (Bradley & Bryant, 1983), it is a poor predictor of 
subsequent reading achievement in German (Wimmer, Landerl, & Schneider, 
1994) and Dutch (de Jong & van der Leij, 1999), where rapid naming ability 
accounts for larger proportions of unique variance in reading ability. 
Although there has been a burgeoning of research on dyslexia in different 
languages in recent years (Goulandris, 2003), cross-linguistic studies that 
directly compare dyslexia in English (about which we know a great deal) and 
dyslexia in a different language are still comparatively rare. Nonetheless, the 
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prevailing view is that the core phonological deficits of dyslexia are harder to 
detect in children who have learned to read in transparent orthographies such 
as German or Italian. (Vellutino et al., 2004, p. 17) 
While many researchers claim that the existence of ‘phonological’ problems at the 
pre-school age is the best predictor of reading difficulties, Scarborough (1990) 
asserts that pre-school children who later turn out to be dyslexic have a normal 
vocabulary but use a restricted syntax. In other words, she considers that dyslexics 
show early signs of non-phonological problems. 
Vellutino et al. (2004) recommend focusing on what works and what does not 
when it comes to teaching children with difficulties how to read, instead of trying 
to find out what their problems are – an approach whose net effect ‘would be to 
shift to intervention as the primary means for defining the disorder’ (p. 30).  
Perception – motor skill – neurology – genetics 
The early 1980s saw the start of work to further develop Orton’s theories. 
Geschwind, Behan and Galaburda (1985) argued, like Orton had done, that the 
primary cause of dyslexia is an abnormal ‘division of labour’ between the two 
hemispheres of the brain. They also agreed with him that dyslexia is most prevalent 
in boys and men. However, they did not consider genetic causes to be primary. 
They focused mainly on the higher prevalence of left-handedness and 
immunological diseases in dyslexics than in the general population. 
Since the specialisation of the brain hemispheres (which determines, among 
other things, hand preference) and the development of the immune system pass 
through critical stages at the same time in a foetus, these researchers assumed that 
abnormal physiological circumstances could be involved in both cases. In further 
work based on this hypothesis, special emphasis has been placed on the relative 
size of the planum temporale in the left and right hemisphere, respectively (the 
planum temporale is normally larger and more active in the left hemisphere; cf., 
e.g, Tønnessen, 1997b). New technology has also made it possible to study the 
activity (blood flow) of the planum temporale on either side of the brain (cf., e.g., 
Duane & Gray, 1991; Filipek, 1999; Pennington et al., 1999). 
Simos et al. (2002b) examined the brain activity of eight dyslexics aged between 
seven and seventeen, finding that their patterns of activity during reading differed 
from those of normal readers. However, after 80 hours of training their activity was 
more normal. No certain conclusions can be drawn from this finding, but it could 
indicate that pedagogical approaches can affect the way in which the brain 
operates. By analogy, it could then be assumed that the absence of stimulation or 
the wrong type of stimulation could give rise to problems; it is likely that young 
people are the most susceptible to influence in this respect. And yet there are also 
many indications that dyslexics will have to wrestle with their problems throughout 
their lives (Vellutino et al., 1996, 2000). Many training or treatment approaches do 
seem able to help, but do they primarily alleviate symptoms or do they 
permanently affect the causes of the problems? 
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Stein and Fowler (1985) made two interesting claims: that co-ordination at 
motor level of the two eyes is a problem among dyslexics; and that dyslexics’ eyes 
are not entirely stable during fixations. Subsequently, Stein and Walsh (1997) 
asserted that dyslexics also have problems with the magnocellular system, one of 
two main systems involved in vision (the other is the parvocellular one, centred on 
the pupil and the fovea, which is used during fixations to study details). The 
magnocellular system records wholes and movement. It determines, among other 
things, how the eyes should move about in a written text. It has since been claimed 
that there is a corresponding system in the auditory field. This means that it is 
possible to assert that the underlying causes of dyslexia are neurological in nature. 
 The difference between auditory and phonological difficulties is related to the 
fact that hearing is a general sense while phonology concerns the ability to 
distinguish and categorise language sounds. According to Eden and Zeffiro (1998), 
‘these perceptual and cognitive abnormalities arise from dysfunction of a neural 
system common to both’. Galaburda and Livingstone (1993) also support the idea 
that dyslexics’ magnocellular system operates abnormally in both the visual and 
auditory fields. In the latter field, this entails problems processing and perceiving 
high-speed information (something that several others have also asserted, but using 
other causal explanations; cf., e.g., Tallal). Stein and Walsh (1997) claim that both 
the visual, the auditory and the motor systems are affected: ‘the evidence is 
consistent with an increasingly sophisticated account of dyslexia that does not 
single out either phonological or visual or motor deficits. Rather, temporal 
processing in all three systems seems to be impaired. Dyslexics may be unable to 
process fast incoming sensory information adequately in any domain’ (p. 147).  
Since the 1980s, a steadily increasing number of sophisticated genetic studies of 
dyslexia have been carried out. One of the largest and best known was performed 
in Colorado, examining and comparing several thousand pairs of twins with and 
without reading difficulties (cf., e.g., DeFries et al., 1997). The study findings vary 
somewhat as regards the degree of heritability, but basically it has been concluded 
that genes and the environment are about equally important. Attempts have also 
been made to identify the key chromosomes, with above all numbers 1, 2, 3, 6 and 
15 being mentioned. These findings, however, are based on probability estimates 
with considerable margins of error. Given the complexity of reading skill, and 
hence of reading difficulties, it is a reasonable assumption that additional genes and 
chromosomes play a part. For reviews, see Grigorenko (2001) and Fisher and 
DeFries (2002). 
As mentioned, the first dyslexia researchers assumed that reading difficulties 
were hereditary. The rapid and extensive developments seen in medical genetics 
over the past 20–30 years give reason for hope that the key to early diagnosis will 
be found in that field. This could make early prevention and tailor-made 
interventions possible – but perhaps optimism has been excessive, for several 
reasons. First, there is a mismatch between imprecise definitions of dyslexia (see 
above) and the much more sophisticated and accurate methods and instruments 
used in genetics. This makes any results uncertain and subject to a variety of 
interpretations. Second, since reading is a complex skill, it is likely that several 
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genes and chromosomes are involved to the extent that dyslexia is a hereditary 
condition. And third, the effects of genes and the environment in this specific case 
are uncertain. Certain characteristics, such as blood type, are hereditarily 
determined for life, but many others are determined by an interplay between the 
genes and the environment. And the recent branch of science called epigenetics 
suggests that the environment is in fact able to modify genes and their functions in 
the body.  
 It could be that other paths can take us further in terms of prediction, prevention 
and early, customised intervention. Heikki Lyytinen and his colleagues in 1993 
began a large project based on the heritability of dyslexia. A large group of 
pregnant women were asked whether they or the fathers of their children had (or 
had had) reading difficulties. If one or both parents did, their children qualified for 
the study group. If neither parent had ever had any reading difficulties, their 
children instead qualified for the control group. Obviously, the definitions of 
reading difficulties underlying the assessment of whether the parents had had such 
difficulties represent a point of unclarity and uncertainty in this project, but the 
study design is still promising. Starting when the children were six months old, a 
series of tests were carried out. These were followed up frequently using age-
appropriate tests until the children were of school age. Both in terms of the number 
of participants, the number of tests and the duration of the study, this is one of the 
largest projects carried out in dyslexia research. It is also one of the projects that 
have yielded the largest number of publications, and it has produced a number of 
findings increasing the predictability and preventability of reading and writing 
difficulties (cf., e.g., Lyytinen, 1995, 2002; Lyytinen et al., 2007). 
Evaluation – intervention 
I have chosen to use the words ‘evaluation’ and ‘intervention’. Others prefer terms 
such as ‘diagnosis’ and ‘treatment’, but they may evoke medical precision and 
effectiveness. The definition of dyslexia is relatively imprecise, which makes it 
harder to operationalise the conditions that must be met, and also to find effective 
interventions. Still, it is remarkable how much the various methods used have in 
common, even though the causal explanations underlying them are different. 
The past 30–40 years have seen the development of a series of new approaches 
to evaluating dyslexia. One of the best-known is the Bangor Dyslexia Test (Miles, 
1997), which – besides traditional reading tests – includes questions as to whether 
the person is left- or right-handed and whether any member of the person’s family 
has reading or writing difficulties. It is also tested whether the person has difficulty 
reciting the multiplication tables at a reasonable pace, whether the person has 
problems with tongue-twisters such as ‘spectroscopy’ and whether there are cases 
of letters being mixed up with each other. 
In the Phonological Assessment Battery (Frederickson et al., 1997), the reading 
of non-words is the most important component. One sub-test involves children 
being given three words (such as ‘sun’, ‘moon’ and ‘stone’) and asked to identify 
those that begin with the same sound. It is also tested how quickly the children can 
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name things and read numbers. In another sub-test, the children are to produce 
‘spoonerisms’: if told ‘Hong Kong’, they should respond with ‘Kong Hong’. The 
children’s ability to find rhyming words is tested for example by having them 
decide which words among those presented – say, ‘bone’, ‘book’ and ‘stone’ – 
rhyme with each other. 
The tests available have progressively become quite numerous. Another that 
particularly deserves mention is the Dyslexia Early Screening Test (Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 1995), which tests a range of motor skills – especially automatisation and 
co-ordination – claimed to be associated with later reading skill, on the assumption 
that the risk of reading difficulties can be determined to some extent at an early 
pre-school age. 
When it comes to interventions, Hinshelwood (1917) made the following claim: 
‘My long experience of congenital word-blindness has enabled me to give with 
confidence a much more hopeful prognosis […] viz. that in nearly all cases […] the 
children so affected with proper treatment and great perseverance can be taught to 
read’ (p. 90 f.). Hinshelwood used a ‘multisensory’ method, according to which the 
children should both see, hear and write the letters and words. Repetition and high-
volume training are also important in this context. His method was called 
Simultaneous Oral Spelling (SOS); it has quite a bit in common with the ‘look and 
say’ method of the Whole Language school of reading instruction. 
Orton (1937) claimed that ‘the best approach and the one which yields the best 
return for teaching efforts is to find the smallest possible unit which the child can 
handle and begin a gradual reconstruction of the sequences or series of the smallest 
units’. (p. 218). In essence, this is the same as proponents of the Phonics school of 
reading instruction claim to this day. Orton’s assistant Anna Gillingham further 
developed the treatment approach: ‘The technique in this book is based upon the 
constant use of association of all the following – how a letter or word looks, how it 
sounds and how the speech organs or the hand in writing feels when producing it’ 
(Gillingham & Stillman, 1969, p. 17). This is clearly rather consistent with 
Hinshelwood’s methods, and later studies have indeed shown that these methods 
are highly effective (Bryant & Bradley, 1985, p. 130 ff.). As regards the choice of 
words, emphasis is placed on finding a progression where the most frequent and 
simplest words are used initially, and where rarer and more complex words are 
introduced by stages. A further development of this method can be found in Miles  
(1998), The Bangor Dyslexia Teaching System. 
There has been much discussion about how and when the concept of phonemes 
should be presented in reading instruction. Many children find it hard to distinguish 
and identify phonemes in the stream of speech. Liberman (1973) studied 40 first-
year students (aged 6–7) and found that 50% of them could find the boundaries 
between syllables (e.g., ‘stu-dent’) but only 17% could identify the three phonemes 
of a simple word such as ‘sun’. According to Studdert-Kennedy (1991), ‘[i]t is a 
general rule of both phylogeny and ontogeny that complex structures evolve by 
differentiation of smaller structures from larger. Accordingly, we should not expect 
children to build words from phonemes as adults do: rather we should expect 
phonemes to emerge from words’ (p. 16). In other words, it is easier to begin with 
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wholes and split them up than to begin with the smallest elements and build larger 
wholes. The Whole Language school of reading instruction represents an extreme 
version of this position; there is some variation within this school, but many of its 
proponents put off teaching children to identify and recognise phonemes for a very 
long time (cf., e.g., Goodman, 1996). When it comes to the question of what 
‘language units’ are the most ‘natural’, it should also be noted, as mentioned 
above, that Goswami and Bryant (1990) focus on the intermediate level between 
syllables and sounds, namely on onsets and rimes. 
As regards interventions to prevent and remedy dyslexia, there are probably 
grounds for drawing a general conclusion to the effect that various versions of 
phonological training, repetition/‘overlearning’ and multisensory stimulation have 
been the most broadly used. However, there is some variation among the 
phonological approaches used. Adams (1990) notes the following about reading 
instruction in general: 
What if we restrict attention to the programs that are centered on phonics? 
Can we extract an operational definition of the endeavor from them? The 
answer is no or, at least, not easily. The problem is that there exist many, 
many such programs – each of Robert Aukerman’s books cite over 100. To 
be sure, a central tenet of each of these programs is that working knowledge 
of the letter-to-sound correspondences underlying our system of writing is 
key to proficient reading. Beyond that, however, they differ greatly. (p. 51 f.) 
Finally, when it comes to more untraditional and controversial methods, the 
Doman–Delacato method can be mentioned as an example. It was developed on the 
basis of neurological studies and theories. While it became very controversial in 
the context of dyslexia treatment, it remains in use to some extent in the treatment 
of certain other learning difficulties and neurological conditions. The idea was that 
dyslexia is due to abnormal development in parts of the brain, particularly the 
cerebellum (which Nicolson and Fawcett would later also associate with dyslexia). 
According to Doman and Delacato, those abnormal circumstances had arisen 
because the children had not gone through all stages of physical development in the 
right way. To attain ‘full neurological organization’, daily exercises including 
crawling, balancing, rhythmic movements, etc., were carried out for about a year 
(cf. Doman et al., 1960).  
A FINAL NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF DYSLEXIA 
In this chapter I have used a somewhat coarse division into ‘beginning’ and 
‘continuation’, mainly to pinpoint the origins – or beginnings – of dyslexia 
research and to emphasise the characteristics of this research during the 
development of a paradigm in the 1960s and 1970s – the continuation. However, 
this division also reflects a claim on my part that knowledge about the beginning is 
important not only to understand the continuation but also to discuss and challenge 
the existing paradigm. The steady increase in activity within dyslexia research has 
made it even more important to ask questions about where we should go from here 
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and what opportunities for new thinking and improvement are available to us. This 
requires us to ask a few fundamental questions and to examine and discuss 
alternatives – and that is precisely what I will try to do in this book.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CHALLENGES IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
From the turn of the century until the 1950s, it was commonly understood that 
dyslexia was a biologically determined condition. Perceptional and neurological 
anomalies were centrally featured in theories on the disorder. In the 1950s and 
1960s it became increasingly common to attribute reading and writing difficulties 
to inadequate or incomplete education. Beginning in the 1970s, many began to 
ascribe the cause of dyslexia to a ‘language disorder’ – and especially to a deficient 
phonological awareness (cf. Vellutino, 1979). As described in the first chapter, 
most theorists in this tradition have taken a cognitive approach to language. As in 
other areas of cognitive psychology, flow charts, cognitive models and related 
ideas have played a central role in the study of dyslexia. The ‘dual-route model’ is 
a typical example (cf. Coltheart, 1978; Coltheart, Curtis, Atkins, & Haller, 1993; 
Ellis, 1993; Marshall & Newcombe, 1973; Morton, 1979; Seymour & Porpodas, 
1980). These kinds of models have given us detailed information about the various 
sub-skills that constitute reading ability and, accordingly, about which sub-skills 
can create obstacles for individuals with dyslexia. However, when we try to use a 
cognitive approach to understanding why these individuals cannot accomplish all 
or some of the pertinent tasks, we see the limitations of this approach. Often, we 
seek explanations beyond it, looking, ultimately, for a biological explanation (e.g., 
Frith, 1997). If the field of cognitive psychology is to avoid the use of introspective 
methods, it must focus on the objective norms or rules for correct performance of 
cognitive tasks and not on subjective processes. In this manner, the cognitive 
approach will be more analytical, theoretical and logical than empirical. Cognitive 
psychology alone is not able to answer the question, ‘Why is it that some people 
have difficulty following some of the cognitive norms or rules?’  
 In this chapter we analyse how cognitive psychology defines and treats dyslexia. 
We will also show how behaviourism and connectionism can function as 
supplements in areas in which cognitive psychology has displayed weaknesses and 
limitations. 
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
Cognitive psychology is to a large extent a reaction to behaviouristic ‘black-box 
psychology’. For example, Morton and Frith (1994) proposed that we cannot 
understand autism without accepting a cognitive level between the biological and 
behavioural levels. Even though many cognitive psychologists would agree with 
this, the word ‘cognitive’ has taken on a wider definition than that which was 
originally intended within cognitive psychology. Morton and Frith apparently used 
CHAPTER 2 
20 
the term to encompass most psychological or mental phenomena – including 
emotions, experiences and fantasies – whereas cognitive psychologists have 
traditionally used the term exclusively for intellectual and rational activities. We 
will see later how it is problematic to use the term as broadly as Morton and Frith 
did.  
Traditionally, cognitive psychology has received important input from the fields 
of artificial intelligence and cognitive simulation. Two of the major players in these 
fields made this claim: ‘There is a growing body of evidence that the elementary 
information processes used by the human brain in thinking are highly similar to a 
subset of the elementary information processes that are incorporated in the 
instruction codes of […] computers’ (Simon & Newell, 1964, p. 282).  
It is important to recognise that there have been, and still are, differing opinions 
as to what cognitive psychology entails. For example, Battig (1975) made the 
following firm statement:  
What makes the current high popularity of cognition especially astounding is 
that even its most dedicated advocates seem unable to provide us with a clear 
or consistent definition of exactly what is meant by or encompassed under the 
cognitive label, or how it is to be distinguished from the allegedly non-
cognitive character of whatever is (or was) not described as cognitive 
psychology. (p. 195) 
H. Kreitler and S. Kreitler (1976) remarked that ‘the term “cognitive” has been 
used so widely that one might wonder whether there is anything in psychology that 
is not cognitive’ (p. 4). Despite conflicting opinions, a definite characteristic of 
cognition presents itself. Bechtel (1988) maintained that ‘as the cognitive paradigm 
developed, the idea that cognition involved the manipulation of symbols became 
increasingly central […] [The symbols] were enduring entities which could be 
stored in and retrieved from memory and transformed according to rules’ (p. 1). 
Mental representations and rules are highlighted as characteristic features in 
historical presentations of cognitive psychology (cf. Flanagan, 1991; Gardner, 
1985). ‘Computability’ is also a word that is often used; Von Eckardt (1993) 
referred to it in the following manner: ‘The starting point of computability is the 
idea of an effective procedure – a set of rules which tell us from moment to 
moment, precisely how to behave’ (p. 107). Further, it is worth mentioning the 
connection with computer science, on which Neisser (1976) elaborated:  
It was because the activities of the computer itself seemed in some ways akin 
to cognitive processes. Computers accept information, manipulate symbols, 
store items in ‘memory’ and retrieve them again, classify inputs, recognize 
patterns and so on […] . Indeed the assumptions that underlie most 
contemporary work on information processing are surprisingly like those of 
nineteenth century introspective psychology, though without introspection 
itself. (pp. 5 and 7) 
This last remark is important in light of the fact that there is some disagreement 
among cognitive psychologists concerning avoidance of the subjectivism in 
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introspective psychology. As Cohen (1977) put it, ‘We had a language to talk about 
what happened inside a man which was not a mentalistic introspective language, 
which was not hypothetical neurophysiology and which wasn’t simply a 
description of the visible behavior’ (p. 63). However, we can hardly avoid the 
introspective method if we expand the cognitive to include emotions and 
experiences as, for example, Morton and Frith (1994) have done.  
 Cognitive psychologists have tried to highlight the objectivity in their research 
by comparing cognitive processes to a computer program. Furthermore, the 
relationship between a computer program and computer hardware has been used to 
illustrate the relationship between the mind and the body. Knapp (1986) put forth 
that  
it was possible to speak of a hardware and a software level, a very appealing 
metaphor for many psychologists long perplexed by brain-behavior 
relationships. Ever since, the prevailing notion has been that the computer, 
for the first time, gave psychology the concepts needed in order to develop a 
science of cognition, one that could stand independently from the science of 
physiology. (p. 14).  
We will not take up the complicated mind–body problem here, but both research 
and everyday experience attest that this comparison fails on important points. In 
the case of humans, it is a fact that an organic injury to the brain can alter 
intellectual ability. It has also been shown that psychological problems can lead to 
permanent somatic damages. Yet, when we look at computers, a defect in computer 
hardware will rarely result in a defect to the software, even though damaged 
hardware will make it impossible to use the undamaged software. Along the same 
lines, damaged software will not normally cause permanent damage to the 
hardware. However, damaged software will make it impossible to use the 
undamaged hardware properly. This indicates that we must often define and solve 
problems related to learning and to other cognitive processes in a manner different 
from the way in which we define and solve problems that arise in computer 
hardware or software.  
In delimiting the cognitive realm it is useful to borrow some concepts and 
distinctions from Popper (1977). He identified three worlds: World 1, World 2 and 
World 3. World 1 is the physical reality, which we can verify or falsify with the 
help of our senses. World 2 is the inner, personal reality of emotions, fantasies, 
experiences and thought. It is this reality that introspective psychologists 
investigate. If the definition of the term ‘cognitive’ is expanded as Morton and 
Frith (1994) would have it, we would to a large extent be using introspective 
methods. World 3 can be examined with more objective methods; this reality is 
available for thought but not for the senses. Here we find, among other things, 
mathematics and truths of logic. The rules for grammar in languages are also found 
here. For example, the linguistics of Chomsky (1966) can basically be placed 
within this reality, which is very reminiscent of the Platonic realm of ideas. It is 
clear that Schnaitter (1986) placed cognitive psychology within the realm of World 
3 when he remarked that ‘the information-processing mechanisms proposed in 
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contemporary cognitive psychology are neither part of consciousness nor 
accessible to introspective scrutiny’ (p. 295). Von Eckardt (1995) believed that 
cognitive psychology attempts to find the answer to the question, ‘How does a 
normal, typical adult typically exercise his or her capacity […]?’ (p. 308). This can 
give the impression that cognitive psychology makes generalisations based on 
observations from World 2. What we understand to be correct and important in von 
Eckardt’s statement is that cognitive psychology has a normative character in the 
sense that it describes the normal, or correct, way to deal with a cognitive task 
(e.g., reading).  
The ‘dual-route’ model for reading (cf. Coltheart, 1978; Coltheart et al., 1993; 
Ellis, 1993; Marshall & Newcombe, 1973; Morton, 1979; Seymour & Porpodas, 
1980) must be placed primarily within World 3. The central feature of the model is 
its definition of what reading is – or should be. It points to two main ways of 
reading, each of which is made up of several sub-skills. It does not deal with causal 
analysis; that is, it does not imply that some skills are the cause of other skills. It is 
primarily a logical analysis that attempts to (a) determine which sub-skills 
constitute higher-order skills and (b) logically order these sub-skills. For example, 
grapheme–phoneme associations cannot be made if we have not first identified the 
grapheme and the phoneme. Grapheme identification and phoneme identification 
are, in other words, a logical necessity for grapheme–phoneme associations. 
Because the alphabet is man-made, we must explicitly learn the grapheme–
phoneme relationships. For example, when Liberman (1997) stated that it is not as 
natural to learn the written language as it is to learn the spoken language, this is a 
truism that follows from the definition of the alphabetic principle.  
In World 3, we find a logical decomposition of the skills that take place in 
World 1 or World 2. Bechtel (1988) explained that this is an important difference 
between cognitive psychology and connectionism (PDP): 
This decompositional strategy lies behind traditional cognitive models, which 
quite naturally (given the decompositional approach) construe information 
processing as a matter of manipulating symbols according to rules. […] But 
PDP models move radically away from this approach. Rather, the 
performance of the cognitive tasks is viewed as an ‘emergent’ product of 
quite different sorts of activity at the lower level. Components within the 
network send activating or deactivating signals to other components until the 
whole system settles into a stable state. It is the stable pattern of activation in 
the whole network that is then treated from a higher level as having a 
particular cognitive interpretation. (p. 146) 
Insofar as cognitive psychologists involve themselves in the logical decomposition 
in World 3, it is necessary for them to maintain a sequential and linear model. 
Connectionism, on the other hand, describes mental activity in World 2. Contrary 
to World 3, World 2 is located within time and space and, therefore, has room for 
parallel (or simultaneous) processing. In World 2, it is possible for connectionism 
to speak of emergent properties in a manner that is reminiscent of Gestalt 
psychology. The debate between cognitive psychology and connectionism in the 
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dual-route model (e.g. Coltheart et al., 1993; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989) 
would have been far more informative if the distinctions between World 2 and 
World 3 had been taken into account. In this way, it would have been possible to 
differentiate between what was empirical and what was logical in their models.  
COGNITIVE EXPLANATIONS? 
It is misleading to speak of ‘mental structure’ or ‘mental models’ as long as mental 
phenomena are assigned to World 2. Structures and models belong to World 3. 
Important questions in World 2 are, How do we follow the norms that are found in 
World 3? and Why do some people have difficulty following these norms?  
‘Flow charts’, ‘cognitive maps’ and similar ideas are important to cognitive 
psychology. However, these do not refer to causal relations. They do not say 
anything about which powers are pulling or pushing us from the start to the end of 
a process, or between ‘input’ and ‘output’. If we are driving to a destination, 
having a map does not by itself get us to our goal. Some do not reach the 
destination because they have misunderstood what the goal is; others believe that 
the goal is not attractive enough to warrant the journey. Still others may have 
problems following the map because they do not comprehend the principles on 
which the map is based. Some have engine problems; others drive off into a ditch 
before they reach the goal. If we are going to help those who do not reach the goal, 
it is necessary, but not sufficient, to know at which point they are having difficulty. 
We also have to know why they are having difficulty.  
A dual-route model with flow charts is useful because it can tell us which sub-
skills we achieve and which we do not. To help someone who has a reading 
difficulty, it is, obviously, important to know if the problem is one of identifying 
phonemes, one of connecting phonemes and graphemes, one of tying phonemes 
together, or something else. With the help of a detailed flow chart, one can pinpoint 
exactly which skills are being performed correctly or incorrectly. It is important to 
note that while doing this, we do not localise elements or describe structures that 
exist on the inner plane (World 2). We are only able to determine which skills are 
not being achieved according to the norm (World 3).  
A difficulty can be detected only in the realm of behaviour (World I) – first and 
foremost by recording the amount of time required and the number of mistakes 
made. If we begin to take into account mental factors (World 2), we risk attempting 
to explain something that is complicated (behaviour) with the help of something 
that is even more complicated (mental activity). It would seem that Bolles (1983) 
was correct when he said, ‘Much of modern cognitive psychology seems to have 
much less interest in behavior as such and in the explanation of behavior than it has 
in the understanding of internal processes for their own sake’ (p. 35).  
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF COGNITIVE TREATMENT 
Skinner (1986) made this assertion:  
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The appeal to cognitive states and processes is a version, which could well be 
responsible for much of our failure to solve problems. We need to change our 
behavior and we can do so only by changing our physical and social 
environments. We chose the wrong path at the very start when we suppose 
that our goal is to change the ‘minds and hearts of men and women’ rather 
than the world in which they live. (p. 89f.)  
What characterises a cognitive treatment? Cognitive psychologists often use terms 
that belong to World 2, such as ‘awareness’ and ‘metacognition’. They imply that 
we can monitor and control our internal processes according to the norms and rules 
of World 3. If the treatment of dyslexia is based on this approach, we come upon a 
problem that Skinner (1986) referred to: how can we alter the inner realm of 
another person? Individual differences and lack of opportunity for observation 
make this task problematic. Skinner did not say that the task was impossible, but he 
believed that time and energy are more efficiently used by concentrating on 
changes in behaviour (Skinner, 1984). Is not change in behaviour also the ultimate 
goal of cognitive psychology? Why does a deficit of some sort occur in, for 
example, phonological awareness? Is it an ability that is lacking, one that must be 
built from the bottom up? Or are the abilities there, but requiring knowledge of 
how they are put to use? Metacognition involves the idea of rising to a level above 
the cognitive processes in order to view and control them from the outside. If it is 
true that the cognitive processes occur in modules, as Fodor (1983) claimed, this 
kind of superior consciousness and control would be problematic. Is there a module 
which monitors, unites and co-ordinates all the other modules? In any case, this 
kind of approach places great demands on abstraction and concentration abilities. If 
a person has difficulty with cognitive tasks in one area (e.g., phonological tasks), it 
would be reasonable to assume that he or she would have even greater difficulty 
with metacognitive tasks in the same area. If metacognitive knowledge of 
phonology were introduced before phonology proper, and the method succeeded, it 
could be an indication that the students did not really have the fundamental 
difficulties we thought. Perhaps the problem was that the students simply were not 
using the abilities they possessed. If these abilities do exist, then the teacher should 
function as a ‘midwife’, in the sense that he or she assists in the ‘birth’ of the 
abilities. But what is the teacher to do if the required abilities in a specific area do 
not exist? Schnaitter (1986) presented the problem thus: ‘Suppose that Jones 
stammers whenever he has to report to his boss. But over the weekend he has read 
a book on the power of positive thinking and enters Monday’s meeting having 
resolutely made up his mind not to stammer. Yet he stammers anyway’ (p. 312).  
Premature metacognition is not the only thing that can create difficulties for the 
weakest students. Von Eckardt (1993) stated, ‘The human cognitive capacities are 
sufficiently autonomous from other aspects of mind (such as affect and personality) 
that, to a large extent, they can be successfully studied in isolation’ (p. 312). This 
kind of modular thinking (cf. Fodor, 1983) makes it difficult to find a connection 
between learning on the one hand and motivation, stimulation and reward on the 
other.  
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Both research and practical teaching experience indicate that teaching 
programmes with a cognitive element can be very effective for individuals with 
dyslexia (cf. Hatcher, Hulme, & Ellis, 1994; Lundberg, Frost & Petersen, 1988). 
However, we also find elements of other theories of learning in these teaching 
programmes. This makes it difficult to determine which effects are due to cognitive 
elements. In his presentation and analysis of teaching programmes for students 
with dyslexia, Thomson (1990) wrote that, among other things,  
a further agreed component of teaching a dyslexic is the idea of over-learning 
and over-teaching. Due to attentional, memorial and other difficulties, the 
dyslexic will need the same material presented over and over again using 
different modalities and tasks. He will not deduce or ‘catch’ the rules unless 
they are continually reinforced. (p. 208)  
Here we encounter the behaviouristic terms ‘over-learning’ and ‘reinforce’. They 
are difficult to explain on a cognitive basis. It would seem that these methods are 
used for more cognitive effects (e.g., ‘catching the rules’). When cognitive 
psychologists use computer-assisted learning programmes, there seem to be 
comparable effects. Great amounts of training not only lead to automaticity but 
may also lead to understanding (cf. Wise, Olson, & Ring, 1997).  
Thomson (1990) continued by adding that ‘although authors differ slightly in 
their emphasis, most agree that some form of multi-sensory learning is required. 
Multi-sensory learning involves the integration of visual, auditory, tactile or 
kinesthetic modes, as in associating letters with sounds in writing’ (p. 208). When 
this kind of element is woven into a cognitive training programme, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to determine which effects can be attributed to its cognitive 
elements.  
Researchers working within the cognitive tradition have recently found reason 
to question cognitive treatment procedures and effects (cf. Blachman, 1997; Olson, 
Wise, Johnson, & Ring, 1997; Torgesen, Wagner & Rashotte, 1997). Aaron and 
Joshi (1992) put forth that ‘modern research has cast much doubt upon the 
usefulness of learning rules for reading and spelling’ (p. 131).  
BEHAVIOURISTIC AND CONNECTIONISTIC TREATMENT 
On the question of the purportedly rule-based nature of language, Skinner (1986) 
reminded us that  
until the time of the Greeks, no one seems to have known that there were 
rules of grammar, although people spoke grammatically […] . But cognitive 
psychologists insist that speakers and listeners must discover rules for 
themselves. One authority, indeed, has defined speaking as ‘engaging in a 
rule-governed form of intentional behavior’. […] But there is no evidence 
that rules play any part in the behavior of the ordinary speaker. (p. 88)  
Here Chomsky (1966) would protest, together with the majority of cognitive 
psychologists. They are correct in maintaining that we need rules, but only as 
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norms within World 3. We need these primarily after we have taken action – in 
order to see if we have made an error. There can also arise instances of doubt that 
make us consult the rules before we have completed a plan. Connectionists have 
developed computer programs showing that it is both possible and natural to 
execute learning as well as performance without the use of rules. Both word 
recognition and past-tense acquisition can, for example, be explained without 
recourse to rules (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982, 
1986).  
In its view of rules as opposed to laws, connectionism has more in common with 
behaviourism than with cognitivism. Rumelhart (1984) noted,  
It has seemed to me for some years now that the ‘explicit rule’ account of 
language and thought was wrong. It has seemed that there must be a unified 
account in which so-called rule-governed and exceptional cases were dealt 
with by a unified underlying process – a process which produces rule-like 
and rule exception behavior through the application of a single process. […] 
Both the rule-like and the non-rule like behavior is a product of the 
interaction of a very large number of ‘sub-symbolic’ processes. (p. 60)  
Connectionism is often classified as a form of cognitive psychology (cf. Flanagan, 
1991; Gardner, 1985). However, if we look upon mental representations and rules 
as central characteristics of cognitive psychology (e.g., Bechtel, 1988; Flanagan 
1991; Gardner, 1985), it is more natural to treat connectionism in conjunction with 
behaviourism. Both behaviourism and connectionism are most concerned with 
World 1. Both emphasise that learning occurs primarily through changes to the 
nervous system. Neither behaviourism nor connectionism takes into account the 
difficult questions concerning the causal connections among the behavioural, 
cognitive and biological realms that lie in Morton and Frith’s (1994) model. 
Because behaviourism and connectionism do not distinguish sharply between the 
cognitive and the biological, it is easier for them to explain how we learn ‘through 
the body’ and through practice. For example, when we learn to swim or ride a 
bicycle, we learn skills that are absorbed into the body. If instruction were to begin 
with a theoretical introduction to the body’s buoyancy in water and gravity’s 
effects upon the cyclist, we could not ensure success in the execution of these 
tasks. If the intellect is engaged first and remains dominant, it is probable that 
learning will be inhibited and that performance will be both rigid and uncertain.  
Both behaviourism (especially Skinner’s version) and connectionism are well 
suited to explaining the gradual improvement that occurs through repetition and 
training – especially through trial, error and gradual adjustment. It is also an 
advantage that these schools can explain the connection between learning on the 
one hand and motivation, stimulation and reward on the other. Behaviourism and 
connectionism can lead to teaching programmes that are less intellectualistic than 
those in cognitive psychology. As a conceptual framework, the latter seems more 
able to explain the flexibility, the subtlety and the ability to learn from experience, 
as well as the resilience to damage, that we see in real-life readers (cf. Rumelhart, 
Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986). Cognitivism operates with a near-
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absolute binary division between right and wrong, normal and abnormal, on and 
off, 1 and 0, whereas behaviourism and connectionism can better account for the 
gradual shading of one condition into another.  
Abilities, competence and skills, as defined here, are to a great extent based on 
what Reber (1993) called implicit learning and tacit knowledge. It is learning that 
takes place, and knowledge that exists, largely independently of awareness of both 
the process of acquisition and the content of the knowledge so acquired. Classic 
examples of this are the acquisition of language and the process of socialisation 
whereby individuals come to speak their mother tongue and become inculcated 
with their society’s norms, respectively, without conscious knowledge of the 
underlying principles that guide their behaviour.  
A COMBINATION OF TRADITIONS 
Aaron and Joshi (1992) wrote, ‘Regardless of the method and setting chosen, it 
should be remembered that reading is a skill and, like any other skill, improves 
only with practice. In other words, to become a skilled reader, children have to read 
and read’ (p. 122).  
We believe that the term ‘skill’ requires a more closely defined and central place 
when it comes to discussion of learning and performance in reading. Learning to 
read involves something beyond learning to break the alphabetic code and to make 
correct grapheme–phoneme associations. What do we mean when we say that we 
can read? It does not mean that we can read all words with equal ease and 
certainty. We will always be able to read familiar words more quickly and with 
more certainty and fewer errors than we read unfamiliar words. One defining 
feature of skilled reading is being able to tackle both familiar and unfamiliar 
words.  
Every skill presupposes an ability to switch between awareness and 
automaticity. The skill of walking is, to a large extent, characterised by 
automaticity when we move in one direction over an even surface, without turns or 
traffic factors. If we begin to think about walking, it is most likely that our 
movements become slower and more unsure. If the path is uneven, winding and 
traffic-laden, we must use more awareness to avoid a misstep or an accident. This 
example shows that three types of problems can arise: (a) insufficient automaticity, 
(b) insufficient awareness, and (c) insufficient ability to switch between the two in 
a flexible and expedient manner (cf. Tønnessen, 1997).  
Automaticity is an important term within both behaviourism and connectionism. 
With regard to reading, it is the principal component of efficient decoding. For 
achieving maximum speed, minimal mistakes, maximum confidence and minimal 
effort in the decoding process, automaticity is a necessity. This liberates the 
greatest amount of effort, which can then be used in understanding the text.  
We have seen that awareness is a central term within cognitive psychology. 
However, it has been used in a rather imprecise way. Reber (1995), in fact, pointed 
out that it has a wide range of meanings: ‘The term has a long history which has 
found it being used to refer to a wide range of subjective phenomena from simple, 
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primitive detection of very weak stimuli to deep understanding of complex 
cognitive and affective events’ (p. 79).  
Because it refers to subjective phenomena, awareness belongs to the realm of 
World 2. As mentioned, it is difficult to see how we can describe and explore this 
world in an objective way. It is also difficult to see how we can draw a boundary 
between World 1 and World 2 without hampering the ‘communication’ between 
them. In this respect, connectionism would seem to offer a more realistic and 
fruitful solution than cognitive psychology, as the former does not draw any clear-
cut line of demarcation between the mental and the biological. One unanswered 
question, however, is whether connectionists make room for consciousness and 
awareness in a traditional sense.  
One series of studies has indicated that awareness is necessary for decoding (cf. 
Adams, 1990; Liberman & Shankweiler, 1979; Lundberg. Olofsson & Wall, 1980; 
Olson, Forsberg, Wise, & Rack, 1994; Share & Stanovich, 1995). Automaticity is 
also necessary for reading (cf. Fawcett & Nicolson, 1994; Nicolson & Fawcett, 
1990; Yap & van der Leij, 1993a, 1993b, 1994). However, neither of these is 
sufficient.  
An important characteristic of good reading skills is the flexible shift between 
automaticity and awareness. During text reading, this corresponds to the alternation 
between familiar and unfamiliar words. Referring to computers that are able to 
‘read’ with the help of scanners and synthetic speech, some may put forth the idea 
that we do not need awareness. Perhaps, in the future, cybernetic programs will 
make these reading machines just as self-governed and self-directed as humans. 
But we cannot put these programs into a human! Why should we try, when we can 
complete the task so well with the help of awareness?  
OPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
If cognitive psychology is to avoid the introspective method, it must concentrate on 
standards for correct performance of the cognitive tasks. This primarily involves a 
logical analysis of the tasks. If we search in the mental realm for an explanation as 
to why individuals fail to meet those standards, we cannot avoid the introspective 
method. If we are going to explain varying abilities in learning and performing, 
behaviourism and connectionism are better platforms.  
In a treatment context, cognitive methods risk placing too great a burden on 
students’ intellectual skills. The sharp division between cognitive skills and 
activities on the one hand and emotions, drives and needs on the other makes it 
difficult to integrate motivation in the learning process. In this case, behaviourism 
and connectionism have clear advantages, in that they do not perceive a sharp 
division between the cognitive and the biological. Furthermore, it is fortunate that 
they place so much emphasis on the behavioural level, as it is reading behaviour 
that all are engaged in improving!  
Reading is a skill that requires a flexible and functional combination of 
automaticity and awareness. Behaviourism and connectionism seem to provide the 
most adequate explanation of automatisation. Cognitive psychology has provided 
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important information on which sub-skills are needed for reading. However, many 
questions remain when it comes to awareness and metacognition, which ensure that 
the processes occur in accordance with the norms for correct performance. Can 
cognitive psychology describe and explore these mental processes without recourse 
to introspective methods? 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEFINING ‘DYSLEXIA’ 
INTRODUCTION 
Back in 1995 I took it as an encouraging sign that the very first issue of Dyslexia – 
an International Journal for Research and Practice included an article by Elaine 
Miles that asks the question, ‘Can there be a single definition of dyslexia?’ (Miles, 
1995). The history of science includes many instances in which the formulation of 
daring or fundamental questions opens up new lines of development. The 
probability of this happening as a result of Miles’s article is only increased by the 
fact that the author balances her criticisms with a good measure of constructive 
thinking, and that she invites further discussion instead of precluding it: ‘The 
description given in this case would obviously be more tentative as its purpose 
would be to start a discussion’. 
Miles’s article may perhaps best be understood as one of several recent attempts 
at questioning the paradigm that reading research has been operating within. The 
extensive debate that the Orton Dyslexia Society has had concerning the question 
of definition would be another example. When such an influential organisation 
poses so many fundamental questions, then the chances are high that we will see 
some effect in our research and practice (cf. Lyon, 1995). This chapter aims to 
suggest guidelines and criteria for how we should formulate and evaluate 
definitions of ‘dyslexia’, and carries the conclusion that proposed definitions 
should be formulated and treated as hypotheses.  
DIVERSE NEEDS AND PURPOSES 
Miles (1995) refers among others to Elliott (1990), who notes: ‘What is needed in 
Britain is an agreed definition of specific learning difficulties which carries some 
legal force’. If we are to achieve the ideal of equality under the law, we need some 
permanence, we need to make sure that the laws are clear, and that there is a 
consensus as to which children are to be labelled ‘dyslexic’. Moreover, teachers 
will need to be given definitions of reading disorders that tell them specifically 
what they should be looking for in a child’s reading pattern. Definitions that 
depend on complicated tests and procedures are of little use to teachers. 
In addition we may mention that there is an ongoing power struggle, or at least a 
set of conflicting interests, transcending the needs of the various professional 
groups. Stanovich (1992) notes:  
Some definitions serve scientific purposes and can be judged by research 
criteria. But definitions of learning disabilities serve other purposes as well. 
They have been used by school personnel as a mechanism to leverage school 
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services for low achieving students. Additionally, definitions have been used 
by parents’ groups as advocacy tools to force legislative recognition and to 
direct attention and resources to certain groups of children. […] The highly 
restrictive definitions of the research community are resisted by school 
personnel, who often want the broadest definition possible in order to allow 
themselves discretion in providing services for children with generic school 
learning problems. (p. 279) 
Science must seek truth. But that does not mean that it should remove itself 
completely from practical concerns. Yet in the long run, truth is both practical and 
useful. Research must not merely buy into the definition that is most current, for 
there is never any guarantee that the majority is right. Research needs to show 
creativity and critical good sense. Many people would concur with Fletcher et al. 
(1989) when they claim that  
Careful analyses of the criteria used to define and select children with reading 
disabilities are urgently needed. There is a persistent tendency on the part of 
researchers and professionals working with this population to accept 
traditional definitions of reading disability based on consensus or 
professional opinion without examination of the assumptions or empirical 
characteristics of various definitions. (p. 334) 
The terminology used in reading research has been both unclear and inconsistent 
(see for example Kavale and Forness, 1992; Lyon, 1995; Stanovich, 1994). 
Stanovich (1994) seems to feel a frustration at the lack of clarity in the use of the 
term ‘dyslexia’ when he notes: ‘[…] “dyslexia” carries with it so many empirically 
unverified connotations and assumptions that many researchers and practitioners 
prefer to avoid the term […] (p. 579). He goes on to ask a question:  
Thus the research literature provides no support for the notion that we need a 
scientific concept of dyslexia separate from other, more neutral, theoretical 
terms such as reading disabled, poor reader, less-skilled, etc. Yes, there is 
such a thing as dyslexia if by dyslexia we mean poor reading. But if this is 
what we mean, it appears that the term dyslexia no longer does the 
conceptual work that we thought it did. (p. 588) 
Lyon (1995) claims: ‘Despite the significant role that a definition should play in 
the scientific and clinical understanding of dyslexia, the field has constructed 
numerous vague, ambiguous, and non-validated descriptions of the disorder’ (p. 4). 
Here we find a major cause of the disparate findings concerning the extent and 
cause of dyslexia. The bewildering varieties of terminology make it difficult to 
compare the results one researcher arrives at with the results another researcher has 
obtained. And fuzzy definitions also create problems in diagnostic practice. 
Establishing a clear and consistent terminology is one of the most practical and 
useful tasks a science can perform. 
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TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
There are a great many definitions of ‘dyslexia’. The differences among them are 
not merely verbal; on the contrary, they also exhibit a great variety of ways of 
constructing definitions and of purposes for doing so. In an earlier article 
(Tønnessen, 1995), I tried to show that the definitions of ‘dyslexia’ may be 
grouped according to three principles on which they are constructed: (1) the 
symptom principle, (2) the causality principle, and (3) the prognosis principle. 
Most of the definitions that have been offered are a combination of (1) and (2). 
When it is claimed, for example, that one of the most important characteristics of 
dyslexia is persistence of dyslexic problems despite pedagogical assistance (e.g. 
Frith, 1981; Berninger and Abbott, 1994), then this would be a definition based on 
the third principle, the prognosis of the disorder. This principle could also be 
termed the ‘effect principle’, because it defines the disorder on the basis of the 
effect of the treatment. These effects may be seen at either the level of symptoms 
or the level of causes, but definitions based on prognosis are still not merely 
combinations of definitions based on the principles in (1) and (2). Because most of 
the proffered definitions have been based mainly on symptoms and causes of the 
disorder, I will briefly present and discuss the most well-known definitions based 
on principles (1) and (2). 
The symptom principle 
I use the term ‘symptom’ here in its broadest sense, referring to observable and/or 
measurable signs of underlying conditions and processes. When we describe 
reading behaviour or reading achievement without reference to their underlying 
causes, then we are at the symptom level. The most important symptom-based 
definitions are the ‘discrepancy definitions’. 
Most definitions of ‘dyslexia’ refer to a discrepancy between observed and 
expected achievement (see for example Shaywitz, Fletcher, & Shaywitz, 1995). 
The expected achievement is usually based on the pupil’s IQ. Stanovich (1994) 
writes that  
The critical assumption that was reified in these definitions – in almost total 
absence of empirical evidence – was that degree of discrepancy from IQ was 
meaningful: that the reading difficulties of the reading-disabled child with 
reading-IQ discrepancy (termed specific reading retardation in the classical 
investigation of Rutter and Yule, 1975) were etiologically and neurologically 
distinct from those characterizing the reading-disabled child without IQ 
discrepancy (termed general reading backwardness in the Rutter and Yule, 
1975 study). (p. 581)  
After examining a series of studies, Stanovich concludes: ‘There is no indication 
that the nature of processing within the word recognition module differs at all for 
poor readers with and without IQ-discrepancy’ (p. 587). Several recent studies 
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have also come to similar conclusions (Fletcher, 1992; Fletcher et al., 1994; Olson 
et al., 1989; Siegel, 1989; Shaywitz et al., 1992). 
Another type of symptom-based discrepancy definitions, which I find somewhat 
less problematical, are those that are based on a discrepancy between reading and 
listening comprehension (see for example Aaron, 1989). Yet even here I see some 
problems. First of all, this definition does not allow accurate and reliable 
measurements that make it possible to compare precisely these two modes of 
understanding texts. Secondly, the point of the definition would seem to be the 
assumption that the only difference between listening comprehension and reading 
comprehension lies in the word-identification process. A discrepancy between 
them should therefore be due to a deficient word-identification skill. This inference 
is problematical, however, since oral communication contains information that is 
not available in a text, such as intonation and prosody. A third problem with this 
definition is that some studies suggest that dyslexics do not solely have problems 
with written language, but with spoken language as well (see for example Johnson, 
1994; Scarborough, 1990). 
The discrepancy definition that would seem to be the least problematical is that 
based on the discrepancy between reading age (RA) and chronological age (CA). 
But the problem with this type of definition is that it does not define a closed 
group: the group can vary radically as to type of symptom and cause. How 
heterogeneous the group is depends on how broadly the reading tests that are used 
to define the RA are designed. The size of the group depends on how big a 
discrepancy between RA and CA one chooses as the cut-off point. 
Lyon (1995) claims that ‘These difficulties in single word decoding are often 
unexpected in relation to age and other cognitive abilities’ (p. 15). Statements such 
as ‘unexpected underachievement’ and the like are often found in articles based on 
discrepancy definitions. I think these expressions are unfortunate, because it is 
often our lack of knowledge that makes the underachievement ‘unexpected’. We 
may be lacking diagnostic information about the ‘unexpectedly’ poor reader, or 
perhaps our field has not gained enough insight into the causes of dyslexia. 
The causality principle 
The difference between a symptom and its cause is often arbitrary. Geschwind and 
Galaburda (1987) claim, for example, that an elevated level of testosterone during 
certain weeks of gestation can cause abnormal brain lateralisation, which in turn 
can cause learning difficulties and left-handedness. In this model, one could say 
that abnormal lateralisation is a symptom of too much testosterone during 
pregnancy. I think, however, that we should reserve the term ‘symptom’ for the 
final link in the causal chain – in this case, learning difficulty and left-handedness. 
 The most common definition based on the causality principle is the ‘definition 
by exclusion’. The World Federation of Neurology, for example, defines ‘dyslexia’ 
as ‘a disorder manifested by difficulty in learning to read despite conventional 
instruction, adequate intelligence, and sociocultural opportunity. It is dependent 
upon fundamental cognitive disabilities which are frequently of constitutional 
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origin’ (cf. Critchley and Critchley, 1978). A great many studies of dyslexia have 
done their sampling by excluding pupils who did not meet these criteria. At root in 
this definition is an assumption that these factors are not the cause of dyslexia. 
There is a serious deficiency, however, in this line of reasoning. Even if we assume 
that dyslexia is of constitutional origin, this does not disallow the fact that there are 
some dyslexics who have grown up in a pedagogically or socially impoverished 
environment, or who have lower–than-normal intelligence. Originally, these groups 
were excluded on purely methodological grounds, in an attempt to make sure that 
the condition being studied was not caused by an impoverished environment or 
deficient intelligence. But by excluding these groups from the sample, we have 
given the sample a lamentable bias. Serious objections to exclusionary definitions 
have been raised, on both theoretical and empirical grounds (see for example 
Fletcher & Morris, 1986; Moats & Lyon, 1993; Stanovich, 1993). 
There are many studies which indicate that dyslexia has a constitutional origin 
(e.g. Cardon et al., 1994; Galaburda, 1991; Hynd & Semrud-Clikeman, 1989; 
Wood et al., 1991). In my opinion, however, causal factors should not be included 
in the definition until such time as they have been precisely described and 
thoroughly verified. I do not think any of the causal explanations we have today 
meet this criterion. In order to avoid unnecessarily constricting the research into the 
aetiology of dyslexia, it is important that our definitions are based solely on 
symptoms. 
A great many studies show an association between dyslexia and an impairment 
in phonological processing ability (see for example Adams, 1990; Brady & 
Shankweiler, 1991; Gough, Ehri, & Treiman, 1992; Liberman & Shankweiler, 
1979; Liberman, Shankweiler, & Liberman, 1989; Lundberg, Olofsson, & Wall, 
1980; Olson, Wise, & Rack, 1994; Share and Stanovich, 1995; Stanovich, 1993; 
Vellutino, Scanlon, & Tanzman, 1994; Wagner & Torgesen, 1987). It is often 
unclear whether the phonological anomalies are considered as being symptoms or 
causes. Lyon (1995), for example, claims that reading difficulties are ‘usually 
reflecting insufficient phonological processing’ (p. 9). Here it seems to me that he 
is claiming that the phonological deficit is the cause of the reading problems. 
Despite the wealth of data indicating an association, I still feel that this association 
should be treated as a hypothesis that should be made more precise and formally 
verified before it is brought into a definition of ‘dyslexia’. 
CAN WE DEFINE ‘DYSLEXIA’? 
Miles (1995) asks the question, ‘Can there be a single definition of dyslexia?’ This 
question needs to be treated both theoretically and empirically. For example, there 
are studies indicating that the symptoms can vary from person to person, and also 
from situation to situation for the same person (see for example Moats, 1994). 
Moreover, if one feels that dyslexia is a syndrome consisting of a series of more or 
less vague symptoms, then it will be very difficult to arrive at a precise definition 
of the disorder. This will also be the case if it is true, as claimed by Ellis (1993) 
and others, that ‘reading backwardness seems to be a graded thing more like 
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obesity than measles. We cannot in any simple way divide the population into 
those who are dyslexics and those who are not, so it would seem unlikely that there 
will exist any symptom or sign which will qualitatively distinguish dyslexics from 
non dyslexics’ (p. 111). (See for example Shaywitz & Shaywitz, 1994; Stanovich 
& Siegel, 1994.) 
Why do some researchers feel that dyslexics and normal readers differ only in 
the degree of ability, while other researchers feel that there is an essential 
difference between these readers? Why do some claim that dyslexics can be 
delimited as a group, with a clear set of characteristics, while others claim that this 
is impossible? The reason for the disagreement is in part empirical: they have 
discovered different patterns in their findings. But why have they found different 
patterns? One reason is that they have been focusing on different things. Another 
reason is that they employ different assessment procedures and instruments, and 
that they sample in different ways. All of these differences can in part be traced 
back to the variety of definitions of ‘dyslexia’ that the researchers have been using. 
Empirical facts and theories, in my opinion, are so intimately woven together that 
we can never decide which theory is right solely on the basis of one of them. In this 
article I hope to make the case that theories and empirical findings ought to be 
bound together by treating any definition of ‘dyslexia’ as a hypothesis. 
WHAT TYPES OF DEFINITIONS? 
Any attempt at defining something raises many theoretical and in particular logical 
issues. We are able to examine only a few of the more fundamental of these. In the 
classical tradition from Plato and Aristotle to the early Wittgenstein (Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus), any term can be defined by a finite list of criterial features, 
so that any member of the class displays these features and non-members do not. 
The later Wittgenstein (Philosophische Untersuchungen), and a series of 
subsequent philosophers, logicians, linguists and psychologists have distanced 
themselves from the classic view of definitions. Instead, they have emphasised the 
fact that categories in the real world tend to have fuzzy boundaries and blend into 
one another. Wittgenstein claimed that objects which share the same name 
(normally) exhibit a ‘family resemblance’; that is, they do not share one or more 
definitive characteristics, but rather a network of resemblances, like persons whose 
faces share features characteristic of a family. In logic, this view has been 
deepened and systematised in the field of ‘fuzzy set logic’, which deals with 
degrees of membership in a class (see for example Zadeh, 1975). In psychology, 
we find something similar in Rosch and Lloyd (1978), who claim that words and 
concepts are best defined and learned through the use of examples (‘stereotypes’ 
and ‘prototypes’). From an anthropological point of view (e.g. Geertz, 1983) we 
find the notion that the possibility remains that the most crucial questions about 
categorisation may continue to elude cognitive–scientific methods. 
Of course it is difficult to know to what degree these questions can be answered 
theoretically or empirically. It seems, however, that the classical thinking about 
definitions works best with natural phenomena. Anything properly termed ‘gold’, 
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for example, has an atomic weight of 197 and a melting point of 1063C. Terms 
used for man-made phenomena, for example ‘democracy’, are less amenable to 
classical definitions. Even though this difference between naturally occurring and 
man-made phenomena is useful, it does not solve all the problems. For example, it 
is debatable whether the way in which we divide the spectrum of visible light (red, 
blue, etc.) is natural or man-made (see for example Berlin & Kay, 1969; Heider, 
1972; Sahlins, 1976). To what degree other psychological phenomena are natural 
or man-made is also a matter of dispute. Behaviourism, for example, has tried to 
find a maximum of natural phenomena in psychology. Because many of the classic 
versions of cognitive psychology have been based on the model of the computer, 
we find that many of the central terms used in this school are amenable to classical 
definition. Connectionism, however, has preferred a more ‘fuzzy logic’ type of 
definition based on stereotypes and prototypes (cf. Flanagan, 1991). 
Miles (1995) claims that ‘[…] “description” may be a better term than 
“definition” […]’ (p. 37). Well, that would depend on how we define ‘definition’! 
It is common practice to speak of a term’s meaning as one thing, and its reference 
as something separate (see for example Lyons, 1977). ‘Meaning’ is a linguistic 
phenomenon, ‘reference’ is not. If I am to provide the meaning of the word 
‘bachelor’, I do so by saying that it is equivalent to the meaning of another 
linguistic expression, in this case, ‘unmarried man’. This is called an ‘intentional 
definition’. The word’s reference, on the other hand, is the class of all unmarried 
men. An ‘extentional definition’ consists of a list of all the concrete examples that 
fit the category (see for example Salmon, 1973). Let us say that after performing an 
empirical examination I find out, just to continue with this example, that bachelors 
are self-centred, miserly, shy, introverted and suffer from overly strong attachment 
to their mothers. This would be a description of the reference of the word 
‘bachelor’. It would not be a description of the word ‘bachelor’. What we need is a 
definition of the word and a description of the word’s reference. 
We also need to be clear about the difference between lexical and stipulative 
definitions. The former is used when there is wide agreement as to what a word 
means and how it is used. A ‘triangle’, for example, has the lexical definition: ‘a 
closed plane figure bounded by three straight lines’. But a word like ‘democracy’ is 
not as amenable to lexical definition, because there is no widely accepted 
understanding of it. Therefore, when we want to use the word in a scholarly way, 
we need to make a stipulative definition of it. Here we can choose between the 
various existing definitions, or construct our own. In reading research we will have 
to deal with stipulative definitions; few, if any, of our thorny terms have good 
lexical definitions. By way of an answer to Miles’s question, ‘Can there be a single 
definition of dyslexia?’, I would claim that there is no lexical definition of 
‘dyslexia’. In the following I will, however, suggest guidelines for stipulative 
definitions. 
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DEFINITIONS AS HYPOTHESES 
The questions of how and if we can define ‘dyslexia’ must, in my opinion, be 
determined by both empirical findings and theoretical reasoning. In order to attend 
to both of these, we need to treat definitions as hypotheses.  
Many researchers would gladly escape the burden of defining their key terms, 
not only because of the extra work that honing a precise definition entails, but also 
because they feel the need to keep the question open for as long as possible, so as 
not to restrict the research. Openness is of course a virtue in research. But some 
basic choices simply have to be made. Openness rather manifests itself in one’s 
ability to change one’s mind when the evidence indicates that one is wrong. 
Any serious researcher needs to delimit and identify the phenomenon to be 
studied. If you want to select a sample of dyslexics, you need to know what 
identifying traits dyslexics share. What is the common denominator that permits us 
to group these people together under the label ‘dyslexics’? What must they have in 
common, and which variables may vary from individual to individual? T.R. Miles 
(1994) speaks of ‘lumpers’ and ‘splitters’: ‘[…] lumpers being those who wish to 
group certain things together, and splitters those who wish to emphasize their 
separateness […]’ (p. 195). In this context, he points out that ‘[s]ince boundaries 
often need to be changed as science advances there is no need to fan the flames of 
controversy by insisting that a particular boundary is the only correct one to draw’ 
(p. 196). The answers you give to these questions will govern your choice of 
instruments and methods to be used in identifying potential dyslexics. 
The temptation is to use a loose, fuzzy definition. This temptation should be 
avoided, however. In my reading of the history and philosophy of science, I think it 
nearly always proves to be the case that a maximum of clarity and precision in the 
definition of key terms is the best route in the long run. This means that the 
definition should be operational: ‘The central idea of operationism is that the 
meaning of every scientific term must be specifiable by indicating a definite testing 
operation that provides a criterion for its application’ (Hempel, 1966). An example: 
‘In order to ascertain whether the term “acid” applies to a given liquid – i.e., 
whether the liquid is an acid – insert a strip of blue litmus paper into it; the liquid is 
an acid if and only if the litmus paper turns red’. Even though many would object 
that operational definitions in psychology and education cannot be as precise and 
well-grounded as in this example, I would none the less claim that this should be 
our ideal, in the sense that it determines the direction of our work. 
A good operational definition of ‘dyslexia’ will have to stick to symptoms. First 
of all because a definition has to have a high degree of intersubjective observability 
(i.e. we have to agree that these children present the symptoms, while the others do 
not). And second, because it is important that we do not define ‘dyslexia’ on the 
basis of notions as to its cause or causes. Definitions involving causal factors beg 
the research question by anticipating the results. Any research based on a definition 
of ‘dyslexia’ that outlines its causes will not really be empirical and a posteriori. 
For example, if you define ‘dyslexia’ as ‘difficulties in reading non-words due to a 
deficit in the phonological processing’, then you cannot really be studying the 
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cause of the disorder, because you have already decided for yourself what it is. In 
fact, we find a distressingly similar phrasing in the new definition put forward by 
the Orton Dyslexia Society: ‘[…] difficulties in single word decoding, usually 
reflecting insufficient phonological processing’ (Lyon, 1995, p. 9; my emphasis). 
Looking back at the contributions made by many researchers in the history of 
our field, we often have to ask: which findings are merely true by definition and 
which are truly empirical findings? Assume, for a moment, that we define 
‘reading’ as mainly decoding, and then define ‘decoding’ as phonological 
processing. Should we then be surprised when we find a high correlation between 
‘reading difficulties’ and ‘phonological difficulties’? 
The American Psychiatric Association (1987) claims that it is both possible and 
desirable to delimit the symptoms before searching for the causes: ‘The approach 
taken in DSM-III-R is atheoretical with regard to etiology or pathophysiologic 
process, except with regard to disorders for which this is well established and 
therefore included in the definition of the disorder’ (p. xxiii). A similar stance 
towards delimiting and explaining disorders is fairly widespread in medical 
research. An example from medical history would be the delimiting of the concept 
of ‘cancer’ from purported causes of the disease (cf. Riese, 1953; von Engelhardt 
& Schipperges, 1980). 
In order to allow a definition to guide and perhaps even inspire research, instead 
of circumscribing it too narrowly, we will have to treat the definition as a 
hypothesis. This is in accord with the notion of ontological relativity that is fairly 
widespread in the fields of logic and the philosophy of language (cf. Passmore, 
1985; Quine, 1969). When we devise definitions in our field of research, we should 
not be too concerned about finding the one and only true definition. That may not 
even exist. We should instead be trying to devise the definition that best suits our 
purposes. That does exist. The only problem is, how do we know that we have 
found it? It is kind of like the top of the foggy mountain that surely is there, but 
which you cannot see. And even when you are there, you cannot be sure you are 
there. 
Which symptoms should we start with? I think the answer is: only a very few, 
clearly delimited, and highly quantifiable ones. We need to find out whether or not 
these can be grouped together by studying whether or not they have a common 
cause or causes. The symptoms and causes selected must, in other words, 
reciprocally delimit each other. Or, to put it in the terms geneticists use, the 
genotype and the phenotype have to mutually define each other. When we have 
successfully delimited a cluster of symptoms that somehow ‘belong’ together, we 
follow the same route to find new clusters. Then we have to find out whether it 
would be advantageous to give each of the clusters of symptoms a unique name, 
and/or whether two or more clusters ought to be grouped together under the same 
name. 
We need, in other words, to construct the concept of ‘dyslexia’ from the bottom 
up. First we need to find the individual building blocks, and then to find out what 
kind of edifice we can construct from them. This means that we have to first 
identify the various forms of reading difficulty and then ascertain whether their 
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differences, similarities and associations indicate that they should be grouped 
together under the concept of ‘dyslexia’. As I have claimed elsewhere, ‘[a]n 
inductive approach to subgrouping should be taken, and not the deductive approach 
that has been common in the literature. […] In this way the concept of dyslexia can 
be constructed from the ground up – if dyslexia exists’ (Tønnessen, 1995, p. 153). 
We need, then, to start with the symptoms, and when we find the causes, then these 
may be drawn into the definition (cf. the above-mentioned DSM system). 
I took it as a positive sign of the times that, for example, the Orton Dyslexia 
Society wanted a ‘new, research-based definition’. But it is difficult to see how this 
can be reconciled with the same society’s claim that ‘the definition must be theory 
driven’ (Lyon, 1995, p. 7). I am sceptical about this if by ‘theory-driven’ it is 
meant that the researcher is shackled by theories or paradigms. The scientist must 
remain free to choose new hypotheses. These are for the most part the products of 
creativity (see for example Popper, 1963), and creativity should be nurtured by 
both theory and empirical facts. The subsequent verification or falsification of the 
hypotheses ought to be based on observations that are as objective and as 
independent of theory as possible. I prefer an ‘atheoretical approach’ in this 
meaning of the word, such as DSM-III-R employs in its definitions of psychiatric 
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987, p. xxiii). I propose that we 
need to work as empirically as possible by using the hypothetico-deductive 
method. Naturally, we have good reason to wonder if science ever can be wholly 
objective or ‘neutral’. But dispassionate objectivity should be our goal, even if it is 
like the foggy mountain top we cannot see but know is there. 
Moreover, traditional theories of reading have often had a normative aspect. 
They tend to postulate an ideal of effective reading. I think having a theory-driven 
definition will wind up defining ‘dyslexia’ as a deviation from this ideal way of 
reading. Instead of postulating some ideal way of reading, we ought to focus on 
normal reading. This should be done by a statistical registration of observable 
reading behaviour. Then we can profitably look for patterns of reading that deviate 
from this statistical norm. In this way we are assisted by our definition of ‘normal 
reading’ in identifying the clusters of symptoms I mentioned above in connection 
with definitions as hypotheses. 
As mentioned, the definition should present the meaning of the word, e.g. 
‘bachelor = unmarried man’. Then empirical study can be carried out of individuals 
that fit the category, here ‘unmarried men’. By means of such empirical study we 
may find that the subjects are, for example, self-centred, miserly, shy, introverted 
and suffering from overly strong attachment to their mothers. In chemistry we can 
say for example that everything to be included in the concept of ‘gold’ has to have 
a melting point of 1063C. In psychology, however, we cannot demand that all of 
the characteristics should be identical in order for an instance to be included within 
the concept. But even though this is not possible, we should have it as the ideal 
towards which we strive. If there are meaningful differences in the characteristics, 
then we ought to see if we can delimit the group better, perhaps through 
subgrouping. 
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 In the literature we find many symptoms which are more or less correlated with 
dyslexia (see for example Bannatyne, 1971; Miles, 1993; Wheeler & Watkins, 
1979). This may indicate that it would be wise to delineate ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ symptoms. ‘Primary symptoms’ would be core symptoms which are 
present in nearly 100% of the cases. ‘Secondary symptoms’ are not as frequent, but 
are still more prevalent in dyslexics than in normal readers. Through my own 
research into the associations between dyslexia, left-handedness and immune 
disorders (Tønnessen et al., 1993), I would for example consider left-handedness 
and immune disorders to be secondary symptoms of dyslexia. Further study may, 
however, prove these rather to be primary symptoms of a subgroup of dyslexics. 
Anyway, accompanying symptoms or conditions ought not to be included in a 
definition nor in the diagnosing of dyslexia, until such time as they have been 
proved to be a trait common to dyslexics or to members of subgroups of dyslexics. 
Another interesting constellation is found in Fawcett and Nicolson (1994). In 
my interpretation of their material, I think it would here be correct to term the 
dyslexia itself as a symptom. This does not bar them from saying that dyslexia 
itself also has symptoms: ‘The explanation is in fact markedly different from that 
put forward by phonological deficit theorists, especially with respect to specificity. 
Rather than accepting that the skill deficits are specific to reading-related skills, we 
propose on the contrary, that the reading related deficits are merely the tip of an 
iceberg, and that almost all primitive skills (such as speed of processing and motor 
skill) are likely to be impaired’ (p. 184). If this is correct, then it is doubtful 
whether one ought to say that dyslexia is ‘language-based’. Of course, dyslexia is 
also a language problem to the degree that reading difficulty is a problem with 
written language. But this is so obvious that I doubt that it needs to be accounted 
for in a definition. 
DEFINITION AND SUBGROUPING 
There is an extensive literature on the subgrouping of learning disorders (e.g. 
Miles, 1994; Feagans, Short, & Meltzer, 1991; Rourke, 1985). Looking at this 
literature, one has to wonder: have the researchers created an intractable problem 
for themselves? If we, like Plato, start out on the plane of pure ideas or notions, 
then we will have difficulty in finding our way back to earth. On the other hand, if 
we, like Aristotle, start out here on earth, then the experiences we have will show 
us how high up we can reach towards the pure ideas that Plato started out with. An 
example will illustrate what I mean. Let us say that we first observe a series of 
different animals. Then we try to group them in some way. We construct for 
example the concept of ‘dog’ by grouping Cocker Spaniels, Collies, Great Danes, 
etc., together. We do not proceed the other way round, by starting off with a vague 
and intuitive notion of ‘dog’ and then trying to find out how we can divide it into 
different subgroups. The whole question of the subgrouping of dyslexics has arisen 
because we have not been working empirically and inductively, but rather 
deductively and intuitively! An empirical theory of knowledge forces us to know 
the subgroups before we can know the group. When, for example, Boder (1973) 
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delimits and identifies ‘dysphonetic’ and ‘dyseidetic’ dyslexia, we have to ask 
whether or not these subgroups have so much in common that they can profitably 
be grouped together under the name ‘dyslexics’. What is their common 
denominator and what are the differences between the groups? 
Miles (1994) claims that  
an attempt at an improved classification was made by Rutter and Yule (1975) 
when they drew a distinction between ‘reading backwardness’ and ‘specific 
reading retardation’. Whether this classification has any long-term taxonomic 
power, however, may be doubted. […] It is arguable that they were thereby 
using only a weak taxonomy when a stronger one was in fact available. In 
scientific research caution is sometimes a virtue, but one may tentatively 
suggest that in this case it may have inhibited progress! (p. 207)  
It is also my opinion that we ought to try to establish as small and clearly delimited 
groups as possible. We do not need to decide the issue of how or whether they are 
to be bound together. Others can do that, depending on their purposes and interests. 
In my opinion, one cannot decide a priori which symptoms or which causes 
belong together. The symptoms need to be delimited by associated causes and the 
causes have to be delimited by their associated symptoms. We should start with the 
symptoms manifested by poor readers, say the 10% at the bottom of the ability 
scale, and then describe these individuals as objectively and clearly as possible. 
Stanovich (1994) claims that ‘[t]his problem is a recurring one in the field of 
developmental disabilities, and it arises because the field has repeatedly displayed 
a preference for terminology that connotes unverified theories about causation’ 
(p. 579). Miles (1994) makes the further claim that ‘disagreements over the 
concept of dyslexia are in effect disagreements over the issue of lumping and 
splitting’ (p. 204). I concur. But these disagreements can also be traced back to 
what the purpose of the concept ‘dyslexia’ is. In part, this is a question of what the 
core of the concept should be. However, it is also a question of how precise a 
definition needs to be and how large a group it should encompass (e.g. the 
extension of the definition). 
HOW CAN WE BEST DEFINE ‘DYSLEXIA’? 
Researchers have been working on dyslexia and reading problems for about a 
hundred years now, and we still have not reached a strong consensus on how to 
define ‘dyslexia’. We need clear and useful definitions. We do not necessarily need 
only one definition to be used in all circumstances, just as we do not necessarily 
need only one hypothesis for everyone who wants to do serious research. What we 
need is a common goal and a set of common guidelines for how to define 
‘dyslexia’. We have reasonably clear criteria for evaluating research in general; 
what we need is a set of criteria against which we can evaluate proposed 
definitions. We need these criteria in order to be able to compare the various 
proposed definitions with an eye to sorting the wheat from the chaff. In fact, given 
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today’s circumstances, I am not even sure that the definitions we favour today are 
any better than the definitions formulated by our field’s pioneers. 
 In summary I will propose the following guidelines: (1) We need to decide 
which goals and purposes are to be covered by the definition. We also need to 
decide whether we are to employ the term ‘dyslexia’. (2) We have to try and find 
criteria by which we can ascertain whether one definition is better than another. 
Some guidelines are offered in the following. (3) We need to delimit the 
phenomena at the level of symptoms and not refer to causes until they are 
empirically verified. (4) In order to ascertain which of the symptoms are of most 
interest, we have to start with a description of the symptoms common to the 
poorest readers (perhaps the poorest 10%); this description should be as open, 
objective and clear as possible. (5) We hypothesise that a certain group of 
symptoms belongs together and verify this by ascertaining whether or not they 
share the same causes. We thereby obtain a set of symptoms that belong to a set of 
causes. This constitutes a subgroup. (6) We similarly define as many subgroups as 
it takes to cover all the symptoms which are typical among the poorest readers. (7) 
Two or more subgroups can be grouped together in a larger concept which we can 
then, for example, term ‘dyslexia’. In this way we can construct the concepts from 
the bottom up. (9) One must always keep an open mind about new symptoms and 
causes, and about new ways of describing known symptoms and causes.  
(10) The concept of ‘dyslexia’ is given status as a hypothesis, which we should 
expect to be increasingly fine-tuned in accordance with ongoing empirical 
research. In order to verify, falsify and adjust the concept as expeditiously as 
possible it needs to be formulated precisely and operationally. 
The guidelines I have proposed should not be considered final nor complete. 
Many will find them too strict or restrictive or too much like the hard sciences or 
medical science in particular. I agree with Miles (1995) when she claims that 
‘difficulty in formulating does not necessarily imply that one is talking nonsense’ 
(p. 42). And, I would add: clarity is not enough! The difficulty in formulating is, 
however, one of the greatest challenges in our research. Many other fields have 
weathered similar definitory crises, and through persistent and systematic work 
they emerged stronger and wiser. I feel that all sciences, whether they study hard 
things, like chemicals and rocks, or soft things, like us, must strive for 
terminological precision, intersubjectivity, and well controlled, comparable and 
communicable results. These are the ideals that have pushed the envelope in field 
after field. No one can know beforehand to what degree we will be able to attain 
these ideals, but the history of science shows that aiming too high is better than 
aiming too low.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DEFINING ‘SKILL’ 
INTRODUCTION 
When the concept of ‘skill’ is used in reading and writing research or more 
generally in linguistic research, it is rarely made the subject of detailed and precise 
definitions or reflections. This chapter is a theoretical contribution that consists 
mainly in reflections on the type of phenomenon that ‘skill’ represents. 
Philosophically, the account is based above all on Aristotle’s views, according to 
which ‘skill’ is characterised as a potentiality. Psychologically, this chapter 
expresses the opinion that the only way to describe, understand and explain ‘skill’ 
is by combining behaviourism and cognitivism.  
CHALLENGES 
Background and goals 
Behaviourism and cognitive psychology have been two of the most influential 
schools in psychology in the past 40 or 50 years. In many ways they have been 
polar opposites and mutually exclusive. As an introduction I will examine the 
consequences of employing these disparate schools strictly and consistently. (In 
practice, researchers usually do not do this; most research being done mixes in 
some of the notions from the other camp. But this type of eclecticism is often more 
problematic than ‘pure’ models. Here I have chosen to use pure models primarily 
to make my line of argument easier to follow.) The reflections presented below 
have emerged from my work in reading research, but I would contend that they are 
also relevant to a number of other fields of research within psychology, education 
and linguistics. The aims of this chapter are (1) to focus on the fundamental 
problems of reading research; (2) to problematise the dominant position achieved 
by cognitive psychology in reading research; and (3) to call attention to the fact 
that the concept of ‘skill’ needs to be more closely defined and assigned a more 
prominent position in reading research. I will try to determine the philosophical 
status of ‘skill’ and try to define ‘skill’ by combining key concepts from both 
cognitive psychology and behaviourism.  
PROBLEMS 
Behaviourism ad absurdum  
Behaviourism deals exclusively with observable behaviour (Watson, 1930). It is 
useful for describing associations between observed stimuli and observed 
responses in humans and in animals. It cannot, however, explain the messy 
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deviations in our behaviour that are the result of our cognition or will. Moreover, 
this school of psychology cannot describe, much less explain, ‘inner’ phenomena 
such as doing sums in your head. If we exclusively base our science on observed 
behaviour, we will have to admit that there is quite a gap between the task someone 
is to perform and the solution he or she finds. For example: A voter in an election 
has to decide whether or not the promises the various candidates give during their 
campaigns are believable or not. Basing his or her vote on the candidates’ 
observable behaviour alone would not be wise. A psychology that excludes non-
observable entities such as thoughts and feelings will be a vastly limited science.  
The principle of association between stimulus and response is fundamental to 
behaviourism’s theory of learning. To create strong and lasting associations, 
repetition is necessary. The term ‘overlearning’ is used for when we continue with 
repetitions past the point when stable associations are established. Behaviouristic 
theories of learning do not traffic in notions such as ‘understanding’ (Leahey, 
2001).  
Heartbeats and breathing are for the most part automatised (that is, they take 
place without learning, but we can learn to regulate them somewhat). The term 
habit is used for actions we learn to perform. Habits are basic elements in 
behaviourism. But we should also note that habits can be affected consciously; we 
can change them by intellect and will. From this we may conclude that 
behaviourism alone is not sufficient for explaining all psychological phenomena.  
Cognitivism ad absurdum  
In cognitive psychology all attention is directed towards the ‘inner’ life (von 
Eckardt, 1993; Gardner, 1985). Traditionally this school focuses on ‘thought’ and 
‘awareness’. These terms, however, are unclear. Nor is it clear how thoughts, being 
very subjective things, can be studied. What are the ‘causes’ of our thoughts?  
Behaviourism, as mentioned, uses overlearning in order to secure the best 
possible learning. For example, overlearning is a technique often used with 
dyslexics. Despite the fact that some cognitive psychologists and educators use this 
technique, it must be pointed out that this concept has no basis in their theory of 
learning; it belongs in the school of behaviourism. A pure cognitivist would have 
to employ cognitive techniques in working with dyslexics. The cognitive solution 
to dyslexia is cognition of cognition: metacognition (Gombert, 1992).  
 Metacognition makes great demands on intellectual ability and awareness – 
even for people without learning difficulties. An example: There is a widespread 
consensus that dyslexics have difficulties identifying and distinguishing phonemes. 
They thus also have difficulty forming correct associations between phonemes and 
graphemes. However, explaining this to dyslexics using metacognition is no easy 
task. In fact, it is somewhat akin to using intellectual reasoning to explain to a 
colour-blind person what colours are. Moreover, there is a question as to what is 
meant by this ‘metacognition’ (and by similar expressions such as ‘awareness of 
awareness’). A subject cannot simultaneously be an object. An eye cannot see 
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itself. Metacognition, as it is currently conceived, cannot be studied scientifically, 
nor can it be taught explicitly.  
Assuring the quality of one’s metacognition would require meta-metacognition. 
Assuring the quality of that would require meta-meta-metacognition – and so on, in 
an infinite sequence of ever more ‘metas’.  
In the real world there are no thoughts that are entirely unaffected by feelings, 
urges and sudden insights. This is an important reason for why a pure cognitivism 
is indefensible. Another problem with pure cognitivism is its inability to explain 
why we ‘choose’ one thought over another. The history of science shows that new 
ideas or discoveries often are arrived at by irrational routes (Kuhn, 1970). This can 
only be explained by granting some efficacy to feelings, urges and sudden insights. 
The same is true when we try to explain mistakes in reasoning and learning 
difficulties.  
The problems involved with using the concept of metacognition to explain how 
the mind works do not collide with the obvious fact that we do monitor our own 
mental activities. Even if we cannot observe our mental activities while they are 
taking place, we can observe their results. Aquinas claims that ‘the soul is known 
by its acts. For a man perceives that he has a soul and lives and exists by the fact 
that he perceives that he senses and understands and performs other vital 
operations of this kind […] No one perceives that he understands except through 
the fact that he understands something, for to understand something is prior to 
understanding that one understands’ (De veritate, 10, 8, Thomas Aquinas).  
 Cognitive psychology has often employed flow charts that illustrate the ‘normal’ 
paths followed in solving cognitive problems (Reber, 1993). The dual-route model 
of reading is an example (Coltheart, 2005). There has been disagreement about the 
usefulness of this model for describing, understanding and explaining ‘normal’ 
reading and reading difficulties; cf., e.g., Coltheart, 2006). Is this model best 
conceived of as a ‘summary’ of how people read? Is it a hypothesis about what 
happens at the neurological level or at the psychological level? Perhaps the most 
obvious way of understanding this model is to view it as a description of what is 
meant by ‘reading’; that is, as a definition – more precisely, a normative definition 
that points out the necessary components of adequate reading. In such definitions 
there are more or less explicit conditions on what is ‘normal’ or effective reading. 
To the extent that these conditions are correct, ‘flow charts’ with their different 
‘boxes’ may show us, for example, what ‘subtasks’ create problems for dyslexics. 
In this way they may contribute to a more precise description of dyslexia. Flow 
charts, however, do not give an overview of the causes behind the putative fact that 
reading takes place in a particular way. Nor do they give us any explanation as to 
how or why a particular instance of a person’s reading is influenced by the 
situation or trial conditions. It should also be noted that flow charts do not give 
explanations as to how reading ability is developed. Therefore they do not tell us 
how to help poor readers. We have to know something about feelings, urges, 
habits, environmental factors and the like in order to understand how and why 
individual variations in reading ability (and in particular instances of reading) 
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occur. Neurology, behaviourism and connectionism will provide more insight here 
than cognitive psychology.  
SOLUTIONS 
A realistic psychology  
It must be concluded that pure behaviourism and pure cognitivism both lead to 
unreasonable consequences. An eclectic mix of the two is equally problematic. In 
the real world, body and mind make up a unified whole – but not a mixture. It is 
not so much the case that we have a body and a mind, but that we are both body 
and mind.  
Models that simply assume an interaction between the biological/neurological 
substrate and cognition are riddled with the same problems that Descartes’ dualism 
faced (cf., e.g., Frith & Blakemore, 2005).  
The best hypotheses in this area are those developed by connectionism. 
Connectionism assumes as a starting point that there is no essential difference 
between the cognitive level and the neurological/biological level (Bechtel & 
Abrahamson, 1991).  
One objection to connectionism, however, is that it ignores the differences 
between ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’ of mental acts. Ludwig Wittgenstein claimed that 
‘the human body is the best picture of the human soul […]’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, II, 
pp. iv, 178). He argued that (1) we have a consciousness that cannot be observed 
by others; and (2) mental activity cannot be taken as the cause of observable 
behaviour. He claimed, for example, that when you see someone ‘break out in joy’, 
their observable behaviour is a criterion or a hallmark of their inner joyful feeling. 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, §580). This is to say that both the mental and the physical 
aspects are part of the definition of ‘joy’. A metaphor for this would be a 
mountain-top with two sides. Neither side can be said to cause the other. When we 
have seen both sides of the mountain, we can identify it more precisely and 
confidently than if we had only seen one side of it. Even if a mountain-top has 
several sides, we may use only one name for referring to the top. Similarly, the 
single term ‘man’ may refer to both an outer and an inner ‘side’. Brain-imaging 
and other studies have given us much new knowledge about the brain, but the 
relationship between the mind and the brain as well as the definitions of, say, 
‘skills’ or ‘intelligence’ are primarily philosophical problems and tasks that cannot 
be solved by means of brain imaging; cf., e.g., Brook and Mandik (2004).  
Letting this notion of a mountain-top inform our thinking further, we can say 
that the relationship between the mental and the physical aspects of something, that 
is, between the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ aspects of it, is like the relationship between a 
conceptual definition and an operational definition. The notion of ‘intelligence’, for 
example, can be operationalised by defining it as the score achieved on a certain 
test. Yet according to this way of thinking, we cannot say that the subject’s 
intelligence caused him or her to achieve that score. It is often claimed that an 
operational definition is logically deduced from a conceptual definition. But it is 
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not possible to deduce outer, physical manifestations from inner, mental activity. 
Rather, these phenomena are complementary; they shed light upon each other. In 
order to understand what is meant by, for example, ‘reading’, it is necessary to take 
into consideration both the outer, physical aspects and the inner, mental ones. Only 
when the phenomenon ‘reading’ is determined from both perspectives can we 
begin to look at causal relationships.  
What are skills?  
Just as a human being is a unique combination of mind and body, both of these 
aspects are reflected in the term ‘skill’. In order to understand this term, we do well 
to look to Aristotle’s philosophy. On the one hand, Aristotle disagreed with the 
materialists and the determinists, who claimed that all of our actions are the 
product of inherited factors and the pressures of the environment (nature and 
nurture). On the other hand, he rejected the claims of Socrates and Plato that as 
long as we think correctly, we will also act correctly. For them, a true philosopher 
is one who has clear and true thoughts; as such, he will also be a morally good 
person. Aristotle considered that Socrates and Plato put too much store in the 
power of thought in daily life. He held that intelligence and knowledge alone were 
not sufficient to lead a person to act in accordance with moral norms. In the real 
world, our actions are often some-what ‘distorted’ by feelings and bad influences. 
We need therefore to practice ‘acting good’ – but not as a ‘mechanical’ habit. On 
the contrary: we need to both follow general rules and at the same time take into 
consideration that which is unique in each situation. We acquire an attitude or 
disposition and thereby become virtuous (cf. Thomas Aquinas’, 2006, distinctions 
between ‘potentiae’ and ‘habitus’ in Summa Theologiae, vol. 22, Ia2ae, pp. 49–54).  
Regarding the acquisition of skills, Aristotle writes: ‘of all the things that  
come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity 
(this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often 
hearing that we got the senses, but on the contrary, we had them before we used 
them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first 
exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we 
have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become 
builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by 
doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts’ 
(Artistotle, 1934, 1103a26–1103b2). To this it should be added that skills are not 
unchangeable, even though they are more stable than the particular instances of 
their being performed. There is always the possibility that they will improve or 
degenerate.  
 In the language of today – and with a greater possibility for empirical 
measurement – we can say that skills are combinations of automaticity and 
awareness (i.e. conscious monitoring and possible correction in the performance of 
the task). There are varying degrees of automatising and conscious monitoring. The 
combination of these two ways of performing tasks will vary according to the type 
of task being performed, the purpose of the task, etc. Developing a skill entails 
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developing an automatisation, the ability to consciously monitor one’s 
performance, and the ability to combine these in productive ways.  
We can have a great deal of knowledge about the physical laws pertaining to 
how bodies float on water but still not be able to swim. Aristotle’s dictum on 
practice is valid here. Bicycling is another skill that is developed through practice. 
A high degree of automatisation is necessary. If you think too much about the whys 
and hows of balancing on two wheels, you will fall. But if you bicycle too much on 
autopilot, you will not be able to tackle unexpected situations in a flexible manner. 
We cannot say, however, that a skill is awareness + automaticity. Rather, it is the 
most situationally appropriate combination thereof. These two aspects form a 
unified whole – just as mind and body are a unified whole. A tightrope-walker, for 
example, is not a person who in addition to performing certain movements on a 
tight-rope also has a certain awareness of these actions. As mentioned, both the 
‘inner’ (mental) and the ‘outer’ (physical) aspects of a skill are part of the 
definition of that skill. Therefore, when cognitive psychology puts much weight on 
identifying and performing ‘sub-skills’, this may create more problems than it 
solves. From a logical point of view it may be clarifying to split reading into its 
smallest, atomary units. From a psychological and educational point of view, by 
contrast, it may be extremely challenging. Some people will find the subject too 
abstract. Others will find it difficult to shift in a natural way between parts and the 
whole – as it were, between the trees and the wood.  
It is important to note that the relationship among sub-skills is definitory, that is, 
logical and not empirical. We can illustrate this with the following example: (a) a 
judge is a person who, on behalf of the state and in accordance with the law, 
pronounces verdicts in court cases; and (b) there are a number of laws and rules 
that define what tasks this entails in practice. We can say that (a) is equivalent to 
the skill, while (b) is equivalent to sub-skills. Both (a) and (b) are parts of the 
definition of ‘judge’. The question of how the judge ought to, say, treat the 
prosecutor and the defence counsel cannot be answered empirically, by looking at 
how judges actually perform. The answer must be found in the definitions and 
rules regulating the judge’s activities. Similarly, it is a commonplace to define 
‘reading’ as a skill which includes sub-skills such as comprehension and 
phonological analysis and synthesis. If we lay down categorical definitions of 
concepts such as ‘reading’ or ‘dyslexia’, we thereby exclude them from empirical 
research and insulate them from change. In my opinion, all definitions must be 
perceived and treated as hypotheses in need of adjustment as and when empirical 
research so requires (cf. Tønnessen, 1997a).  
 In addition to reading, important examples of skills are intelligence and 
language skills. Often skills are conceived of and referred to as if they were 
delimited and localised entities (e.g., in Jerry Fodor’s modular theory of mind: 
Fodor, 1983). Hypostatising or substantiating in this manner is misleading. Just as 
the fragility of a glass surface is both nowhere to be found in the glass itself and 
everywhere in it, we cannot localise skills. Even though you are in Norway, it 
makes no sense to conceive of your reading ability as also being in Norway … 
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However, we can describe the conditions necessary for reading, such as awareness, 
certain linguistic skills, vision, etc.  
We need to be clear about the difference between ‘skill’ and the ‘performance’ 
or actualisation of a skill. Even though a skill changes over time, it is still more 
stable than the actualisations of it. This is important to take into consideration 
when diagnosing and treating reading disabilities. Actual instances of reading are 
highly influenced by motivation, concentration, the reading situation and the like. 
To the extent that a person’s reading difficulties are due to such circumstances, 
efforts should be made to improve them. Doing so will usually be easier than trying 
to improve the skill itself.  
How do we learn skills?  
The expression ‘tacit knowledge’ is often associated with Michael Polanyi (1973). 
He expressed his basic point in the sentence: ‘We know more than we can tell.’ We 
see this clearly in practical skills such as swimming, bicycling and the like. We are 
not able to acquire these skills through reading or hearing about them, and we 
cannot explain them fully to another person with words alone. This is not because 
of any lack of verbal ability; it is because these skills are not about ‘knowledge’ in 
the usual sense (cf. Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.1212: ‘What can be shown, cannot be 
said’). They are ‘knowing how’, not ‘knowing that’. Another term for ‘knowing 
how’ is ‘procedural knowledge’ – or ‘tacit knowledge’. Procedural or tacit 
knowledge is not about following rules. It is more apt to say that the activity in 
question is in accordance with rules, not that the person exhibiting the skill is 
following rules intentionally and fully consciously. Often we can only claim that 
there is a regularity or pattern in the activity.  
Even though we cannot describe precisely the regularity or patterns in a 
complex activity (such as swimming or riding a bicycle), our consciousness can 
nonetheless be trained to monitor these activities and take over control of them in 
some circumstances. Control and correction such as this makes the difference 
between, say, a good and a poor pianist. This is typical of all kinds of skills.  
Even though skills cannot be learned through theoretical teaching alone, not all 
such teaching is worthless. Learning through examples – seeing the behaviour 
modelled – is also important. Skills are primarily acquired through ‘implicit 
learning’ and practice (Reber, 1993).  
Potentiality and language  
Like other skills, language skill is a kind of potentiality. For example, when we are 
asleep, our entire language skill exists only as a potentiality. When we are awake, 
we may use parts of it while other parts exist only as potentialities. Moreover, 
language is primarily a skill, not a system as claimed by Chomsky (1957, 2006) 
and others. Language can only be studied through linguistic acts – as realisations of 
language skills. By means of empirical methods we may find regularities and 
patterns in language performance at various times and places. We cannot, however, 
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use the term ’system’ in the same meaning as it has in relation to, say, carefully 
constructed philosophical systems. Regularities and patterns in language 
performance are subject to continuous change. Grammar as a scientific discipline 
consists of empirically based generalisations with limited scope. Researchers, 
authors, teachers and others may use those generalisations to formulate normative 
recommendations about how to use language in order to obtain specific goals when 
it comes to expressing thoughts and feelings, but it must be questioned to what 
extent such recommendations can be seen as empirically based.  
The concept of ‘potentiality’ is also necessary in defining linguistic meaning. 
Plato claimed that concepts or ideas were located in an unchanging ‘realm of 
ideas’. According to this way of thinking, we label a person a ‘human’ because he 
or she exhibits characteristics that are in accord with the unchanging definition. 
During the Middle Ages this notion of ‘conceptual realism’ was criticised by the 
‘nominalists’, who claimed that only particular instances existed. Both ways of 
looking at things reduce potentiality to actuality – to either abstract ideas or 
concrete spoken or written words.  
An alternative solution is to look at words as variables. In mathematics, a 
variable is something that has a value within a certain range. For example, we can 
say that x is a variable within the range of whole numbers from 5 to 11. The seven 
numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 then form a set. At any one time, x can have only 
one of these values (thus, in a sense, the nominalists are correct). But it must be 
added that x can potentially have any of the seven values. By adding the notion of 
‘potentiality’ we assume a middle stance between the conceptual realists and the 
nominalists. We can illustrate this point by using the word ‘man’ as an example. 
Among the potential meanings of this word we find: (a) ‘an adult male human 
being’, (b) ‘a human being of either sex’, (c) ‘the human race’ and (d) ‘a husband’. 
The word potentially has all these – and other – meanings, but it has only one 
meaning at a time. It should also be added that grammatical moods are one part of 
the potentials of meaning. The word ‘help’ may for example be used in an 
indicative mood (‘Paul needs help.’), in an imperative mood (‘Help!’) or as a 
question (‘Does Paul need help?’). The possible meanings (and moods) taken 
together delimit the range of the word – just like a given set of numbers delimits 
the possible values of a variable. Contexts, situations, persons, etc., determine 
which of the potential meanings is actualised.  
Empirical studies are necessary to delimit these fields of meaning. Meaning is a 
potential that signs (codes, symbols, etc.) ‘have’. How this potential is realised 
depends on the person, intention, situation, etc. Empirical investigation must be 
based on physical reactions elicited by linguistic acts, and on interpretations of 
those reactions. The goal of empirical investigations is to obtain descriptions, 
definitions, explanations and understanding. As mentioned above, meaning 
involves both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ aspects. Based on investigations of reactions we 
may formulate hypotheses of meaning, although we will never attain exhaustive 
and unchangeable definitions. There are usually several sets of possible realisations 
of potentials for meaning. These, however, are not as clearly defined as in 
mathematics. They are more like magnetic fields, where at the centre we find the 
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most common meanings. A field of possible meanings can also change over time 
and place. In studies of the type referred to here it is not useful to draw sharp lines 
between semantics, pragmatics and hermeneutics. A certain meaning cannot be 
localised to a certain element in the overall linguistic code or string of signs, nor to 
the non-linguistic context. Attempting to localise exactly where the meaning arises 
in, say, a poem or other ‘message’ is as impossible as localising where the fragility 
of a glass surface ‘is’: it is everywhere and nowhere.  
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CHAPTER 5 
READING SKILL 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will describe and explain what it means that reading is – or is 
based on – a skill. We will use the overall (singular) term ‘reading’, and we will 
argue that this can be seen as a single skill. While it is perfectly possible to break 
reading down into several sub-skills, the main objective of this chapter is to show 
that, like any other skill, it constitutes a combination of automaticity and 
awareness. This means that the concept of ‘skill’ combines key ideas of both 
behaviourism and cognitivism – and thus also of connectionism. 
We distinguish between reading skill as such and the performance of that skill. 
A person’s performance of a skill may vary because of situational and motivational 
factors while the skill itself is more stable. A further point to be kept in mind is that 
(literate) people, even when they are not reading, retain their reading skill as a 
potential in the same way as, say, intelligence is still there as a potential when 
someone is asleep. 
Against the backdrop of our distinction between a skill and its performance, it 
may be useful to ask what the goal of reading research is. Is it to investigate 
reading behaviour? If so, any findings are likely to shed light on individual 
differences in reading pace and reading mistakes. However, the typical purpose of 
reading tests, as reflected both in their design and in their administration, is rather 
to obtain a picture of the underlying reading skill (and this is true of IQ tests as 
well: like reading tests, they aim to investigate the abilities enabling us to act in 
certain ways). Reading has traditionally been broken down into decoding and 
comprehension. In our view, these two parts can be brought together in a special 
way by hermeneutics, through the concept of ‘interpretation’. 
A review of the research literature on reading and reading difficulties shows that 
‘skills’ and ‘abilities’ are rarely mentioned while ‘processes’ and ‘models’ are 
more frequent concepts, used to describe the tasks that must be solved in order to 
go from script to meaning. Such descriptions show what a reader must be able to 
do – they do not primarily concern knowledge, but rather skills. Sometimes those 
tasks will be performed well, meaning that the person will read well. On other 
occasions the tasks will be solved less well, and so reading performance will be 
less good. Reading skill, however, may remain the same regardless of such 
variation. 
Underpinning this chapter is a conviction that having an insight into the basic 
questions and their answers will strongly influence the choices teachers make in 
their professional practice. In a certain sense, there is nothing as practical as a good 
theory. Those who have not thought deeply about the fundamental issues will fall 
easy prey to new trends coming into fashion. 
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The literature in the field of reading research is extensive, meaning that writing 
a short chapter requires making big choices. Below, we will first briefly present a 
small selection of theories and approaches that we see as central to the history of 
reading research. They all have something to say both about the sub-tasks of 
reading and about how those can be carried out. Then we will present a number of 
processes that have been central to large parts of reading research. Finally, we will 
try to bring together the above in order to show how various elements may 
supplement each other in a fruitful understanding of reading skill. 
THEORIES AND APPROACHES IN READING RESEARCH 
This section will give brief characterisations of the schools of psychology that we 
consider to have been the most central to the study of reading: behaviourism, 
cognitivism and connectionism. However, the first sub-section deals not with a 
school of psychology as such, but rather with an approach to research – the visual 
one, which originally attracted the strongest interest in reading research. This 
involves both the eye, sensing, perception and memory, meaning that medical and 
psychological issues alike are relevant in this context. 
The main focus below will be on ideas of special importance to views on 
reading and the investigation of reading. As we will see, this applies in particular to 
automaticity, awareness and interpretation. 
The visual approach 
The first studies of reading and reading difficulties placed their main focus on the 
visual: eye movements, visual sensing and visual perception as well as visual 
memory. The latter can be broken down into iconic memory, which is a very brief 
gathering of impulses immediately after sensory impressions reach the eyes; short-
term memory, to which the impressions then proceed; working memory, where 
they can subsequently be more actively processed; and finally long-term memory, 
where they can be stored. 
Where to draw the line between sensing and perception is controversial, but  
at least iconic and short-term memory are often counted as part of the sensing 
system. Processing in working memory, however, is part of perception and 
involves interpreting sensory impressions. This processing is based not only  
on the impressions as such, but also depends on long-term memory and on 
recognition or cognition: to interpret the word ‘sun’, a person must both  
recognise the image (spelling) of the word using long-term memory and think a 
few thoughts about what the sun is like. In the earliest studies of reading 
difficulties, researchers assumed that the main problems of dyslectics related to 
visual sensing and perception (this explains why ‘word blindness’ was a common 
term). Later on, the position of the eyes (e.g. the presence of a squint) and their 
movement were also identified as possible causes of reading difficulties (Miles & 
Miles, 2001). 
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Until about 1960, reading research primarily concerned itself with the eye-
movement patterns of readers in general and dyslectics in particular. The reason for 
this may well be that eye movements lend themselves to more exact measurement 
than do sensing and perception. The characteristic features of eye movements 
during reading are jumping movements often referred to as ‘saccades’. These occur 
between ‘fixations’. During a fixation, which is when information is primarily 
gathered, the eyes stay focused for 200–500 milliseconds. Then there is a saccade 
to a point about ten letters further on in the direction of reading. The saccade lasts 
for 20–50 milliseconds, during which time only a minimum of information is taken 
in. In the event of problems, the reader will carry out ‘regressions’ by jumping 
backwards in the text to pick up the thread again. Ever-more sophisticated 
instruments and measuring methods show considerable variation in eye-movement 
patterns during reading (Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989). 
 Even though reading research from the 1960s onwards has paid less attention to 
visual matters, this approach has been taken forward, in particular through 
neurological studies showing that it is possible to distinguish between a 
parvocellular system and a magnocellular one. The parvocellular system, which 
from an evolutionary perspective is considered to be a younger, more ‘modern’ 
component of human physiology than the magnocellular one, is primarily 
concentrated in the pupils and is used to focus on details when the eye is at rest, 
meaning that it is used above all during fixations. The magnocellular system is 
involved in peripheral vision, which is coarser and yields larger units, and is also 
able to record movement. It is responsible for informing a person when to end a 
fixation and whether there is a need to make a regression in order to ‘get back on 
track’. In addition, it provides information enabling the length of the next saccade 
to be determined. It is assumed that the problems of dyslexics are located mainly in 
the magnocellular system (Stein, 2001). 
Behaviourism 
From the 1930s to the 1960s, various strands of behaviourism dominated both 
psychology in general and the psychology of reading and reading instruction in 
particular. Behaviourism is a heterogeneous school of psychology; for our  
present purposes, we would like to emphasise the following tenets as characteristic: 
(a) psychology should be based only on that which is externally observable;  
(b) people learn by making associations; (c) associations are reinforced by 
repetition; (d) automatised, rapid and energy-saving responses are a consequence 
of this; and (e) emotions and instincts or needs explain motivation and cause 
people to respond to reward and punishment (Leahey, 2001). In other words, the 
psychological driving forces are irrational. We will see later on that it is less clear 
what the driving forces are in cognitive psychology, which places its main focus on 
the rational. It should be noted that behaviourism, unlike parts of cognitive 
psychology, sees learning how to read not as a special case, but as based on general 
principles of learning (Baum, 2005). Omaggio (1993) describes the psychology of 
reading of 1950s behaviourism as emphasising ‘habit formation, brought about by 
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the repeated association of a stimulus with a response’ (p. 45). Language was seen 
as a ‘response system that humans acquire through automatic conditioning 
processes […] some patterns of language are reinforced (rewarded) and others are 
not […] only those patterns reinforced by the community of language users will 
persist’ (p. 46). A great deal of importance was attributed to language habits, 
repetition and drilling. 
 Behaviourists used various methods and elements in reading instruction, but a 
central position progressively came to be occupied by Phonics (a teaching method 
placing special emphasis on awareness of language sounds; cf. the chapter on 
reading instruction in this book). Samuels and Kamil (1984) claim that ‘little 
attempt was made to explain what went on within the recesses of the mind  
that allowed the human to make sense of the printed page’ (p. 25). Representatives 
of cognitive psychology contend that Phonics was used differently in their  
circles, but – as we will see – that school also draws strongly on association and 
automatisation (Samuels & Kamil, 1984). 
 According to Baum (2005), behaviourism evolved and became more diverse 
after J.B. Watson formulated its most important basic principles in the 1920s. We 
will not go into historical details here, but a quotation from Watson (1930) of 
relevance to teaching may be an appropriate starting point: 
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world 
to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train  
him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer,  
artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his 
talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. 
(p. 82) 
This statement may be intentionally drastic, but even so it is typical that the student 
is seen as highly passive, and the teacher as correspondingly active, in the context 
of education and instruction. Teaching becomes superficial and mechanical. The 
children are exposed to specific stimuli intended to elicit specific responses. In this 
respect, Watson’s student B.F. Skinner was more open-minded. He assigned 
greater importance to the children’s power of initiative and to their spontaneity, 
emphasising that desirable actions should be rewarded (reinforced) to increase the 
likelihood that they will be repeated. Further, Skinner took a negative view of 
punishment, but the implications of this are open to discussion. If criticism and the 
correction of mistakes are perceived as punishment and thus discouraged, learning 
by failing will not be very effective, and as the philosopher of science Karl Popper 
has shown, falsification – or trial and error – is the most effective method in human 
problem-solving and learning (Popper, 1959). As we will see later, the cognitive 
psychologist Kenneth S. Goodman considered that this insight should underpin 
reading instruction. 
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Cognitivism 
The boundary between behaviourism and cognitive psychology can be identified 
by reference to Ausubel (1968), a cognitive psychologist who emphasised the 
difference between meaningful learning and rote learning. However, the various 
strands of cognitive psychology place more or less weight on meaning – some of 
them focus more on concepts such as ‘awareness’ and ‘metacognition’ (thinking 
about thinking). 
 Yetta M. Goodman and Kenneth S. Goodman are among those who assign great 
importance to meaning, stressing that readers create meaning in their encounters 
with texts (while other cognitivists in reading research play this position down or 
disagree with it). For example, Goodman and Goodman (1994) assert the 
following: 
Reading is not simply knowing sounds, words, sentences, and the abstract 
parts of language that can be studied by linguists. Reading, like listening, 
consists of processing language and constructing meaning. The reader brings 
a great deal of information to this complex and active process. […] As 
readers make use of their knowledge of all the language cues, they predict, 
make inferences, select significant features, confirm, and constantly work 
toward constructing a meaningful text. Not only are they constructing 
meaning. They are constructing themselves as readers. (pp. 112–115). 
In this connection, Liberman, Shankweiler and Liberman (1989) stress, among 
other things, that there is an essential difference between written language and 
spoken language in that proper application of the alphabetic principle requires 
awareness of the internal phonological structure of words represented using the 
alphabet, and that – unfortunately for emerging readers and writers – such 
awareness is not an automatic consequence of speaking a language. For this reason, 
Phonics and phonemic awareness have been at the centre of much cognitivist 
reading research. Starting from a meaning-focused variety of cognitivism, 
Goodman and Goodman (1994) claim that Phonics should not be taught, because 
children ‘can discover letter-sound regularities from experiencing actual print and 
doing real writing’ (p. 22). This may be an extreme position, but we will see later 
on that both implicit learning and the ability to notice (as opposed to just seeing) 
are things that must be kept in mind when it comes to children’s reading and their 
acquisition of reading skill. Indeed, Goodman and Goodman (1994) presuppose, in 
several places, that reading consists primarily of associating entire words with 
meaning. Because of the essential role of association, this can be claimed to be an 
element of behaviourism 
 Cognitivists who have criticised the Goodmans and those like-minded have 
started from dual-route (or two-channel) models. According to Seymour (1986), 
dual-route models are based on the claim that ‘the interpretation of an array of 
letters typically involves the co-operation of two functionally distinct processes:  
a lexical process, by which the pronunciation of known words may be directly 
“looked up” or addressed, and a non-lexical process which makes use of a 
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knowledge of letter-sound associations to assemble a conventionally acceptable 
pronunciation’ (p. 5). Since one of those routes corresponds to the Goodmans’ 
direct route from meaning to pronunciation, we are dealing with association here  
as well. The other route requires words to be broken down into letters (graphemes), 
which must then first of all be recognised or identified. This, too, is a matter of 
association. To avoid, say, mistaking the letters J and L for each other, a  
reader must have established, by means of a large number of repetitions,  
clear representations of the differences between them. Then, once the graphemes 
have been identified, they must be associated with language sounds (phonemes). 
After that, the phonemes are combined into a sound package, which is associated 
with a meaning. Even when this procedure is used, then, behaviourist laws of 
association clearly play an absolutely central role. 
 As mentioned, association is closely linked to repetition, automatisation and 
rapid, energy-saving responses. The cognitive element primarily consists in the 
analysis of a written image and the synthesis of phonemes. The analysis of the 
written image relates above all to visual sensing and perception. As we have seen, 
these are closely related. Some might assert that sensing is non-cognitive, while it 
is commonly claimed that perception is cognitive because interpretation is an 
important component of it. When phonemes are to be combined into a sound 
package, there is a need for memory. Some will say this is short-term memory, 
others will contend that working memory is the best term. Both of these are central 
to cognitive psychology. 
 Unlike behaviourism, the cognitive school does not restrict itself to the 
externally observable. Instead, the internal – often referred to as mental processes – 
is the main object of interest. As already mentioned, this creates room for aspects 
such as meaning, awareness and metacognition. However, it is striking that 
cognitivists have been more concerned with structures and models than with 
processes and internal driving forces such as emotions and needs. Part of the 
reason for this may be that cognitivists have drawn inspiration from the linguist 
Noam Chomsky and from computer technology (particularly artificial intelligence 
or AI) (Leahey, 2001). As a rule, no explicit emphasis is placed on introspection 
(subjective observation of one’s inner life), but it is otherwise open to discussion 
what type of empirical data makes up the foundation of this school. Its reading 
models, which often constitute detailed presentations of the dual-route model, 
show the various sub-tasks that reading can be assumed to consist of. These models 
can be compared to anatomical models of the human skeleton and inner organs: 
they provide a picture of the structure, but not of the driving forces explaining life. 
On this point, cognitivism differs from behaviourism, which shows how emotions 
and needs make people react to reward and punishment, and also explains variation 
in motivation. Such irrational factors are difficult to accommodate even in a very 
broad concept of cognition. 
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the idea that nerve cells may be more or less ‘fired up’. This makes it possible to 
explain not only occasional sub-optimal performance of tasks but also progressive 
acquisition and progressive loss of knowledge and skills. Like behaviourism, 
connectionism is better than cognitivism at explaining individual differences. 
 Unlike behaviourism, connectionism does not restrict itself to the externally 
observable. But unlike cognitivism, it still refuses to use ‘mentalist’ language such 
as ‘inner representations’ and ‘ideas’. As a result, concepts such as ‘meaning’ and 
‘representation’ are rare in connectionist writings. Nor does connectionism assume 
the existence of such clearly delimited abilities or modules as are often found in 
cognitivism (cf. Fodor, 1983). Further, while cognitivism assumes a clear 
distinction between the rational and the irrational and also often distinguishes more 
or less clearly between the psychological and the physical, connectionism asserts 
that such distinctions cannot be made. This avoids many of the problems that arise 
in cognitivism. However, critics consider this to be a way for connectionism to 
disregard individual problems. For example, it can be objected on good grounds 
that it is difficult to find a place for meaning in connectionist thought, even though 
connectionist models of reading always include a ‘semantic processor’ (Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004). A further potential objection is that connectionism has little 
place for the control function which is included in the cognitivist framework in the 
form of awareness or conscious monitoring and steering. On this last point, though, 
connectionists would assert that the nervous system has an inherent tendency to 
find balance or harmony. Problems and tensions are resolved in a way that 
resembles how this is done in a cybernetic system, with feedback from one part of 
the system influencing the remainder. When it comes to learning, this actually 
resembles Jean Piaget’s theory of assimilation and accommodation (Piaget, 1966). 
 Like cognitivism, connectionism often uses models showing activities on the 
internal level. However, connectionist models are usually less detailed than 
cognitivist ones. Further, while cognitivism typically assumes that the sub-tasks 
included in a model are carried out in a specific order and one at a time, 
connectionism claims that many processes are going on simultaneously or in 
parallel (this is why connectionism is occasionally referred to as ‘parallel 
distributed processing’ or PDP). In addition, connectionism has an interesting 
theory about ‘emergence’, according to which there occasionally arise cascades of 
reactions whose result is more than the sum of the inputs. This can be compared to 
the concept of ‘insight’ in gestalt psychology, where there are sudden leaps in 
comprehension. As we will see later on, something similar can also be found in the 
distinction between seeing and noticing. Children spelling or sounding their way 
through a word often experience the type of sudden revelations sometimes referred 
to as ‘Aha! moments’. For example, the word ‘summer’ may be read out as /s/-/ʌ/-
/m/-/m/-/ә/-/r/. Then suddenly everything falls into place and the child realises the 
correct meaning. But if, say, lexical stress is misplaced or the process is too slow, a 
child may not discover what the corresponding spoken word is. 
 Connectionism has turned out to be a good fit with the workings of the nervous 
system. This school of psychology has also managed to develop software that very 
successfully simulates the consequences of learning and of damage to the nervous 
system
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figurative expressions presupposing that reading can be compared to the placing of 
building-blocks on top of each other. First and most obviously, this is because 
these expressions evoke a sequence from the point when the written image reaches 
the eye to the point when the reader identifies a pronunciation and a meaning. 
However, there is probably also often an underlying idea that the first or bottom 
blocks are simpler or less complicated than the top ones. This is why it is more 
common to talk about automatisation in relation to the bottom blocks. In our 
opinion, first, both automatisation and awareness are needed at all levels; and, 
second – as we will show later – it is more appropriate to talk in terms of the 
relationship between the whole and its parts than in terms of that between the top 
and the bottom. 
Bottom-up approach 
Opinions differ as regards how many building-blocks there are between the bottom 
and the top. We will not discuss this issue in detail here, only mention a few main 
blocks that are usually included in descriptions. 
 Reading theory generally distinguishes between graphemes and phonemes. 
These concepts exhibit some variation as regards their use and content, but 
generally speaking phonemes are language sounds used to express meaning. The 
word ‘sun’ thus contains three phonemes. A grapheme is a graphical representation 
of a phoneme. Basically, this means that there is one grapheme (or letter) 
corresponding to each phoneme. Such correspondences are of course rarely perfect 
– one grapheme may represent several phonemes and a phoneme may be 
represented by several graphemes. 
 The manifestations of graphemes and phonemes encountered in real life are not 
uniform. Since there are handwritten and printed versions of individual graphemes, 
in various fonts, in bold and italic type, upper- and lower-case letters, etc., the 
identification of graphemes must be based on both sensing, perception and 
memory. Identification thus presupposes interpretation, and this is true of 
phonemes as well. For example, the realisation of the phoneme corresponding to 
the <a> grapheme will have a slightly different ring to it depending on who is 
speaking. This variation is associated, among other things, with gender, age and 
dialect. The phoneme has been compared to an atom, which consists of a nucleus 
surrounded by a ‘cloud’ of electrons: the nucleus represents the common features 
of the phoneme while the cloud represents this variation in its pronunciation. 
 Despite this need for interpretation, however, there is a large extent of 
automatisation in the identification of graphemes and phonemes. On the other 
hand, as we will discuss in greater detail later, what is happening automatically 
must be ‘monitored’ so that any problems that arise may be solved and any 
mistakes may be corrected. 
 When the written image has been broken down into graphemes, each grapheme 
is associated with a phoneme. These phonemes are then brought together to form a 
pronunciation. If the word is long, or if the phonemes are brought together too 
slowly, it may be that some sounds escape from memory. For example, some of the 
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first sounds in ‘summertime’ may be forgotten, and then there is no way to find out 
to which of the words of spoken language the sound package corresponds. Now, if 
the model involves such a sound package being compared with words of spoken 
language, there must be some form of external or internal pronunciation. Except in 
the case of reading aloud, however, the nature of this pronunciation is a 
controversial issue: is it sub-vocal (i.e. involving movements of the vocal chords 
that do not produce any audible sounds), or is it entirely mental? 
 Analysis and synthesis here involve a complicated combination of the whole 
and its parts. What is required, in a sense, is the ability to tell the trees from the 
forest. A person with normal vision will see all words and their component parts, 
but may not necessarily notice all of the relevant details, perhaps focusing instead 
on too large a number of small details or on too small a number of large ones. 
 Cognitive psychology has devoted a great deal of attention to models such as the 
dual-route one, which consists of a direct route and an indirect one. Here, two 
things should be noted. First, it is a well-known fact that good readers really do see 
words as wholes and associate them with meaning. Second, there is a consensus 
that unfamiliar words must be broken down into graphemes, which are then 
associated with phonemes. As we will see later on, the distinction between the 
direct route and the indirect one largely corresponds to our distinction between 
automaticity and awareness. However, it should be added that the indirect route 
requires both automaticity and awareness. This is because it presupposes that the 
association between grapheme and phoneme has been automatised. If a reader 
recognises parts of a word, such as a few syllables or morphemes, there will not 
just be a need for association between phonemes and graphemes, but also for 
association between larger units. This could be claimed to represent an additional 
route, meaning that there are more than two. However, in our opinion the two-way 
distinction is appropriate given that the indirect route requires analysis and 
synthesis – to a greater or lesser extent – while the direct one does not. The 
phonemes must be brought together to form wholes, which must be compared with 
words of spoken language. 
 This two-way idea has been known and used since the beginnings of reading 
research, but it was not formally made into a dual-route model until the arrival of 
cognitivism. It is debatable who was the first to represent this idea graphically, but 
Morton (1968) was at least one of the first to do so. The first route, leading from 
whole words to meaning and/or pronunciation, can be fully explained by the laws 
of association of behaviourism. The second, indirect, route is also largely based on 
those laws, namely as regards the connection between graphemes and phonemes. 
What it requires in addition to those laws is analysis and synthesis, tasks primarily 
based on sensing, perception and memory. Perception and memory would be seen 
by most people as cognitive tasks, but even so many would also claim that 
behaviourism can explain memory in terms of associations. 
 When it comes to the analysis of written images, there is a need for visual skills. 
Not only must the visual organs and the sensing system function properly, but there 
is also a requirement for perception, which really is interpretation: to make sense of 
difficult handwriting, for example, the relevant details must be identified. Those 
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details must always be interpreted in the light of larger wholes, but the size of the 
wholes chosen in this context is an open question. In other words, there are no 
limits specifying what the smallest or largest units are. To this should be added that 
memory must also be used to determine, say, whether a letter is a J or an L. 
 The synthesis of language sounds requires auditory and phonological skills. 
Whether phonological skills can be reduced to auditory skills is a controversial 
question. In our view, auditory skills are a prerequisite for phonological ones. 
Phonology is about sounds, but primarily about distinguishing language sounds 
from other sounds and distinguishing between different language sounds. In other 
words, it is largely a question of identification and categorisation. Synthesis 
requires, first, that an increasing number of phonemes are maintained in working 
memory – for example, first /s/, then /ʌ/ and finally /n/. Further, it is important to 
bring these together into a whole: ‘sun’. While what matters in analysis is 
identifying the trees, the key to synthesis is identifying the forest. The latter task 
consists in comparing the whole arrived at with a word of spoken language located 
in memory. At first glance this may seem a simple task, but most people will have 
noticed that early beginning readers may run into problems in this context. For 
example, if a child devotes too much time to each of the sounds of the word ‘sun’ 
or places the stress incorrectly, he or she will have difficulty realising that this 
sound package corresponds to a familiar word in spoken language. 
 In reading-instruction theory, the Phonics tradition (see the chapter on reading 
instruction in this book for further explanation) is the one that has placed the most 
emphasis on the bottom-up approach. Both behaviourism and large parts of 
cognitive psychology have been part of the Phonics tradition, based on the 
argument that this approach is necessary to read unfamiliar words. The Whole 
Language (or Whole Word) tradition (again, see the chapter on reading instruction 
in this book for more details) represents the other extreme of reading-instruction 
theory yet also belongs to the cognitive school of psychology. Its advocates do 
accept that the indirect route can be helpful to solve some problems, but also claim 
that motivation and meaning can be lost if excessive emphasis is placed on that 
method. In addition, they see a risk that children will become too preoccupied with 
the trees and lose sight of the forest. 
Top-down approach 
When faced with entirely new phenomena, people do not normally start with the 
smallest details. Let us take as an example how scholars have gone about 
understanding the Voynich manuscript, described as ‘the world’s most mysterious 
manuscript’ (Brumbaugh, 1977). They first tried to form an overall impression of 
the whole: When was the manuscript written? By whom? For whom? Why? What 
is the main point? While not arriving at any certain and clear answers to these 
questions, scholars made guesses, assumptions and hypotheses that were more or 
less well-founded, primarily using their imagination and their creativity. Only then 
did they try to make sense of the details of the manuscript in the light of these 
overall considerations. This is a typical example of the top-down approach. The 
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more unfamiliar and unknown a phenomenon is, the more overall in nature the 
approach taken to it will be. In the case of reading, neither the written image nor 
the meaning is likely to be as unknown as in the case of the Voynich manuscript, 
which is why there is rarely a need to take such an overall approach and place such 
emphasis on it. 
 As mentioned above, the Whole Language school of reading instruction 
represents a top-down view of the reading process. This school belongs to 
cognitivism, which focuses mainly on the meaning-related aspect of reading. If 
experienced readers encounter an unfamiliar word, they will follow the indirect 
route, with analysis and synthesis, as described above. However, if the word is 
entirely unfamiliar in terms of both meaning, spelling and pronunciation, this route 
will not be very helpful. If, say, the word is from a language completely unfamiliar 
to the reader, he or she will end up with a sound package but will not know how to 
pronounce it nor what it means. Then the word must be looked up on the internet or 
in a dictionary. This requires knowledge and skills: being able to key in the letters 
in correct order in a search box or knowing how the letters of a word can be used to 
find it in a dictionary. And if such a search is successful, it will often turn out that 
the word has several potential meanings. Then it is necessary to study the context 
in which the word is used in order to find the most likely or appropriate meaning. 
 Such problems potentially caused by entirely unknown words are evidence that 
the bottom-up approach is not always effective. Kenneth S. Goodman (Goodman, 
1967), when referring to reading as a ‘guessing game’, may have been out to 
provoke by his choice of words, but still it is often the case that readers are able to 
make good assumptions about the meaning of unfamiliar words based on their 
context – and sometimes such assumptions may even be more helpful than 
dictionary entries. 
Interactive approach 
When it comes to the interactive approach, the most influential school of 
psychology may be connectionism. This approach, first, does not involve 
sequential processes where one task is completed before the next one is begun but 
allows for parallel or simultaneous processes. Second, this approach also allows for 
interaction among all sub-processes. 
 In addition, there is no clear-cut distinction between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’, as can 
be seen from the connectionist David E. Rumelhart’s choice of terminology: 
I use the term perception rather freely here. In general, it is my opinion that 
the distinction between the perceptual and conceptual aspects of reading is 
not that useful. As I will suggest later, there appears to be a continuity 
between what has been called perception and what has been called 
comprehension. My use of the term perception in the present context is 
simply the use of the one term to cover the entire process. (Rumelhart in 
Ruddell, Ruddell, & Singer, 1994, note on p. 893) 
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As is clear from the model of Seidenberg and McClelland (1989) presented above, 
these connectionists presuppose an interaction between various ‘processors’: a 
context processor, a meaning (or semantic) processor, an orthographic processor 
and a phonological processor. To this could be added sensing and perception, 
which are closely associated with comprehension and cognition in the above 
quotation from Rumelhart. 
 Marilyn Jager Adams, who wrote one of the most influential books – Beginning 
to Read – about reading and reading instruction, has the following to say about the 
connectionist way of thinking: 
The power of these models derives from the fact that they are neither top-
down nor bottom-up in nature. Instead, all relevant processes they include are 
simultaneously active and interactive; all simultaneously issue and 
accommodate information to and from one another. The key to these models, 
in other words, is not the dominance of one set of processes over the others, 
but the coordination and cooperation of all as shaped by the reader’s own 
prior knowledge and experience. (Adams in Ruddell, Ruddell, & Singer, 
1994, p. 843) 
READING SKILL 
As initially mentioned, we intend to conclude this chapter by trying to bring 
together some of the threads of the discussion in order to investigate what it means 
that reading is a skill. 
 Let us first examine the claim that reading is a skill similarly to, say, 
intelligence. When people are asleep and not using their intelligence, it is still there 
as a potential to solve problems and perform other tasks. The same applies to 
reading. We thus cannot agree with behaviourism, which restricts reading to 
external observable reading behaviour or to performance on reading tests. If 
reading skill is to be measured, it is of course important to have access to good 
tests that measure this skill or potential as accurately as possible. This means that 
those tests should have high validity and reliability. In this context, the difference 
between reading skill as such and its performance is important. For example, if a 
student is having difficulties showing his or her true potential because of poor 
concentration or nervousness, it is important to take measures to remedy these 
factors. By contrast, if the actual skill or potential is inadequate, there is a need to 
take much more far-reaching action. 
 There is also, as mentioned to begin with, a need to distinguish between 
knowledge and skills. Typical examples of knowledge are facts gathered in 
memory relating to, say, geographical names or years that are important in history. 
Typical examples of skills include swimming and riding a bicycle. It is not unusual 
for knowledge and skills to be interwoven. A person who speaks a foreign 
language can be said to possess a skill, but that skill also consists in knowledge 
about the pronunciation and meaning of words in that language. By emphasising 
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that reading is a skill, we do thus not exclude that reading may also require 
knowledge, above all knowledge about spelling. 
 What, then, characterises the good performance of a skill? The most important 
thing is to find an optimal combination of automaticity and awareness. The concept 
of automaticity comes from the behaviourist tradition, which led to an excessive 
preoccupation with automatisation in reading instruction, making reading 
mechanical and superficial. The concept of awareness comes from the cognitivist 
tradition, which has focused too much on metacognition and on knowledge of 
rules. Both behaviourism and cognitivism represent important insights that must be 
taken into account in order to understand what reading is and how this skill can 
best be acquired. In our opinion, connectionism has combined these two schools of 
psychology in a way which is very fruitful to reading research and reading 
instruction. Our terminology, however, differs slightly from that used by 
connectionism. 
 What do we mean by an optimal combination of automaticity and awareness? 
What is crucial is that the respective weight allocated to these must be adapted to 
the circumstances. Let us take a concrete example from a field other than reading. 
A person riding a bicycle who relies completely on the ‘autopilot’ may end up in 
trouble. But so may a person who thinks too much about what he or she is doing 
when bicycling. There must be awareness supplementing automaticity. By 
awareness we mean two things: monitoring and steering. In the bicycling example, 
monitoring means that the rider must pay attention to what is happening in traffic, 
to the direction in which the road is heading, to any alien objects on the ground, to 
adjusting his or her velocity to the sharpness of curves, etc. In a sense, all cyclists 
with normal senses will record everything on their way, but they will not notice 
everything. The difference between seeing/hearing/sensing on the one hand and 
noticing on the other is an important element of awareness, involving a change in 
focus between the whole and the part – or between the forest and the trees. The 
second thing we mean by awareness, besides this kind of monitoring and 
observation, is the conscious ‘turning-off of the autopilot’ to take over control in 
case of problems, errors or uncertainty. To bring us back to reading, it can be 
noted, as previously mentioned, that eye movements or saccades are largely 
automatised during reading. However, fixations are sometimes longer because of a 
need to ‘draw the threads together’, and sometimes a reader will make regressions 
backwards in the text to ‘resume the thread’. Such reading behaviour represents 
manifestations of the steering aspect of awareness. 
 When a person is reading a simple text on a familiar and interesting subject, 
automaticity may predominate, but awareness must always be at the ready, 
monitoring and intervening as and when necessary in the case of problems, errors 
or uncertainty. It should be noted, though, that it is important to teach young 
beginning readers to ‘take the plunge’ without an excessive fear of making 
mistakes. Kenneth S. Goodman (1994) makes an important point when asserting 
that ‘[r]isk-taking has been recognized as a significant aspect of both language 
learning and proficient language use. In risk-taking there is a necessary balance 
between tentativeness and self-confidence’ (p. 120). On the other hand, children 
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must not learn to rely excessively on the autopilot, either. There must be a proper 
balance between self-confidence and self-criticism. Reading will be the least 
effortful and the most rewarding with an optimal combination of automaticity and 
awareness, because this yields a reading fluency that promotes both an appropriate 
reading pace and good reading comprehension. There is no mathematical formula 
for this – rather, it is an attitude acquired through extensive practical training, good 
role models and a supportive environment. 
 To this should be added that risk-taking leading to error may yield positive 
learning. According to the philosopher of science Karl Popper, trial and error is the 
best route to comprehension and learning in research (Popper, 1959). This can be 
claimed to apply to all learning. In an educational context, however, it is important 
to ensure that children will not see their errors or mistakes as failures. Teachers and 
other adults must draw on their wisdom when making corrections – unless the 
children detect and correct their own mistakes, which awareness actually often 
helps them do. 
 It is also important to ensure that automatisation does not cover only the 
technical aspects of reading – interpretation and problem-solving also need to be 
automatised to some extent. Correspondingly, awareness may be needed at all 
stages of the reading process. As mentioned above, sensing and perception 
typically happen so quickly that they may be believed to be entirely automatised 
‘chain reactions’, but they also involve the solution of tasks or problems. Indeed, 
according to Rumelhart as quoted above, there appears to be a continuity between 
what has been called sensation and perception and what has been called 
comprehension – sensations are not just patterns of irritations on our sensory 
surfaces. To delve deeper into this issue, we believe that it is fruitful to make use of 
hermeneutics, something that in our view has so far not been done to a sufficient 
extent in reading research. This is probably because reading research has mainly 
taken place in the English-speaking world while hermeneutics belongs to a 
Continental European tradition. 
 Hermeneutics was originally a method for interpreting literary, theological and 
legal texts. However, it has progressively evolved into a general method of 
interpretation which can be used, for example, to interpret existence as a whole – 
that is, as a philosophical method (Gadamer, 1960). On the other hand, it can also 
be used to interpret the simplest of sensory impressions. The principle remains the 
same: seeing the whole and the parts in relation to each other. When faced with 
entirely new and unfamiliar phenomena, people like to begin by trying to achieve a 
rough overall understanding. This is then used to identify what seem to be relevant 
details and attempt to understand them. Other details will also be noticed and 
understood in different ways. As a rule, this understanding of details will affect, 
and thus change, the understanding of the whole. And this new understanding of 
the whole may in turn contribute to a new understanding of the parts. This 
interaction between the whole and the parts is referred to as the hermeneutic circle 
or spiral. In theory, there can be no such thing as a final, entirely certain and 
entirely clear understanding of anything: hermeneutics amounts to the constant 
testing of hypotheses without ever arriving at final answers. In practice, for 
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instance when it comes to the interpretation of sensory impressions, this testing of 
hypotheses usually stops rather soon; but finding, say, the deepest meaning of an 
important text often involves quite a few rounds of the hermeneutic circle or spiral. 
In reading research, there is a great deal of talk about ‘comprehension’. Since it is 
never possible to determine whether this result has been attained, however, it 
would be better to talk about ‘interpretation’ instead, given that this represents an 
open process. 
 Most investigations of reading comprehension, including the large international 
ones such as PIRLS and PISA, are based on concrete questions and answers – 
either open questions and answers, which are assessed and scored by researchers, 
or multiple-choice questions where students select options. The answers sought 
sometimes consist in pure facts while other questions require more or less logical 
or psychological inferences to be made. The tests do not primarily concern the 
process leading up to the answer, but the answer itself. What is more, ‘rational’ 
lines of reasoning characterised by common sense are highly valued while the tests 
are less well suited to more extreme individuals who either go strictly by logic or 
have a vivid imagination. This way of measuring (reading) comprehension has 
characterised psychological and pedagogical research in English-speaking 
countries. 
 On the European Continent, by contrast, hermeneutics has been more important 
(although not yet in the field of reading tests). There, the process – interpretation – 
is what matters the most. In addition, hermeneutics takes a broader perspective 
than traditional theories of comprehension in that it covers the entire spectrum 
from the interpretation of sensory impressions to the interpretation of life 
experiences. In other words, it is relevant to everything from the psychology of 
perception to philosophy – including textual analysis. It is true that this process of 
interpretation is more difficult to measure than the product of comprehension, but 
even so we are of the opinion that it is more important to focus on that process than 
on the product traditionally referred to as reading comprehension. This is because 
hermeneutics can give us a platform or common denominator for the entire reading 
process, from sensory perception to the interpretation of all the nuances of meaning 
of individual words and the interpretation of long texts or complex situations as 
wholes. Someone meeting a person for the first time will interpret that situation 
and that person using the same method as when interpreting the tiniest sensory 
impressions for the first time. 
 As we have seen above, many people – especially of a cognitivist persuasion – 
claim that reading requires phonological awareness. This is correct in the sense that 
a reader must know that there is a connection between the phonemes of spoken 
language and the graphemes of written language. In a sense, we hear all of the 
sounds in a stream of speech, but we do not notice them all. In initial reading 
instruction, it is important for children to notice the elements making up the stream 
of speech. And attention or awareness in the sense of noticing things is also 
important when sounds are put together to form wholes. If a reader sounds out, say, 
/s/-/ʌ/-/n/ too slowly, he or she may not notice the similarity between that sound 
package and the word ‘sun’ of spoken language. This is a field where children can 
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often be seen to experience Aha! moments – a phenomenon which is in fact closely 
related to what connectionists call ‘emergence’. 
 Correspondingly, it is important that a reader should not only see the text, but 
also be able to notice the letters. When someone is noticing details in this manner, 
awareness predominates over automaticity – and as mentioned, the balance 
between them must be adapted to the circumstances. A good reader will be able to 
rely on automaticity to a large extent, but even good readers must make use of 
awareness when proof-reading. 
 We mentioned before that the history of reading research started with a visual 
approach. While that approach has not been particularly prominent after the 1960s, 
there have been interesting developments in the visual study of reading as well. 
Above all, it has been found that when readers are fixating, they use the 
parvocellular system to delve deeper into details. The magnocellular system, by 
contrast, provides a rougher overall impression, giving information about the 
required duration of fixations and the appropriate length of saccades between 
fixations. This can be seen as an ingenious alternation between automaticity and 
awareness and between a rough impression of wholes and more detailed study of 
parts. 
 According to the dual-route model – which has been particularly emphasised by 
cognitivist reading researchers even though it has been more or less implicitly 
assumed to exist ever since the beginnings of reading research – there is a direct 
route from whole words to their meaning and pronunciation, with word recognition 
taking place automatically. The other route is the one that must be taken when 
word recognition is not automatic. This dichotomy also corresponds to that 
between automaticity and awareness. It is important to combine these two routes in 
an optimal way. 
 One advantage of bringing hermeneutics – the theory of interpretation – into 
reading research is, as already mentioned, that it can be used across the range, from 
the interpretation of sensory impressions and graphemes to the interpretation of 
entire texts or meanings. An additional advantage is that this extends the focus to 
encompass the processes involved rather than just the final products or outputs. 
This makes it possible to find out whether a reader is on the right path – to the 
extent that there is indeed a right path and a set goal. The disadvantage is that this 
makes measuring more difficult, but the most important things are in fact often the 
hardest to measure.  
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CHAPTER 6 
READING FLUENCY 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Wolf and Katzir-Cohen (2001), the amount of interest paid to reading 
fluency has varied over the history of reading-instruction theory, with high points 
during periods when reading aloud has been seen as crucial. Allington (1983) in 
particular has contributed strongly to the inclusion of fluency as an explicit 
objective in various national curricula. Such official recognition has given reading 
aloud a higher status and greater importance in reading instruction. The US 
National Reading Panel (2000) further reinforced this tendency (cf. Pikulski & 
Chard, 2005). As we see it, however, there remain two large and challenging 
questions: what is reading fluency, and how is it best measured? This chapter aims 
to take a closer look at those two questions. It must be seen in the context of the 
chapters on reading skill and reading instruction in this book, given the importance 
of understanding the inter-relationships among reading fluency, reading skill, 
reading pace and reading comprehension. A key point in this respect is the insight 
that hermeneutics can bring together sensory impressions from letters and the 
understanding of meaning. 
DIFFERENT VIEWS ON READING FLUENCY 
At an early stage of the history of reading-instruction theory, a great deal of 
emphasis was placed on automatising the technical elements of reading as far as 
possible (cf., e.g., Huey 1908) so as to achieve good reading fluency. This term 
(and others) have been used in various, often unclear meanings. According to the 
National Reading Panel (2000), it is ‘a critical component of skilled reading’ 
(p. 32) and ‘an essential part of reading’ (p. 328) – even though it is not clearly 
defined. It is also unclear whether this means that fluency should be included in the 
definition of reading. For example, fluency has so far not been an element of the 
different variants of – and proposed extensions to – the ‘reading formula’ (reading 
= decoding × comprehension) (Gough & Tunmer, 1986). 
 In practice, good public readers such as actors and news presenters are probably 
often used as benchmarks to determine what ‘reading fluency’ means, with 
flawless and fast reading (aloud) as the common characteristics. Against that 
background, one might wonder whether aesthetic concerns are also part of the 
reason why reading fluency is emphasised at school. Further, it is nowadays often 
stressed that reading aloud should resemble natural speech as far as possible, or 
rather that reading aloud should be such that it captures and maintains the listener’s 
attention and interest. However, many object to ascribing such importance to the 
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receiver. For example, Harris and Hodges (1985) assert that reading fluency is the 
‘freedom from word identification problems that might hinder comprehension’ 
(p. 85).  
 According to another view, reading fluency is seen as the ‘bridge’ between 
decoding and comprehension (Chard, Pikulski, & McDonagh, 2006). A person 
reading unevenly and slowly will have problems with comprehension and thus find 
it difficult to identify the speech equivalents of written words and sentences. A 
similar view on reading fluency underlies the CORI educational software (Guthrie, 
Wigfield, & Perencevich, 2004); it is reflected in the fact that special emphasis is 
placed on increasing the reading fluency of struggling learners up to a level where 
their reading pace no longer prevents them from gaining access to content. It is 
interesting to note that once students have attained that level, reading pace is no 
longer assigned special importance. Up to a certain level, then, reading fluency will 
thus presumably promote the reader’s own comprehension – as well as that of any 
listeners. As we will show later, however, the opposite also applies in that reading 
fluency presupposes a certain level of comprehension. 
 The direction of any causal relationship between reading comprehension and 
reading fluency is indeed a moot point. LaBerge and Samuels (1974) go beyond 
asserting that reading fluency is a mere bridge between decoding and 
comprehension by specially emphasising that automatisation of the technical 
elements of reading lead to more attention and energy being devoted to reading 
comprehension. In line with this, Rasinski and Hoffman (2003) claim that 
automatisation and correct pronunciation and comprehension are important 
components of reading comprehension, but add prosody to the list. In reading 
aloud, like in spoken language, the meaning of a sentence is not just the sum of the 
meanings of the component words, because the effect of prosody (intonation, stress 
and rhythm) must be added to this. 
 Prosody constitutes a condition of meaning specific to spoken language. Its 
absence from written language means that written text must carry a heavier 
semantic burden than speech (with some of that burden being allocated to 
punctuation, which is absent from spoken language). Thus prosody is not only of 
aesthetic importance, but provides information about the emphasis placed on 
individual units of meaning and about their grouping together. It is a well-known 
fact that the meaning contained in a sentence can be altered through modifications 
to stress, voice quality, intonation and rhythm. Text type also matters greatly – the 
reading of a poem will have a different prosody from the reading of a political 
manifesto – and so do the situation and purpose of reading. According to Miller 
and Schwanenflugel (2006), prosody contributes positively to reading 
comprehension beyond its importance for correct and quick word recognition. 
While prosody as such is not a norm, but rather a tool to describe characteristics of 
spoken language in terms of stress, intonation and rhythm, prosodic characteristics 
can in practice come to be associated with various expressive ideals of a more or 
less normative character, such as that of reading aloud in a ‘natural-sounding’ way. 
Here, too, however, the direction of the causal relationship becomes unclear. 
Consequently, even though prosody is a relatively well-defined concept of 
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phonology, it does not help much when it comes to clarifying the meaning of 
reading fluency. Indeed, prosody may well be definable, but it is hard to say what 
prosodic characteristics are correct in a given situation or in the reading of specific 
types of text. The measurement of prosody and thus of reading fluency will 
therefore be subjective and qualitative. To this should be added the question of 
whether prosody is not rather a manifestation of comprehension – is it not the case 
that only when someone has understood the content of a written utterance will he 
or she be able to add appropriate prosody to the various parts of that utterance? 
 Rasinski (1990) claims that the typical approach to instruction in prosody and 
reading fluency has been for the teacher to read first in an exemplary manner and 
for students to imitate. Technical aids have also been made use of in this context 
(cf. Johnston, 2006). Once the teacher has read a text, the student will read the 
same text and be corrected until the result is satisfactory. However, such imitation 
may easily become both artificial, mechanical and automatised in a way that will 
make the student shift the emphasis to the exterior and the surface, which may 
hinder rather than facilitate comprehension. Hoffman (1987) therefore warned 
against this type of imitation and reading aloud; and according to Altweger, Jordan 
and Shelton (2007), this is why reading fluency is not, and should not be, given 
much room in modern reading instruction. What is more, the transferability of the 
results of the method for training prosody is an open question: to what extent will 
they apply only to the text trained? Should not reading fluency be something that is 
adapted to the circumstances obtaining in the individual case? Perhaps it is better to 
measure this mainly in relation to new, unfamiliar texts? 
 Based on what has been said about prosody, it can be claimed that to the extent 
that reading fluency can be measured, such measurement must above all be based 
on reading aloud. But does that mean that reading fluency can be defined only in 
relation to reading aloud? If reading fluency promotes reading comprehension, it 
should presumably be aimed for in silent reading as well. Surely, the claim made 
by the National Reading Panel (2000) that reading fluency is an essential part of 
reading (p. 328) must apply to silent reading, too? We have discussed the role of 
prosody in the evaluation of reading fluency, but it seems that prosody is irrelevant 
for silent reading. Then the issue of reading fluency is reduced to a question of 
reading pace, or possibly of reading pace in relation to scores on reading-
comprehension measurements taken immediately after reading. If the concept of 
reading fluency is to cover all reading (both silent reading and reading aloud), the 
situation described above makes it difficult to define and measure. Further, an 
exclusive focus on pace is not appropriate, either, because it is not possible to read 
faster than one thinks. Against the backdrop of these circumstances, we find it 
appropriate to suggest that (good) reading fluency might mean thinking one’s way 
through a text without the written medium obstructing one’s thought. Such an idea 
is close to the view of Harris and Hodges (1985). In that case, reading fluency will 
have to be defined individually and situationally – in the light of the person and 
circumstances concerned – and not in relation to group or national standards. 
 As mentioned, reading instruction has traditionally placed a great deal of 
emphasis on reading aloud. Obviously one important reason for this is that it 
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allows students’ decoding skills to be tested. However, less importance has been 
attached to testing comprehension, and it was often forgotten that students devoted 
so much attention to reading aloud in a correct or elegant manner that they had 
correspondingly less focus on comprehension (Hyatt, 1943). Yet Huey (1908) 
argued early on that more weight had to be assigned to students’ individual silent 
reading, which can both be faster and yield better comprehension than reading 
aloud, and which also facilitates individual adjustment and enhances motivation. 
Based on these ideas, some authors advised against internal ‘pronunciation’ during 
silent reading (McDade, 1937; Rohrer, 1943). It can be questioned whether this 
represents an appropriate understanding of silent reading, but we will not delve 
deeper into this issue here. However, it is interesting to note that less weight being 
placed on reading aloud traditionally results in less weight being placed on reading 
fluency as well. According to Rasinski and Hoffman (2003), reading aloud is the 
best way to promote reading fluency. On the other hand, Allington (1983) claims 
that silent reading is the best way to promote comprehension. These two 
countervailing claims make it obvious that there is a need for a clearer concept of 
reading fluency during silent reading. 
 As mentioned above, reading fluency is also understood, to some extent, as a 
matter of reading pace. This underpins several of the positions referred to above: 
any position emphasising automatisation will also emphasise pace. What several of 
those positions may seem to be lacking, however, is the insight that the pace must 
be adapted to the circumstances. In this chapter, we will maintain our hypothesis of 
reading fluency as thinking one’s way through a text without being obstructed by 
the written medium precisely because it allows for the adjustment of pace to 
circumstances. This hypothesis thus also tempers the widespread idea equating 
reading fluency with a quick reading pace, opening for new ways to think about 
reading fluency. The need for more nuanced thinking about reading fluency is 
particularly urgent given the software on offer to schools from commercial players 
which generally go very far in equating reading pace and reading fluency. 
However, we will not devote any attention to such applications in the present 
chapter except by evoking the need for ideas about fluency that differ from those 
represented by such software. 
HOW DOES READING FLUENCY MANIFEST ITSELF? 
In 1974, LaBerge and Samuels stressed the importance of reading fluency, but with 
the primary aim of automatising visual perception, the identification of letters and 
sounds, the bringing together of sounds, etc. (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974). Their 
idea was that inadequate automatisation of these tasks draws attention and energy 
away from comprehension efforts. Stanovich (1980) and Perfetti (1985) express 
similar ideas, with automatisation and energy efficiency as keywords. While they 
draw upon behaviourist thinking, their objective is to promote the cognitive 
processes, particularly comprehension. This means that reading fluency is intended 
to promote cognitive aspects. However, it is rarely mentioned that cognitive 
aspects can promote reading fluency, too.  
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 Stanovich makes a distinction between bottom-up and top-down processes. The 
former start with the perception of letters and end with the comprehension of words 
or larger units of text. This ‘route’ is associated with the Phonics school of reading-
instruction theory. The latter processes go the opposite way and are more closely 
linked to the Whole Language school (cf. our chapters on reading skill and reading 
instruction in this book), according to which readers make assumptions about the 
meaning of words based on their context and the purpose of the text, such that it 
may not be necessary to decode or read each word in detail. Stanovich (1980) is of 
the opinion that starting from context must entail slow and highly effortful reading. 
Those who choose this strategy because they have difficulties placing building-
blocks on top of each other using the bottom-up approach will, in all likelihood, 
read with greater uncertainty and make more mistakes than those who have a 
certain and automatised mastery of the bottom-up approach. In our view, however, 
it cannot be excluded that those who have automatised those basic skills will start 
‘at the top’ with meaning and context; we see this as a good illustration of the 
artificial opposition between Phonics and Whole Language. Pressley (2006) has 
tried to find an intermediate position between these two opposite schools, an 
attempt that we will comment on in greater detail later (see also Chapter 7). 
 Automatic, fast and correct identification of the pronunciation and meaning of 
individual words can be seen, at most, as a necessary condition for reading fluency, 
but not as a sufficient condition because reading fluency applies to entire sentences 
and even larger chunks of text. What is more, automatic and fast identification of 
individual words may easily lead to mechanical reading and does not ensure that 
reading produces coherent wholes. For readers to attain correct prosody, for 
example, there is a need for a comprehension of the whole to determine, to some 
extent, how smaller parts should be read. The top-down approach must thus be 
applied to some degree. However, as is clear from our chapters on reading skill and 
reading instruction in this book, all reading – and hence all reading fluency – must 
be based on the alternation between focusing on the whole and focusing on the 
parts. 
 LaBerge and Samuels (1974) and Stanovich (1980) have made important 
contributions to the debate on reading fluency. However, we have two important 
objections or additions: (1) their view of automatisation is problematic in that they 
do not see automaticity and awareness in context (see, e.g., Tønnessen, 1999, 
2011); and (2) interpretation and comprehension should be based to a larger extent 
on the hermeneutic tradition, which has so far played a more important role on the 
European Continent than in the pedagogy, psychology and philosophy of English-
speaking countries. 
 It is true that LaBerge and Samuels (1974) probably make an important point in 
their claim that humans can direct their attention to only one thing at a time and 
that the automatisation of the ‘technical’ tasks of reading makes it possible to 
devote a maximum of attention to comprehension. However, it must be kept in 
mind that complete automatisation is neither possible nor desirable. The idea of 
reading fluency as being able to think one’s way through a text without being 
obstructed by the written medium, elaborated upon earlier in this chapter, 
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internalises that insight from LaBerge and Samuels (1974), but without making it 
into an either/or choice between automaticity and awareness. All skills are 
performed through a situationally determined alternation between automaticity and 
awareness, the latter meaning that people monitor their performance and intervene 
as needed in the case of errors or problems. New and difficult tasks require more 
awareness than familiar tasks. Possessing a skill to a high level means being able to 
achieve an optimal alternation between automaticity and awareness, taking account 
of the requirements of the situation. One example is riding a bicycle. This is an 
activity that people tend to automatise to a large extent, but riding at high velocity 
on an unfamiliar and rugged path requires a high level of awareness. Someone who 
trusts the ‘autopilot’ too much in such a situation will easily end up with problems 
that are difficult to solve. Further, a gymnast drawing excessively on automaticity 
may produce an overly mechanical performance – even though it may be 
technically flawless (an aesthetic aspect which, as mentioned before, can be argued 
to apply to reading fluency as well). 
FROM BALANCED APPROACH TO HERMENEUTICS 
As mentioned, the main emphasis of Phonics is on the bottom-up approach while 
that of Whole Language is on the top-down approach. In our view, those two 
approaches must be combined. A person who has successfully automatised the 
bottom-up processes (of decoding) is in a good position to become a fluent reader, 
but to the extent that fluency includes mastery of prosody, that person must also 
understand units larger than words. For example, correct use in reading aloud of 
the falling intonation signalling the end of a declarative sentence which is found in 
many languages, including Norwegian and English, presupposes an understanding 
of the sentence as a whole. A sentence whose function is to ask a question will not 
have that intonation but will instead be given another characteristic intonation with 
a rise on the last word. Further, questions often have a syntactic structure which 
indicates early on in the sentence that they are indeed questions, for example an 
interrogative pronoun or (in the case of Norwegian and some other Germanic 
languages) the main verb at the very beginning of the sentence. Recognition of 
such markers, and the implementation of the associated prosodic features, requires 
both long experience and a highly active form of reading. To read aloud in a 
manner resembling natural speech, a person must read actively, alternately 
focusing on the part and the whole – that is, focusing both on the pronunciation of 
each word and on its context. On this view of fluency, the most frequent cases of 
fluency breakdown during reading aloud will be those where the reader is 
preoccupied with the word just being read but fails to take in the function of the 
utterance. In such cases, readers are likely to realise their mistake immediately and 
will often produce a new version with correct prosody afterwards. Hence the top-
down approach comes into play here in a certain sense and to a certain degree; we 
are of the opinion that general hermeneutic principles apply, meaning that the 
whole is understood in the light of the parts, and vice versa. 
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 Those principles can be illustrated by a person trying to understand a poem, who 
has to start with a rough understanding of the whole to make sense as far as 
possible of the individual words. This can be said to constitute an assumption or a 
hypothesis. Once the meanings of the individual words have been identified, it is 
likely that the understanding of the whole will change as a result. Such change to 
the hypothesis or overall understanding corresponds to the way in which a 
scientific hypothesis may be modified after encountering reality. Logically 
speaking, the structure or approach is the same: a new understanding of the whole 
forms the basis for new readings and new ways of understanding the details, which, 
in turn, will change the understanding of the whole again. This process is referred 
to as the hermeneutic circle or spiral. It is used not only to interpret texts – the 
same method is actually used to interpret sensory impressions. Faced with the task 
of interpreting unclear handwriting, for example, it is a good idea to start from an 
understanding of the whole. In this sense, good reading will constantly combine 
bottom-up and top-down processes. This can be seen as a combination of the 
schools of Phonics and Whole Language from the field of reading-instruction 
theory, but the way they are combined differs from the way suggested in the 
‘balanced view’ recommended by Pressley (2006). 
 Automatised use of the bottom-up approach may quickly come across as 
mechanical; an extreme example is hyperlexia, which involves very fast decoding 
with few mistakes but minimal comprehension. In our opinion, the reflections 
presented above provide additional support for the view of reading fluency as the 
bridge between decoding and comprehension. At the same time, however, it should 
be noted that a certain amount of reading fluency will promote comprehension; a 
person reading slowly and unevenly will have difficulties with interconnections 
and comprehension, never really ‘getting into the text’. Samuels and Farstrup 
(2006) are right to claim that comprehension and reading fluency have a mutual 
impact on each other and that it is hard to say which of them comes first. Further, it 
is clear that the purpose and nature of a text as well as motivational factors 
influence reading fluency. Exposure to a wide range of different reading situations 
and texts is important for the development of maximum flexibility and reading 
fluency. 
FOCUSING ON READING FLUENCY IN EDUCATION 
The lines of reasoning followed in this chapter have certain ramifications for the 
possible role of reading fluency in education. One main implication is that there 
should be a strong focus on increasing the reading pace and automatising word 
recognition until a reading level is reached where the written medium no longer 
obstructs the students from thinking their way forward in the text. This is what we 
see as reading fluency. On this view, reading fluency includes reading pace, but it 
does not exclusively concern reading pace. Once the threshold has been passed, the 
individual has entered a ‘fluency zone’ with a potential for further development. 
That zone will vary depending on the challenges faced. 
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 A second important implication of our reasoning is that, as students advance to 
higher years and levels, progressively less emphasis should be placed on reading 
pace. This is because an important task of education is to teach students to notice 
things in texts and to relate to texts and text elements of varying degrees of 
difficulty with a view to comprehension. Indeed, it may well be a greater challenge 
to make, say, upper-secondary students read slowly enough, with attention, than to 
make them read faster. We have also pointed to the aesthetic dimension, where 
reading fluency in aesthetic and prosodic terms will overlap with learning goals in 
the fields of presentation techniques and argumentation. That aspect of reading 
fluency will be a natural element of education, particularly in higher years. Against 
this backdrop, there is limited value to having upper-secondary – or other relatively 
senior – students undergo tests that primarily measure reading pace. Such tests may 
actually give teachers, students and parents the wrong signals about the reading 
challenges that students encounter in the years concerned, and also about what 
reading really is. To this should be added the existence of commercial players 
offering products, often at a steep price, said to increase students’ reading pace. 
Many such products have a documented effect on reading pace, and for some of 
them there is also evidence of simple relationships between use of the product and 
reading comprehension. 
 When it comes to the present offer on the Norwegian market, there are 
fundamental objections to be made against this type of documentation. The 
problem is not primarily that the effects are small or non-existent, but rather the 
very absence of critical reflection on how teachers, students and parents should use 
the information and on how it might be part of knowledge about what reading is. 
Speed-reading courses probably do make their participants read faster (even though 
some studies show little or no effect), but the main content of such courses consists 
of general learning and reading strategies that good teachers also use on an 
everyday basis, although perhaps not always to their full potential. And speed-
reading courses are probably also able to accelerate the reading pace of people who 
have no real reason to be slow readers. This can be explained by reference to the 
fact that each person has a range for the performance of reading skill within which 
performance can be more or less optimal. Further, in a best-case scenario, some 
participants in such courses will also make discoveries leading them to develop 
more strategic reading. However, this is exactly what good teachers do every day at 
school, and – unlike the commercial players – teachers also present this as part of 
an overall understanding of the development of reading. Moreover, schools are 
offered software based exclusively on strict behaviourist ideas, but without the 
behaviourist reflections on what reading is. If such software is used on an everyday 
basis at schools without a very good awareness of how it might promote reading 
skill, there is cause for concern. 
 A recent study shows that adult dyslectics read faster and with better 
comprehension when they are pushed to speed up their reading (Breznitz et al., 
2013). That study used computer software showing sentences on the screen with 
the letters moving to from left to right at a set pace and disappearing off the screen, 
forcing the reader to speed up. After completing a task, the reader was asked a 
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comprehension question. If he or she gave a correct answer, each letter in the next 
sentence would be shown on the screen for 2 milliseconds less. If the answer was 
wrong, the exposure time did not change. There is of course a limit to how fast 
anyone can read, which is why the training was organised in sessions. What is 
interesting about this approach is the mechanism (the comprehension question) 
linking the reading pace to the level of comprehension at a fundamental level. In 
addition, this study gives a perspective on our point that the performance of 
reading skill takes place within a range and that the development of reading skill 
involves expanding and moving the upper limits of that range (see also our chapter 
on reading skill in this book). This means that the method used in the above-
mentioned study can be seen as a method for adjusting the reading pace to the 
circumstances, the objective being the further development of reading skill.  
 In this chapter, we have proposed a hypothesis about reading fluency understood 
as thinking oneself through a text without being obstructed by the written medium. 
This requires an interplay between the whole and the parts and is thus linked at a 
fundamental level to the individual performance of reading skill, which is a 
prerequisite for the development of reading skill itself. 
 There is widespread agreement among researchers and practitioners alike that 
reading fluency is important, but definitions are both unclear and varying. There is 
no doubt that uneven and slow reading makes it difficult to take an overview and 
thus to find out what a text corresponds to in natural speech. Reading fluency thus 
promotes reading comprehension, but – as we have seen – reading comprehension 
also promotes reading fluency. Isolated reading aloud, with an exclusive emphasis 
on pronunciation and prosody, may become superficial and mechanical. Such 
exercises may also draw attention away from reading comprehension. Further, 
reading fluency includes an aesthetic component, but this must not be cultivated for 
the sake of its aesthetic value. A speed-skater chooses flexibility and style because 
this increases velocity: aesthetics and effectiveness form a unit. This should also be 
the case for reading fluency and reading comprehension. 
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CHAPTER 7 
READING INSTRUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate on the methods of initial reading instruction has probably been the most 
intense in the United States, where the positions may also have been the most 
entrenched. In our own country, Norway, and generally in Scandinavia, the camps 
have been less rigidly opposed to each other. To this should be added that the 
Norwegian spelling conventions, dialect situation and cultural and educational 
circumstances have affected the characteristics of the national debate. However, 
given that the underlying pedagogical principles are similar, we will here account 
for some of the main developments of the debate in the United States. 
 Most commentators tend to refer to two main positions, using somewhat 
different names for them. Here we will call one of those camps Phonics and the 
other Whole Language. However, it should be kept in mind what Chall (1967) 
found after reviewing 85 studies of teaching methods, namely that ‘[i]t was what 
the teacher did with the method, the materials, and the children rather than the 
method itself that seemed to make the difference’ (p. 270). This is important not 
only because any method will be interpreted and practised differently by different 
teachers, but also because the teacher’s personality and the classroom environment 
may be crucial to the students’ learning outcomes. 
 In Norway, Reading Based on Speech (or LTG) was a popular method in the 
field of initial reading instruction from the 1970s to the 1990s. This method has 
some affinities with the Phonics–Whole Language debate but also exhibits certain 
characteristics and underlying explanations that fall outside that debate. In this 
chapter, we will focus mainly on Phonics versus Whole Language, because in our 
opinion this best illustrates the fundamental positions and points of disagreement. 
However, we will begin with some brief information about LTG and a few 
comments on it. 
 The LTG method was developed in the 1970s by the Swedish primary-school 
teacher Ulrika Leimar (Leimar, 1974). Her starting point was that initial reading 
instruction at the time was characterised by an artificial and restricted vocabulary 
(corresponding rather well to the criticism levelled by the Whole Language school 
at the Phonics school in the United States). She wanted to bring the vocabulary 
used closer to what the children already knew when first starting school – not 
primarily include more literary texts. The aim was to integrate meaning and 
motivation in the learning of the technical skills required for reading. This was a 
reaction on her part to a predominant Phonics-type tradition, and she was seen as 
an opponent of that tradition. However, the main reason for her reaction was in fact 
the way in which that tradition was being practised, and today many would 
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probably place her in between the two US traditions. As evidence, consider the 
following quotation (Leimar, 1974): 
That first autumn when I was trying out the method (1969/1970), I was not 
sufficiently aware to what extent it is necessary to draw the children’s 
attention to character–sound correspondences. As a result, in their uninhibited 
activity in October, the children started guessing words wildly in spontaneous 
whole-word reading. To remedy such look-and-guess tendencies, I started 
letting the children analyse the words and experiment with them […] It seems 
to me that exclusive whole-word reading may not be recommendable at the 
initial stage. The children must be taught to sound written words together 
based on an analysis of the sounds in their own, spoken words […] They 
must be taught a technique to approach even texts that are unfamiliar to them. 
(p. 40; our translation) 
Below we will briefly present (1) the Whole Language tradition and (2) the 
Phonics tradition, and then (3) examine whether, and if so how, confrontation 
between these two traditions can be avoided. 
THE WHOLE LANGUAGE TRADITION 
It is a moot point when Whole Language – in some version or other – was brought 
into reading instruction in the United States, but at the end of the 19th century there 
was a reaction to a long-standing tradition in initial instruction where the focus was 
on short and typically meaningless syllables such as ‘ba’, ‘bi’, ‘bo’, ‘bu’. Both 
teachers and parents felt it was too long before the children engaged in any 
meaningful reading, fearing that this might undermine their interest and 
motivation. Reading instruction at the time involved a great deal of drilling and 
superficial testing. The main method for assessing the children’s skills was reading 
aloud. The linguistic and literary quality of the texts used was low, both because 
the teachers did not want to depart too far from the children’s everyday language 
and because there was a limited supply of study materials. Moreover, no particular 
attention was paid to the depth or quality of the children’s comprehension. Reading 
was seen as a technical skill and a practical tool – not as a gateway to the world of 
language and culture. 
 As an alternative to that method, an increasing number of people were of the 
opinion that children should start by learning the connection between entire 
‘images’ of written words – primarily short and highly frequent ones – and their 
meanings. Subsequently, the idea was for the children progressively to learn how 
to analyse these written images into letters (graphemes) to be associated with 
language sounds (phonemes). However, the progression of such instruction could 
well be somewhat random and often lacked a strong basis in research. Then, from 
the 1920s onwards, the learning principles of behaviourism became predominant 
(Rodgers, 2001). Behaviourists wanted to explain all human behaviour in terms of 
external, observable events, meaning that phenomena such as awareness and 
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thoughts were excluded from study. Reading was explained, in particular, with 
reference to automatisation. 
 The ‘Sputnik Shock’ of 1957 resulted in increased spending on both education 
and research in the United States, and this also had an impact on reading research 
and reading instruction. Teachers, parents and researchers debated with increasing 
intensity which method of initial reading instruction was the most effective and 
efficient. More careful reflection was carried out to underpin and refine the Whole 
Language tradition referred to above, according to which learning to link entire 
written-word images with their associated meanings is more important than starting 
from the component parts of the words and understanding their structure. 
Advocates of Whole Language claim that children must also learn to place the 
words in broader linguistic contexts to be able to find the correct meaning. Kenneth 
S. Goodman and Frank Smith became the most influential representatives of this 
movement, and also those who went farthest in their thinking. 
 According to Yetta M. Goodman and Kenneth S. Goodman (1994), ‘[r]eading is 
not simply knowing sounds, words, sentences, and the abstract parts of language 
that can be studied by linguists. Reading, like listening, consists of processing 
language and constructing meaning. The reader brings a great deal of information 
to this complex and active process’ (p. 112). 
 Goodman and Goodman further claim that ‘[a]s readers make use of their 
knowledge of all the language cues, they predict, make inferences, select 
significant features, confirm, and constantly work toward constructing a 
meaningful text. Not only are they constructing meaning. They are constructing 
themselves as readers’ (p. 115). This view – from a cognitivist perspective 
focusing on meaning and thus on the similarities between spoken and written 
language – underscores the importance of understanding and constructing 
meaningful units and wholes. By contrast, other cognitivists, such as Shankweiler 
and Liberman (1989), focus on decoding (that is, the technical sides of reading) 
and consequently stress the differences between listening and reading. 
 Goodman and Goodman (1994) consider that breaking down spoken language 
not only risks making the details overshadow the whole, but that the demands 
placed on the children’s ability for abstract thinking are also great – it is always 
easier to understand a detail if it is placed in a context or shown as part of a whole: 
Through miscue analysis we have learned that, other things being equal, short 
language sequences are harder to comprehend than are long ones. Sentences 
are easier than words, paragraphs easier than sentences, pages easier than 
paragraphs, and stories easier than pages. (p. 121) 
Meaning is not something clear and final that a text gives its readers – they have to 
use their creativity and their power of empathy to find the most meaningful wholes 
in which the parts can be included: 
The power of language users to fill knowledge gaps with missing elements, to 
infer unstated meanings and underlying structures, and to deal with novel 
experiences, novel thoughts, and novel emotions derives from the ability to 
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predict, to guess, to make choices, to take risks, to go beyond observable 
data. We must have the capability of being wrong lest the limits on our 
functioning be too narrowly constrained. Unlike the computer, people do not 
exhibit specifically programmed, totally dependable responses time after 
time. We are tentative, we act impulsively, we make mistakes, and we 
tolerate our own deviations and the mistakes of others. (p. 104) 
And nor do readers arrive at meaning by following rules. They have to try different 
ways, and they must dare to make mistakes: 
Everything people do, they do imperfectly. This is not a flaw but an asset. If 
we always performed perfectly, we could not maintain the tentativeness and 
flexibility that characterize human learning and the ways we interact with our 
environment and with one another. This model of imperfection causes us as 
researchers not to worry about why people fall short of perfection; rather, we 
are concerned with why people do what they do and with what we can learn 
about language processes from observing such phenomena […]. (p. 104) 
The way readers arrive at meaning and at wholes is by formulating and testing 
hypotheses – which is also, incidentally, the way science progresses. Goodman 
(1967) has referred to this approach, somewhat drastically, as a ‘guessing game’. 
Even though Goodman emphasises that attaining meaning is the primary aim of 
reading, he does not deny that it may be necessary to break words down into 
graphemes and phonemes. A reader faced with an unfamiliar word cannot always 
just guess – he or she must sometimes search for an answer. 
 Smith (1971) largely shares Goodman’s view of reading and of the learning and 
teaching of it. In his opinion, phonemes and graphemes – the smallest building-
blocks – are too abstract for many children, who must learn to see them in broader 
contexts. At a general level, he asserts that ‘[t]he psycholinguistic perspective had 
a number of influences on the field of reading. First, it encouraged us to value 
literacy experiences that focused on making meaning. This meant that many 
classroom activities – particularly work-sheets and games which focused on 
enabling skills such as specific letter-sound correspondences, syllabification 
activities, structural analysis skills, specific comprehension activities, or study 
skills – were devalued’ (p. 29). Further, the focus on the students’ activities 
entailed a corresponding toning-down of the teacher’s importance: the teacher’s 
role was presented not so much as teaching the students to read but as helping them 
read. The children must indeed learn to read by reading – but the teachers must be 
ready both to motivate and to correct. Further, reading must not be reduced to a 
technique. Linguistic awareness and literary taste are overall objectives of a 
reading instruction that takes as its starting point not only whole words but also 
whole language. 
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THE PHONICS TRADITION 
Whole Language was seen as a liberation from superficial, drill-based reading 
instruction. And there is of course no doubt that teaching children the meanings of 
whole-word images can be helpful to them on their way to becoming good readers. 
However, there are some objections to it. First, this approach can also degenerate 
into drill; and second, it does not make children wholly self-reliant readers because 
they still have to learn how to analyse word images and what the basic principles of 
written language are. While these aspects are not entirely neglected by the Whole 
Language tradition, many think it does not pay enough attention to them. 
 The alternative is the Phonics tradition. But what characterises that tradition? 
Adams (1990) finds that question difficult to answer: 
What if we restrict attention to the programs that are centered on phonics? 
Can we extract an operational definition of the endeavor from them? The 
answer is no or, at least, not easily. The problem is that there exist many, 
many such programs – each of Robert Aukerman’s books cite over 100. To 
be sure, a central tenet of each of these programs is that working knowledge 
of the letter-to-sound correspondences underlying our system of writing is 
key to proficient reading. Beyond that, however, they differ greatly. (p. 51) 
Some of the first – and most prominent – representatives of the Phonics movement 
assert that, in written language, ‘[m]eanings are not conveyed directly by signals 
that differ holistically, but rather by words that are distinct from each other in their 
internal structure. This structure is formed of a small number of meaningless 
phonological segments we know as consonants and vowels, and governed 
according to a highly systematic combinatorial scheme called phonology’ 
(Shankweiler & Liberman, 1989, p. 7). The relationship between letters (or 
graphemes) and language sounds (or phonemes) varies between languages. Some 
languages, such as Finnish, are entirely regular in that a letter is pronounced in the 
same way in all contexts. English is one of the least regular languages in this 
respect (cf. Seymour, 2005). Hence English-speaking children learning how to 
pronounce letters have to learn a great many exceptions. There is obvious variation 
in how they learn this – as is clear from the claim that upwards of 75 per cent of 
children will learn to read regardless of the method being used, often without 
particularly explicit instruction (Shankweiler & Liberman, 1989). In other words, 
they discover connections between spoken and written words on their own, through 
experience with written texts. 
 Phonics stresses the importance of children attaining phonemic awareness. 
Children perceive spoken words as wholes but have to learn that those wholes 
consist of discrete sounds. This is the only way for them to learn what the 
individual letters represent. Once they have learned that, they can break down a 
written image into its component letters and associate sounds with those letters, 
meaning that they understand that the word ‘sun’ consists of three letters 
corresponding to the three sounds /s/ + /ʌ/ + /n/. Bringing those three sounds 
together yields a whole corresponding to the word ‘sun’ of spoken language. But if 
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the children pronounce this too slowly or put the stress in the wrong place, the task 
of finding out what it corresponds to in spoken language becomes more difficult. 
 The US National Reading Panel (2000) defines phonemic awareness as the 
ability to focus on and manipulate phonemes in spoken words. Phonemic 
awareness can be measured in a series of ways, including by testing the ability to 
identify the first sound in a word, sounds common to several words or words 
distinguishing themselves from each other by their first sound, combining isolated 
sounds into words, breaking up a word into its component sounds, or identifying 
the word that will remain after a sound has been removed from another word 
(National Reading Panel, 2000, pp. 2–1 ff.). 
 While there are many studies indicating that such tests or exercises do measure 
or promote phonemic awareness, it can be questioned to what extent they do not 
also measure or require other intellectual skills. It is clear that the tasks involved 
demand a great deal of concentration, abstraction and motivation. Many children 
may also have difficulty understanding the purpose of such tasks. Still, despite 
these reservations, a series of studies indicate that Phonics is an effective and 
efficient method of initial reading instruction; the National Reading Panel (2000) 
has compiled one of the most recent and most extensive overviews of its use and 
effectiveness. However, as mentioned by Adams in the quotation above, there is 
significant variation in the content and use of this method. For example, there is no 
consensus when it comes to for how long or to what extent the method should be 
used, nor as regards how much account should be taken of individual factors. It is 
also unknown to what extent this method promotes a desire to read or a sense of 
linguistic and literary quality. 
BALANCED INSTRUCTION 
According to Gaffney and Anderson (2000), Whole Language was at its most 
popular in the United States from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Cowen (2003) 
presents and evaluates six research reports on initial reading instruction published 
between 1967 and 2000 – Bond and Dykstra (1967), Chall (1967), Anderson, 
Hiebert, Scott and Wilkinson (1985), Adams (1990), Snow, Burns and Griffin 
(1998) and National Reading Panel (2000) – concluding that all of them take a 
‘balanced’ view on the relationship between Whole Language and Phonics. This is 
correct insofar as none of the six reports is extreme or obviously biased, but it must 
be said that Cowen uses ‘balanced’ in varying and unclear meanings. 
 A more recent evaluation, that by Pressley (2006), was based on classroom 
studies, which sets it apart from many others. Today he may be the person 
primarily associated with the concept of a ‘balanced view’ on reading instruction. 
We will therefore briefly highlight some of his findings and thoughts. First, he 
notes that ‘[l]iteracy instruction in the top three classrooms was exceptionally well 
balanced with respect to the elements of whole language – reading of outstanding 
literature, writing – and the explicit teaching of skills’ (p. 252). Here it would seem 
that ‘balanced’ is above all used to refer to the amounts and proportions of the two 
methods, and this also seems to be the case in the following quotation: 
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The radical middle proposed here is only radical in contrast to the extreme 
whole-language and phonics positions that have defined the recent debates 
about beginning-reading instruction. There are a number of scholars before us 
(e.g., Adams, 1990; Cazden, 1992; Chall, 1967, 1983; Delpit, 1986; Duffy, 
1991; Fisher & Hiebert, 1990; McCaslin, 1989) who have proposed that the 
most sensible beginning-reading curriculum should be a balance of skills 
development and authentic reading and writing. The unique contribution of 
the work of our group is in demonstrating that is really what good teachers do. 
(p. 280) 
Balancing and combining in this sense is of course important, but it is easy to form 
the impression that the goals set and activities undertaken are entirely different in 
nature: on the one side (Phonics), technical skills are being promoted; while on the 
other (Whole Language), the aim is to promote a desire to read as well as linguistic 
and cultural tastes. This should mean that the proportion of Phonics will be 
progressively reduced in favour of Whole Language as the children acquire the 
fundamental skills. 
 However, the issue of balancing can also be seen from the perspective of how 
reading is defined. As we understand it, that is the approach underpinning the 
following claim by Pressley (2006): 
Some who have thought about meaning making during reading seem to think 
that meaning making occurs from the bottom up. For them, reading is about 
the processing of letters and words. Meaning making is sounding out the 
words, which are listened to by the mind. Indeed, there is a long history of 
distinguished research establishing that even when good readers read silently, 
there is something of a speech process involved […] Others who think about 
meaning making during reading think that it occurs from the top down. That 
is, based on world knowledge, people have hypotheses about what the text is 
going to say, and this prior knowledge goes far in explaining comprehension 
(Anderson & Pearson, 1984). (p. 59) 
Pressley’s view is that there is an intermediate position between the bottom-up and 
top-down approaches, where both of those approaches are involved in the 
construction of meaning (or meaning-making) from a text. Here the bottom-up 
approach is seen as the central feature of Phonics while the top-down one is 
correspondingly seen as central to Whole Language. In our opinion, however, this 
is not just an intermediate position but amounts to the integration of the two 
approaches – depending on how the two approaches are seen. 
 The bottom-up approach in reading entails taking the written image as the 
starting point and noticing what elements it consists of. The first step is thus visual 
sensing, followed by interpretation through visual perception. This interpretation is 
based on memory as well as on a whole in which the sensory impression is placed 
– in the case of reading, letters are seen in relation to words and larger units of 
meaning. It happens so fast that people rarely associate these fundamental 
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processes with meaning, but the connectionist Rumelhart would appear to do so, 
considering his use of terminology: 
I use the term perception rather freely here. In general, it is my opinion that 
the distinction between the perceptual and conceptual aspects of reading is 
not that useful. As I will suggest later, there appears to be a continuity 
between what has been called perception and what has been called 
comprehension. My use of the term perception in the present context is 
simply the use of the one term to cover the entire process. (Rumelhart, 1994, 
p. 893) 
In our opinion, it might be even more fruitful to use hermeneutics, which is a 
general theory about interpretation and meaning. It has been particularly prominent 
on the European Continent – especially in Germany and France. The reason why it 
has hardly made an appearance in reading research may well be the predominance 
in that field of researchers from the English-speaking world. The fundamental idea 
of hermeneutics is that the whole and the part must always be understood in 
relation to each other. Someone who encounters an unfamiliar phenomenon will 
typically first try to place it in a broader context. When, say, reading a poem for the 
first time, a reader will perhaps ask him- or herself whether it is part of a major 
collection of poems or written by a major poet. The reader may also want general 
information about the author and the poem – cultural background, year of writing, 
intended readership, etc. This yields a rough overall understanding, which the 
reader will use to identify important parts and to attain an initial understanding of 
them. That understanding, in turn, will be used to adjust and refine the 
understanding of the whole, which will then be used to achieve a better 
understanding of the details. This alternation between the whole and the parts is 
called the hermeneutic circle or spiral; it means that it is never possible to attain a 
final and completely clear understanding of anything. This method was originally 
used to interpret theological, legal and literary texts, but it has since come into 
more general use. In fact, this method is used to try to understand people, actions – 
indeed the whole of existence. What is more, it is also used to interpret sensory 
impressions, which is why it is misleading to claim that reading occupies an 
intermediate position between sensing and comprehension. In line with 
hermeneutics – and with Rumelhart and others – it is better to talk in terms of an 
interaction between the whole and the parts. 
 But what does this mean for classroom practices? The distinction between 
Whole Language and Phonics roughly corresponds to that between implicit 
teaching and learning and explicit teaching and learning. Studies of emergent 
literacy show that children are capable of acquiring both phonemic awareness and 
a sense of linguistic and literary quality without explicit instruction. Indeed, 
Shankweiler and Liberman’s above-mentioned claim that 75 per cent of children 
will learn to read regardless of the method used could indicate that the distinction 
between the two methods is artificial. The solution, in our view, does not involve 
mixing the two methods in set proportions but rather in dissolving the distinction 
between them. However, this does not mean that our solution is methodlessness. 
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Rather, creativity must be harnessed to ensure that approaches suitable to 
individual learners are constantly being developed and tried out. 
 The biggest problem in present-day reading instruction may be 
intellectualisation and abstraction, introduced as a result of a rather extreme 
interpretation of the concepts of phonemic awareness and metacognition (thinking 
about thinking). Children do need to learn about the relationships between 
phonemes and graphemes, but as far as possible this must be achieved by means of 
concrete examples. The old rule according to which people learn to read by reading 
has a good deal of truth to it, and so does the rule about learning through trial and 
error. One of the teacher’s most important tasks is to correct and motivate in the 
best possible way. This is more art than technique. The teacher’s personality is 
often more important than the methods used. 
 
93 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
While there is an extensive literature both in the field of philosophy of psychology 
and in that of philosophy of education, hardly any published philosophical 
reflection has been devoted to reading and dyslexia research (among the few 
exceptions, I would like to mention Helland and Rommetveit, 2006, and Elliott and 
Gibbs, 2008). The amount of empirical research into reading and dyslexia has 
increased greatly, but there has been little theoretical thinking to accompany that 
increase. In order to look back upon the research undertaken and evaluate it with a 
view to the future, it is necessary to introduce additional theoretical considerations 
of a more profound nature. In this book, I have tried to deal with a number of 
themes of topical interest. I would like to use these concluding reflections to 
emphasise and elaborate on some of my main points. It is of course impossible to 
present all nuances, reservations and grounds, but I do hope that I will be able to 
describe my ideas clearly enough to stimulate further reflection. 
HAS PROGRESS BEEN MADE IN READING AND DYSLEXIA RESEARCH? 
State of the art in 2000 
In 1997, the United States Congress decided to appoint a committee called the 
National Reading Panel, which was given the task of investigating the impact of 
various methods in initial reading instruction. The Panel reported in April 2000. 
The title of its report was Teaching Children to Read and its subtitle was An 
Evidence-Based Assessment of the Scientific Research Literature on Reading and 
Its Implications for Reading Instruction. 
The following quotation is taken from the report summary: 
The Panel considered roughly 100,000 reading studies published since 1966, 
and another 10,000 published before that time. From this pool, the Panel 
selected several hundred studies for its review and analysis. The National 
Reading Panel’s analysis made it clear that the best approach to reading 
instruction is one that incorporates: 
– Explicit instruction in phonemic awareness 
– Systematic phonics instruction 
– Methods to improve fluency 
– Ways to enhance comprehension 
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The Panel found that a combination of techniques is effective for teaching children 
to read: 
– Phonemic awareness – the knowledge that spoken words can be broken apart 
into smaller segments of sound known as phonemes. Children who are read to at 
home – especially material that rhymes – often develop the basis of phonemic 
awareness. Children who are not read to will probably need to be taught that 
words can be broken apart into smaller sounds. 
 
– Phonics – the knowledge that letters of the alphabet represent phonemes, and 
that these sounds are blended together to form written words. Readers who are 
skilled in phonics can sound out words they haven’t seen before, without first 
having to memorize them. 
 
– Fluency – the ability to recognize words easily, read with greater speed, 
accuracy, and expression, and to better understand what is read. Children gain 
fluency by practicing reading until the process becomes automatic; guided oral 
repeated reading is one approach to helping children become fluent readers. 
 
– Guided oral reading – reading out loud while getting guidance and feedback 
from skilled readers. The combination of practice and feedback promotes 
reading fluency. 
 
– Teaching vocabulary words – teaching new words, either as they appear in text, 
or by introducing new words separately. This type of instruction also aids 
reading ability. 
 
– Reading comprehension strategies – techniques for helping individuals to 
understand what they read. Such techniques involve having students summarize 
what they’ve read, to gain a better understanding of the material’. 
 
In the full report, the Panel claimed that ‘[t]he results of the meta-analysis were 
impressive. Overall, the findings showed that teaching children to manipulate 
phonemes in words was highly effective under a variety of teaching conditions 
with a variety of learners across a range of grade and age levels and that teaching 
phonemic awareness to children significantly improves their reading more than 
instruction that lacks any attention to [phonemic awareness]’ (National Reading 
Panel, 2000, 2.2). This is considered to be one of the biggest and most important 
findings in reading research over the past 50 years. (Note that comparison is made 
with ‘instruction that lacks any attention to [phonemic awareness]’ and that no 
reference is made to the amount of attention devoted to phonemic awareness.) But 
is this knowledge really all that new?  
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State of the art in 1908 
In 1908, Professor Edmund Burke Huey published a book entitled The Psychology 
and Pedagogy of Reading. With a Review of the History of Reading and Writing 
and of Methods, Texts, and Hygiene in Reading. This probably is the first overview 
of research in the field – and as it turns out, even then people were already 
discussing the importance of phonemes, phonemic awareness and Phonics. 
The phonic method used by the Jansenists in the Port Royal Schools, long 
neglected but advocated again by Thornton in 1790, began, as we have seen, 
to be extensively used as a special method in this country in the system of 
Leigh, about 1870–1873. It is a spelling method, but the word is spelled by its 
elementary sounds and not by the letter-names. The word is slowly 
pronounced until its constituent sounds come to consciousness, and these 
sounds are associated with the letters representing them. Drill in this sound 
analysis trains the articulation, trains the ear and the ability to sound the 
letters of any new word and gives the power to pronounce it by blending the 
sounds […]. (Huey, 1908, p. 266)  
In this connection, there began a debate against the background of the fact that the 
English language has more sounds than it has letters. Some people claimed that 
‘[t]he forty-four or more sounds used in English needed as many characters, and 
when these were furnished the method came to be known as the phonetic, to 
distinguish it from the simpler phonic’ (p. 267).  
 Huey is convinced that children must learn to break printed or handwritten 
words down into letters and that they must learn to associate those letters with 
sounds. Further, they must also learn to make syntheses of those sounds. And the 
wholes thus arrived at, they must learn to associate with words of spoken language. 
However, the key questions in this context are when children are to learn these 
things, and how they should learn them. Huey stresses repeatedly that two 
circumstances must be taken into account in learning to decode words in the above-
mentioned way: first, that the oral stream of speech is continuous, meaning that it 
may be difficult for children to isolate its component elements; and second, that the 
child’s natural unit is semantic in nature. Specifically, some people claimed that 
the smallest semantic unit is the sentence, because it reproduces an idea, while 
others considered that children first learn the meaning of individual words – 
especially those corresponding to concrete objects – and that entire ideas or 
sentences represent a higher level of complexity. 
 Huey does not present any statistics on the most widely used methods in the 
United States in the late 19th and early 20th century, but his impression is that 
most teachers tend to begin their reading instruction by introducing whole 
sentences or whole words. Where teachers start with whole sentences, these tend to 
deal with topics that the children have experienced and are interested in. For 
example, a lesson may begin with a type of ball game. When the children are 
holding the ball, they say, ‘I am holding a ball’. That sentence is then written on 
the blackboard, or is already printed in a book. Each time the children see the 
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sentence, they are reminded of the situation or experience to which it refers. After 
some time, the written images begin to be analysed: ‘the sentence-wholes are 
gradually analyzed into their constituent words and these again, in time, into their 
constituent sounds and letters. The important thing is to begin with meaning 
wholes […] letting analysis follow in its own time’ (p. 274). However, methods of 
a type that we today associate with Phonics also existed back then: 
Of these the ‘Synthetic Method of Reading and Spelling’, by Rebecca S. 
Pollard, has been very widely used, although its popularity is waning. This 
method is purely phonic, almost arrogantly so. The author states that ‘there 
must be no guesswork, no reference to pictures, no waiting for a story from 
the teacher to develop the thought’ […] The main business of the method is 
to make the child able to pronounce words for himself as he comes to them in 
reading new matter, and it accomplishes this result pretty effectually. (p. 281) 
Huey’s main objection to Phonics is that ‘[i]f this method is used too soon, it 
results in word reading, as it takes so long to get the word that the thought is lost’ 
(p. 294). In today’s terminology, we would say that the children focus on the 
decoding and pronunciation of individual words rather than on the meaning and 
coherence of the text. According to a well-known claim by Gough and Tunmer 
(1986), reading = decoding × comprehension. Huey may not have used that 
terminology nor that formula, but he would agree that correct decoding and 
pronunciation alone do not amount to reading. The decoding of non-words is thus 
not reading and should therefore not be as prominent as it is today in contexts such 
as the training and testing of dyslexics. Further, Huey may not have used the term 
‘dual route’, but he did distinguish between the two alternatives involved: either 
the reader knows the whole word and associates directly to its meaning, or the 
reader has to decode the word by sounding it out (at least mentally) letter by letter. 
In this context, Huey warns of ‘[t]he danger of reading words rather than ideas’ 
(p. 296). The most important goal, in his opinion, is to find meaning in the text, and 
this requires a certain amount of fluency. The joy of reading good literature is 
important on both counts: ‘Methods come and go, but all lack the essentials of any 
well-grounded method, viz. relevancy to the child’s mental needs’ (p. 305). 
 To sum up, it may well be claimed that, one hundred years and more than one 
hundred thousand research projects later, little has changed when it comes to the 
goal of reading. There is a consensus that children should read texts that are as 
meaningful as possible to them and that they should read with fluency. There is no 
dispute about the importance of the desire to read. Further, there is general 
agreement that children need to learn how to decode and hence to learn about 
phonemes – while it is true that there is some difference of opinion as regards when 
and how children should be taught about them, Huey would claim that this is 
something that must be adapted to the needs of each individual child. 
 In the light of this, there seems to be good reason to conclude that the heated 
debate between Whole Language and Phonics has been very much beside the point, 
and of limited value. For some of the participants in that debate, considerations of 
prestige and power may have outweighed any concern for the children’s best 
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interests or for scientific truth. In my opinion, Michael Pressley has taken a 
sensible position with his ‘balanced view’ (cf. Pressley, 2006), but I still consider 
that too much attention is often devoted to determining the appropriate proportions 
or the appropriate importance to be assigned to each of these two approaches. In 
my opinion, it should instead be emphasised that the entire reading process 
constitutes a shifting back and forth between the whole and the parts, and in this 
context I believe that hermeneutics should be given a more prominent role (cf., 
e.g., Gadamer, 1960). It is in the nature of the human being to search for meaning. 
All sensory impressions must be interpreted, and this is done by seeing the parts in 
relation to the whole. When the inscription on the Rosetta Stone was first 
interpreted, the scholars started from an assumption about when and where the text 
came into being, what its purpose was, etc. On this basis, they tried to assign 
meaning to the individual characters. Their interpretation of the characters then 
altered their overall view of the text in some respects, and their new view shed new 
light on the interpretation of the characters. The new understanding of the 
characters formed the basis of a new overall view, and so on. This is called the 
hermeneutic circle or spiral; you never know whether you have attained a complete 
and correct understanding of something. The same approach is taken to read 
unclear and unfamiliar handwriting – and in fact also to read printed text, even 
though people tend not to be aware of this because familiarity with the printed 
characters has made the process automatic and rapid. It is more obvious that this 
approach is used to interpret words and sentences.  
 Against the background of the above, I would like to claim that reading is 
primarily an interpretive skill. Given that you never know whether you have 
attained a complete and correct comprehension, I consider it better to talk about 
‘interpretation’ than ‘comprehension’ in reading research. This change in 
terminology would also entail a shift in focus, from the product to the process. 
When it comes to psychological schools of thought, I am of the opinion that 
connectionism is best able to embrace these ideas. The processes involved are not 
primarily sequential in nature, but rather parallel and multidirectional (cf. the 
connectionist concept of ‘back propagation’). There is a progressive ‘calibration’ 
or closing-in on the truth, and there is a dynamic relationship between the whole 
and the parts. What is more, much more weight is assigned to learning, individual 
differences and individual change than in the cognitive school of psychology. To 
illustrate the relationship between the whole and the parts, I would like to refer to 
the following quotation from the connectionist David Rumelhart: 
I use the term perception rather freely here. In general, it is my opinion that 
the distinction between the perceptual and conceptual aspects of reading is 
not that useful. As I will suggest later, there appears to be a continuity 
between what has been called perception and what has been called 
comprehension. My use of the term perception in the present context is 
simply the use of the one term to cover the entire process. (Rumelhart, 1994, 
p. 893) 
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Both hermeneutics and connectionism are genuine intellectual creations of the 20th 
century, and I would like to claim that, applied to the study object of reading in the 
manner outlined in this book, they represent a mindset that deserves to be referred 
to as new. 
IS THERE ANY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ATTESTING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF 
PHONEMIC AWARENESS? 
I am thus of the opinion that phonemic awareness is an absolutely central 
component of reading skill – but does this represent a major empirical finding? 
First, we have seen that even Huey stressed the importance of phonemic 
awareness, and he did not have as much empirical research to underpin that 
statement as exists today. In a sense, it can be claimed that what we are dealing 
with is an analytic truth which follows from the very definition of ‘reading’ 
chosen. It is commonly claimed, by reference to Gough and Tunmer (1986), that 
reading = decoding × comprehension. There are many definitions of ‘decoding’, 
but let us focus here on the fact that it entails a ‘translation’ from writing to speech. 
With our alphabetic system, this means that each letter (grapheme) must be 
associated with a sound (phoneme). In other words, decoding requires the ability to 
distinguish and identify the individual phonemes in the oral stream of speech. 
Hence, phonemic awareness is necessary by definition. Further, given that a 
‘translation’ is to be made from speech, vision is also a necessary condition for 
decoding, and there are additional conditions that are necessary by definition. 
 A student of the history of reading and dyslexia research easily forms the 
impression that phonemic awareness is paramount. However, meta-studies – 
including those presented by the US National Reading Panel – actually show its 
importance to be limited. Now, why does phonology not explain more than it does? 
In fact, based on the definition of ‘decoding’, as discussed above, all we are able to 
say is that having phonemic skills is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
reading skill (given that there are other conditions that must also be met, such as 
having adequate eyesight). Let me illustrate this logical difference with an 
example. If we define ‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried man’, this means that both the 
property of ‘unmarriedness’ and the property of ‘manhood’ are necessary in order 
for the term ‘bachelor’ to be used. On its own, neither of these properties is 
logically sufficient, but together they constitute a necessary and sufficient condition 
for using the term ‘bachelor’. In other words, ‘bachelor’ can be used if and only if a 
person is both a man and unmarried. 
 As regards the empirical part of the research, I would like to add that the vast 
majority of studies show that phonemic awareness is indeed required for learning 
to read. It is also clear that those who have the opportunity to practise phonemic 
skills will perform better at tests later on. But what kind of tests are those? As a 
rule, they are decoding tests where the key variables are the number of mistakes 
and the rate of decoding. Using the above-mentioned definition, this means that the 
skills measured are largely identical to the skills practised, and it is hardly 
surprising that practising phonemic skills will cause students to perform 
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measurably better at those same skills. Further, the fact that phonemic awareness is 
a necessary condition does not have to entail that improvement to those skills will 
always result in a corresponding increase in the rate of decoding – there might well 
be a threshold value beyond which an improvement in phonemic skills will not 
cause decoding skills to improve correspondingly. 
 Analogous conclusions can be drawn as regards dyslexia. If we claim that 
phonemic awareness is necessary for decoding, this means that inadequate 
phonemic awareness is logically sufficient to cause decoding problems – which are 
commonly defined as ‘dyslexia’. When it comes to empirical studies, there is 
reason to emphasise a problem that I have already dealt with in an article entitled 
‘How can we best define “dyslexia”?’ (Tønnessen, 1997a), namely that ‘phonemic 
difficulties’ are often included in the definition of ‘dyslexia’. When a dyslexia 
group is to be selected for a research project, care is typically taken to ensure that 
its members, but not those of the control group, have phonemic difficulties. Then it 
is only natural that the prevalence of phonemic difficulties will be higher among 
dyslexics! In other words, the conclusion that phonemes and phonemic awareness 
are important factors in both reading skill and dyslexia is one that follows from the 
fundamental definitions used. What is more, most studies have only tested the null 
hypothesis and reported p values, which means that they are of limited value. 
Fortunately, the calculation of effect size has gained an increasingly prominent 
place. 
 Regardless of the fact that many new ideas about the importance of phonemes in 
reading are not empirical but logical-analytic in nature, they do represent useful 
clarifications and reminders. However, additional reflection at the level of the 
philosophy of science would contribute towards assigning appropriate places to 
those insights as well as towards the search for (new) empirical questions to be 
asked.  
 Even though the concepts of ‘phoneme’, ‘phonemic awareness’, ‘phonology’ 
and ‘Phonics’ have had a very central place in reading and dyslexia research, 
fundamental questions in this context have been explored only to a relatively small 
extent. The level of precision should have been higher and a series of philosophical 
problems should have been clarified. In this field, Uppstad (2005) has made 
important contributions. 
HAS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY BEEN BENEFICIAL  
TO READING RESEARCH? 
Psychology was dominated by behaviourism from the 1930s to the 1960s. After 
that, it was cognitive psychology that exerted a dominant influence, during a period 
also characterised by a large increase in reading and dyslexia research, which 
largely chose cognitive methods. It is open to discussion both for how long this 
cognitive dominance lasted and how it manifested itself, but even so I consider that 
cognitive psychology has left such deep marks in reading and dyslexia research 
that special attention should be devoted to it. I will focus particularly on a number 
of problems and limitations associated with that school of psychology. This means 
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that I will address themes that deserve to be treated far more thoroughly than it is 
possible to do here, but I hope that I will be able to contribute towards further 
reflections. Howard Gardner makes use of the term ‘cognitive revolution’ 
(Gardner, 1985). In science, ‘revolution’ is above all associated with Thomas 
Kuhn’s theory of science (Kuhn, 1970), where a revolution involves shifts in the 
paradigms of research, including radical changes in fundamental methods and ways 
of thinking. One example is the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. The 
move from behaviourism to cognitive psychology is hardly comparable to that 
major change in physics. It is also clear that cognitive psychology has many 
precursors in both psychology and philosophy. One example is gestalt psychology, 
in relation to which Hergenhahn (1992) noted that ‘[p]resent-day cognitive 
psychology – with its emphasis on organization, structure, relationships, the active 
role of the subject, and the important part played by perception in learning and 
memory – reflects the influence of its Gestalt antecedents’ (p. 544). In the field of 
philosophy, the obvious precursors include Plato and Descartes. 
 What is more, it is often unclear what the concept of ‘cognition’ includes. 
Hergenhahn (1992) claims that cognitive psychology deals primarily with 
‘language, thinking, perception, problem solving, concept formation, memory, 
learning, intelligence, and attention’ (p. 543). Hence, irrational phenomena such as 
needs, emotions, wishes, interests, motivation, faith, imagination, creativity, etc., 
are out of reach of cognitive psychology – as originally delimited. Rationalist 
philosophy, which inspired cognitive psychology, also took no interest in those 
phenomena and had no place for them. When individual thinkers have 
subsequently attempted to extend the concept of ‘cognition’, they have ended up at 
odds both with the tradition and with their own foundations. Gardner (1985) claims 
that ‘[c]ognitive science is predicated on the belief that it is legitimate – in fact 
necessary – to posit a separate level of analysis which can be called the “level of 
representation”. When working at this level, a scientist traffics in such 
representational entities as symbols, rules, images – the stuff of representation 
which is found between input and output – and in addition, explores the ways in 
which these representational entities are joined, transformed, or contrasted with 
one another’ (p. 38).  
 While behaviourism talked about a ‘black box’ between stimulus and response, 
cognitive psychology thus wishes to explore the inner life, which cannot be 
observed from the outside. Instead of ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’, they use the terms 
‘input’ and ‘output’, which they have borrowed from computer science. This is no 
coincidence: according to Gardner (1987), ‘not all cognitive scientists make the 
computer central to their daily work, [but] nearly all have been strongly influenced 
by it’ (p. 40). Hergenhahn (1992) stresses that ‘[t]here is no better example of how 
developments outside psychology can influence psychology than the emergence of 
information-processing cognitive psychology. Most information processing 
psychologists note the similarities between humans and computers […]’ (p. 543). 
The brain is commonly compared to a computer and thoughts to software. What 
takes place between input and output is called ‘processing’, a word originally 
borrowed from chemistry and biology but now also established in the field of 
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computer science. Cognitive psychology tries to find the most adequate way 
possible to break a process down into sub-processes or sub-tasks, which are often 
presented in the form of flowcharts. In the case of reading, one possible such 
breakdown is as follows: First, two options or routes are distinguished: (1) the 
direct route, where the reader recognises the word as a whole and is able to move 
directly from written image to meaning; and (2) the indirect route, which readers 
use when they do not recognise the whole word. This second route yields the 
following sub-processes or sub-tasks: (a) visual analysis of the written image; (b) 
isolation and identification of each letter, in the order as written; (c) association of 
each letter with the corresponding sound; (d) linking together of those sounds; (e) 
pronunciation of the whole; and (f) association of that whole with a word of spoken 
language. (A typical example of how reading is treated in cognitive psychology can 
be found in Ellis (1993).) The main contribution of cognitive psychology concerns 
the description of the reading process; it has been less useful when it comes to 
explaining or understanding that process. 
 Now, do these flowcharts represent an empirical finding? In my opinion, their 
main function is to make the ramifications of the definition of ‘reading’ more 
precise. The various sub-tasks cannot be identified unless it has first been defined 
what reading is. However, empirical studies can provide information about the 
relative order of the sub-tasks and about ways of distinguishing between them. For 
example, there are studies showing that some people are able to associate each 
letter with the corresponding sound (sub-task 2 c) but not to link those sounds 
together (sub-task 2 d). This allows the conclusion that these are two distinct tasks. 
In the case of linking the sounds together (sub-task 2 d) and pronouncing the whole 
(sub-task 2 e), however, it can be questioned whether someone has really linked the 
sounds together if he or she is unable to pronounce the resultant whole; this is 
largely a matter of definitions. Since the breakdown into sub-tasks largely follows 
from the definition, all such flowcharts have something normative about them: they 
show how it is deemed that reading should be done, or what is a normal reading 
process. According to Hergenhahn (1992), ‘[t]he information-processing 
psychologist usually concentrates his or her research on normal, rational thinking 
and behavior and views the human as an active seeker and user of information’ 
(p. 543). In the diagnosis of reading difficulties, it is important to know which sub-
tasks are causing problems, because this makes it possible to engage in special 
practice of those sub-tasks. However, this is easier to do with some sub-tasks than 
with others. For example, there are a number of potential reasons why students 
may have difficulties associating a sound package with a word of spoken language. 
If, say, the sounds /s/+/ʌ/+/n/ are pronounced too slowly, it may be difficult to 
associate the whole with the familiar word ‘sun’ of spoken language. The same is 
true if a word is incorrectly stressed.  Gardner (1985) further claims that, ‘[t]hough 
mainstream cognitive scientists do not necessarily bear any animus against the 
affective realm, against the context that surrounds any action or thought, or against 
historical or cultural analyses, in practice they attempt to factor out these elements 
to the maximum extent possible’ (p. 41). In other words, emotions, needs, 
punishment and reward, which were absolutely central to behaviourism, have little 
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place in the descriptions and explanations provided by cognitive psychology. 
However, if biological needs and feelings are not included, the best that can be 
hoped for is to find reasons; causes will be completely out of reach. It is hard to 
imagine how thoughts alone could be the driver of human actions. People cannot 
prioritise among their thoughts unless there are habits or emotions associated with 
them. This means that both motivation and learning are difficult to explain in 
cognitive psychology. Indeed, Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) assert that 
‘[c]ognitive psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers […] tended to 
ignore learning until recently’ (p. 69). What cognitive psychology primarily shows 
is how input is processed and transformed into output. It does not show how 
humans learn. According to Thorne and Henley (2001), ‘[r]ule-based systems have 
limits, and one of [artificial intelligence]’s remaining problems is that humans gain 
new knowledge by learning, something most computers do not do, and something 
neglected by most cognitive psychologists’ (p. 549). 
 Cognitive psychology may not have accounted for principles of learning in its 
theory, but in its practice it has used such principles – mainly borrowed from 
behaviourism. For example, the association of graphemes with phonemes requires 
many repetitions, leading to strong associations and automatisation. But when it 
comes to why people move in a specific order from sub-task to sub-task in the 
flowchart, it is necessary to ask whether this is really also due to association and 
automatisation, or whether it might have something to do with the goal pulling 
‘from the end’: the wish to find meaning. (According to Hergenhahn (1992), many 
cognitive psychologists actually claim that the human being is an ‘active seeker 
[…] of information’ (p. 543). That claim presupposes the existence of irrational 
interests, which are outside the tradition of cognitivism.) Such an explanation 
would be teleological rather than causal, but how could wishes be explained 
rationally and cognitively? The flowcharts of cognitive psychology can show what 
sub-tasks are creating problems in reading, but they cannot explain why someone 
ends up having problems with those sub-tasks. To do that, cognitivists will have to 
borrow causes from other fields or schools such as medicine, behaviourism or 
connectionism. However, the combination of those with cognitive psychology 
gives rise to philosophical problems that have hardly been addressed at all in 
research. 
 Can cognitive psychology be used in special-needs education to remedy reading 
difficulties? As mentioned above, it can point us to the location of the problems 
between input and output, but the classic definition of ‘cognitive’ mentioned by 
Gardner (1985) and others cannot accommodate methods such as ‘over-learning’, 
which are available to behaviourism. My interpretation of this is that from the 
1980s, cognitive psychology increasingly looked for solutions in two fields: 
metacognition and neurology.  
 Metacognition is consistent with the fundamental principles of cognitive 
psychology. It uses cognition to solve cognitive problems. However, this solution 
gives rise to many problems. At the philosophical level, it is controversial what 
metacognition means and whether it is possible: Can we really be aware of our 
awareness? Is this not as difficult as seeing our eye while seeing? At the scientific 
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level, metacognition is problematic because it seems to require introspection, 
which cannot be either verified or falsified. At the educational level, finally, 
metacognition could perhaps be said to be about learning to learn – but this is a 
very abstract and demanding notion, especially to those with learning difficulties. 
 If neurology is brought in, there arises a philosophical question about the 
relationship between the mental and the physical. One solution is reductionism. 
However, that would mean that the problems are not really cognitive, but medical – 
and so cognitivism would give up trying to solve the problems on the basis of its 
own principles. 
WHAT KIND OF A PHENOMENON IS READING? 
When I started working in the field of reading and dyslexia research twenty-five 
years ago, the first question I asked myself was: What kind of phenomenon am I 
going to investigate? It may seem odd to begin a career in empirical research with 
so theoretical issues, but the big differences between how cognitive psychology 
and behaviourism view the goals and methods of research make it clear that 
theoretical opinions may have a large practical impact. 
 I drew inspiration from Aristotle (384–322 B.C.). In his exploration of the 
human being, he was flanked on one side by Plato (428–348 B.C.), who placed all 
emphasis on ideas and on the rational, and on the other side by materialists such as 
Democritus (460–370 B.C.). Present-day psychology is in a similar situation, with 
cognitivism and behaviourism on either side. In my opinion, the former school 
commits an intellectualistic fallacy while the latter commits a mechanistic fallacy. I 
think Aristotle offered a good combination of theory and practice, which he often 
illustrated with examples from the world of craftsmen and artists: ‘For the things 
we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become 
builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by 
doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts’ 
(Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, 1). In this context, Aristotle also makes an 
important distinction between potentiality and the realisation of potentials. 
Heraclitus (540–480 B.C.) claimed that everything is in constant change. Plato’s 
view, by contrast, was that anything that truly exists is unchangeable. Aristotle’s 
position was that when for example a human being develops, there is something 
that remains constant and something that changes: there is both continuity and 
discontinuity between childhood and old age. The distinction between potentiality 
and realisation has been very important throughout history when it comes to 
explaining change. In psychology and linguistics, for example, we see today how 
Noam Chomsky assumes a version of Plato’s position – or, to be precise, of 
Descartes’s position. Chomsky believes that all humans are born with the same 
linguistic structures. These do not change, but humans discover and use them to a 
greater or lesser extent. According to Aristotle’s way of thinking, this leaves no 
room for genuine change and development. Inspired by Aristotle, I thought this 
might be the place to find a key to a fruitful combination of behaviourism and 
cognitive psychology. I found that Aristotle’s examples and terminology best 
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corresponded to the concept of ‘skill’. The combination of theory and practice (and 
of mind and body) inherent in that concept is extremely important in all human 
activity, but it has been clarified and deepened only to a limited extent. In everyday 
language, the word ‘skill’ tends to be used mainly about physical or motor tasks 
that require automatisation, mechanical drill and habituation. However, I would 
like to emphasise that this needs to be combined with conscious monitoring and 
control. It should thus be possible to obtain important elements for my combination 
endeavour from both behaviourism and cognitive psychology. 
 What is important is finding the right combination and alternation between 
automaticity and awareness. If, say, a cyclist trusts his ‘autopilot’ too much, 
unexpected situations may give rise to big problems. But devoting too much 
attention to keeping one’s balance may also cause big problems. The key is 
adjusting the use of automaticity and awareness, respectively, to circumstances. In 
other words, there must be a flexible and situationally determined alternation 
between the two. 
 When it comes to the relationship between reading, dyslexia and automatisation, 
I was first inspired by Nicolson and Fawcett (1990), who found that dyslexics did 
not only have automatisation problems in the actual reading process, which had 
been noted before, but also problems in motor processes, including balance. On 
this basis, they claimed that ‘dyslexic children will suffer problems in fluency for 
any skill that should become automatic through extensive practice’ (Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 1990, p. 29) and developed what has been referred to as the ‘dyslexic 
automatisation deficit hypothesis’. This has later been supplemented with the 
‘conscious compensation hypothesis’, which states that, ‘despite their more limited 
automaticity of skill, dyslexic children are able to perform at apparently normal 
levels most of the time by “consciously compensating”, that is, by consciously 
concentrating (controlled processing) on performance that would normally be 
automatic’ (Nicolson & Fawcett, 2010, p. 68ff). Here they come close to my own 
ideas about awareness. One way in which they tested their hypothesis was to make 
dyslexics perform several tasks at the same time, which they turned out to be much 
worse at than normal readers. I will not go into detail about the hypotheses and the 
testing of them, but they provided a great deal of stimulus for my work. However, 
while Nicolson and Fawcett stress automaticity, I consider that the problem, or the 
challenge, is to find a flexible and appropriate alternation between automaticity and 
awareness. This is in fact what I define as the characteristic common to all skills. 
Most people who discuss skills – including Nicolson and Fawcett – focus too much 
on automaticity. When it comes to awareness, it is important to distinguish two 
aspects: seeing and noticing. Someone riding a bike will see everything on the road 
and in the surrounding landscape, but she will not notice everything. A reader sees 
the whole text but does not notice all details. 
 LaBerge and Samuels (1974) claim that automatisation in reading is particularly 
important to free the maximum amount of resources for the task of finding the 
meaning of a text. In their opinion, automatisation primarily encompasses the most 
elementary tasks, such as processing of visual information, perception, 
identification of letters and sounds, linking together of sounds, etc. In my view, by 
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contrast, comprehension – or, rather: interpretation – must also be automatised, at 
the same time as awareness must also be used. As already mentioned, I see reading 
primarily as an interpretive process, from the interpretation of letters to the 
interpretation of entire texts. This interpretation process is based on constantly 
seeing wholes and parts in relation to each other, and this hermeneutic alternation 
between wholes and parts is a skill which must combine awareness and 
automaticity in a flexible manner. I thus started by asking questions about what 
kind of phenomenon reading is. As mentioned, I have found it to be mainly a skill. 
To a lesser degree, however, it is also knowledge, for example knowledge about 
the relationships between graphemes and phonemes or about the meaning of 
words. Reading shares the quality of being a skill with many other human 
activities. What, then, is the difference between reading and other skills such as 
swimming or cycling? One of the most specific sub-skills involved in reading is 
interpretation, and this, in turn, consists of various sub-skills. For example, readers 
interpret written characters as well as the meaning of words and sentences. All of 
this requires automaticity and awareness. Other important sub-skills include 
making associations between graphemes and phonemes, and synthesising sounds 
into whole sound packages to be associated with meanings in spoken language. 
This must be automatised, but it must also be made subject to awareness.  
 Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1990) claim that people first learn a skill by following 
rules. After a while they will perform the skill automatically, without thinking. 
This automatic performance may become mechanical, so the next step of 
development, they say, is based on intuition. In my opinion, this is obfuscation; the 
word ‘intuition’ has many definitions, and all of them are unclear. Actually, a good 
speed-skater or tightrope-walker does not use intuition, but rather a constant 
combination and alternation between automaticity and conscious monitoring and 
control. In the event of problems or mistakes, there is a need for active control. 
Such control is often based on trial and error. If, say, a cyclist finds herself in an 
entirely new situation, she cannot draw upon either rules or automaticity. The 
choice of solutions or actions in such circumstances will depend on experience, 
knowledge, habits and creativity. If the first attempts fail, new ones will be made. 
On this point, I draw inspiration from the way in which Karl Popper thinks that 
problems are solved in research (Popper, 1963). People learn through trial and 
error, but as a rule this is not explicit. Rather, it is a question of implicit learning 
and of tacit knowledge or skills (cf. Reber, 1993). Such learning or acquisition of 
skills leads to changes in the nervous system which have been well described and 
explained by connectionist psychology – while cognitive psychology has no help to 
offer on this count. Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) maintain that ‘[m]any 
psychologists were influenced by Chomsky as they moved from behaviorism to 
information processing because his grammar suggested ways to model human 
knowledge using linguistic-style rules’ (p. 13). However, even though Chomsky 
has various definitions of ‘rules’, they all relate to norms and intentions ‘up front’ 
that ‘pull’ (teleological explanations) rather than causal factors ‘in the back’ that 
‘push’. For cognitivists, the order of the day is rule-following, while connectionists 
see things – like natural phenomena – as rule-governed, even though they prefer to 
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talk about regularities rather than rules. One example of this is how children 
gradually learn irregular past-tense forms in English (cf. McClelland, Rumelhart, & 
the PDP Research Group, 1986): a type of trial-and-error process takes place until 
a stable state or equilibrium is attained, and networks are built analogously to the 
forming of associations in behaviourist theory. Hence connectionists do not think 
that people are governed by innate systems or structures, as Chomsky claims, 
inspired by Descartes – and Plato. 
 Both behaviourists and connectionists assign very great importance to learning. 
Chomsky distinguishes between ‘competence’ and ‘performance’. The former is 
the universal grammar or set of rules followed by all languages and all thinking. It 
corresponds to the rules of logic that all rational thinking must follow. Performance 
is the practical application of the rules. This distinction to some extent evokes my 
own claim that a skill is a potential that can be realised in different ways. However, 
Chomsky is inspired by Plato’s views on learning. In his dialogue Meno, Plato 
shows how all learning involves bringing knowledge to the surface of awareness 
through recollection. Socrates exemplifies this through his famous interrogation of 
Meno’s slave, where he uses his maieutics to make the slave boy solve a 
geometrical problem concerning the relationship between the sides and the 
diagonal of a square, apparently without the boy having any previous knowledge of 
the matter. Learning, on this view, consists in finding out what is already inside us. 
When I use the word ‘potentiality’ in the context of skills, I draw inspiration from 
Aristotle, who tried to explain change in that way. For example, water is 
potentially both ice and steam (see Chapter 4). The realisation of either potential 
entails a real change. Both the acquisition of a skill and the realisation of a skill 
also entail real change – this does not just amount to discovering what already 
exists. Realisations may vary greatly depending on the person and the situation, but 
this thus does not mean that people just see, more or less clearly, the correct 
solutions that they already have inside them. In my opinion, Aristotle’s theory of 
potentials is better in line with empirical findings in psychology and educational 
science than is Plato’s theory, which has inspired Chomsky and others. 
 I have already presented the classic version of cognitive psychology, but for the 
sake of clarity I would like to repeat the following characteristics: (1) inner 
representations (images); (2) rules or algorithms for processing those 
representations (inspired by computer software); and (3) sequential processing of 
representations, broken down into as small units as possible. This typically 
manifests itself in flowcharts; the best-known one in the field of reading and 
dyslexia research is the dual-route chart. Connectionism rejects all three of these 
points, starting instead from how nerves or nerve cells work. In this respect, 
connectionism represents a further development of behaviourism. It wishes to 
explain the driving forces of the human mind. In my opinion, making use of an 
eclectic mix of behaviourism, cognitive psychology and connectionism would give 
rise to many philosophical problems, but even so these three schools of psychology 
can work together in the description and explanation of skills. They can be seen as 
the three corners of a triangle, or as three sides of a mountain-top. 
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 Nicolson and Fawcett consider that problems with automatisation are primarily 
attributable to anomalies in the cerebellum. However, here it is also relevant to 
refer to the research carried out by John Stein, who has long claimed that visual 
factors represent the main problem of dyslexics. After the relationship between the 
magnocellular and parvocellular systems had been investigated, he formed the 
opinion that the explanation could be an anomaly in the magnocellular system of 
dyslexics, claiming that ‘[t]he magnocellular system is known to be important for 
direction of visual attention and, therefore, of eye movement, hence for visual 
search also’ (Stein, 2001, p. 19). In addition, Stein believes that the visual 
functions are not alone in being impaired by shortcomings in the magnocellular 
system, referring to corresponding findings in the auditive field and relating to 
tactile sensation. Stein’s conclusion is that ‘[i]t seems therefore, that magnocells in 
general might be affected in dyslexics’ (p. 26). As regards the relationship with the 
cerebellum, he asserts that ‘[t]hus the cerebellum not only receives timing signals 
from magnocellular systems in other parts of the brain, but also it can be 
considered itself, perhaps the most important part of the magnocellular timing 
system of the brain’ (p. 27). Here it should be noted that the tasks of the 
parvocellular system are to focus on details and to check whether the quick 
registration of wholes carried out by the magnocellular system is correct. The 
magnocellular system reacts to movement and to wholes, while the parvocellular 
one registers details and requires concentration. In fact, the interplay between these 
two systems is a good fit with the interplay between the whole and the parts found 
in hermeneutics. It also corresponds well to the rapid reactions required for 
automaticity and the deeper and more concentrated efforts required for awareness. 
These are hypotheses that may be worthy of further development and deepening. 
Among other things, they could indicate that the relatively common double-deficit 
theory or hypothesis – where a distinction is made between problems with 
phonological processing and problems with rapid automatised naming (RAN) (cf. 
Wolf & Bowers, 1999) – can be reduced to underlying shortcomings in 
automaticity and awareness (compare also Nicolson & Fawcett, 2010, pp. 25–28). 
 I would also like to mention the research carried out by Dirk Bakker (1990), 
who claims that there are two types of dyslexia: the ‘P’ type associated with the 
right hemisphere of the brain, which sees wholes; and the ‘L’ type associated with 
the left hemisphere, which sees details. This corresponds to the alternation between 
the whole and the parts seen in hermeneutics, and also to the alternation between 
quick hypotheses (automaticity) and monitoring, verification and falsification 
(awareness). 
WHAT FOUNDATION SHOULD WE BUILD ON? 
Frith (1997) distinguishes four levels in reading and dyslexia research: (1) the 
biological level; (2) the psychological level; (3) the behavioural level; and (4) the 
environmental level. While this is a good simplification for educational purposes, 
what is needed in a scientific context is an extensive clarification of each level as 
well as an analysis and explanation of the differences and relationships between 
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them (see Chapter 2). These distinctions give rise to many philosophical problems 
that we cannot deal with here; one of them, though, caused by the distinction 
between levels 1 and 2, is the classic body–mind problem. Behaviourism was 
highly materialist and positivist in nature, preferring to concern itself only with 
phenomena that can be observed using the senses. Cognitive psychology wanted to 
include mental and subjective circumstances as well. Connectionism wished to take 
knowledge about the workings of nerves as its primary starting point, meaning that 
in this respect it was closer to behaviourism than to cognitivism. At the same time, 
however, it did not want to restrict itself to the ‘black-box psychology’ of 
behaviourism. Rather, like cognitive psychology, it wished to describe and explain 
inner phenomena, but without recourse to the inner representations of cognitivism. 
Connectionists considered there to be no grounds for making a sharp distinction 
between the body and the mind. It is open to discussion whether this amounted to 
neglecting or blurring an important problem. Personally, I think that the body and 
the mind should be distinguished, but not separated. Humans have a body that 
others can observe, but we also have mental states that others cannot observe. 
These two form a unit and a whole, but phenomena in one area cannot be fully 
explained by means of phenomena from the other (reductionism). Rather, their 
inter-relationship can be compared to two sides of the same mountain-top. They 
come across as different but belong together. And yet they are not each other’s 
causes. 
 Through our senses, we are influenced by both social and cultural phenomena. 
Some people have claimed that there is an opposition between psychological and 
socio-cultural studies of reading, but I think that is an artificial opposition. It is 
obvious that the literary works and the language that we read are socio-cultural 
phenomena, but the reading as such and the search for meaning must be carried out 
by individuals. The interpretive process involved is a psychological phenomenon, 
but what is being interpreted are socio-cultural phenomena. 
 The four levels of Frith’s model have a parallel in the flowcharts so beloved of 
cognitive psychology, with their clearly defined sub-tasks carried out in a specified 
order. This is a mechanistic way of thinking, inspired among other things by the 
architecture and working procedures of computers. Such analyses have 
traditionally been characterised as ‘homuncular’ because they give the impression 
that there is a series of internal ‘units’ that perform the various tasks in an 
autonomous fashion. One of the most influential researchers when it comes to 
modules and faculties in cognitive psychology is Fodor (1983), but others’ support 
for his ideas has progressively become less widespread and more nuanced. 
However, this way of thinking has left many traces in cognitive psychology that 
remain to this day. To the extent that connectionism illustrates inner processes, it 
does not represent them as clearly delimited, sequentially ordered ‘boxes’. The 
individual components are bigger and less clearly delimited, and the processes are 
parallel (hence connectionism’s alternative name of ‘parallel distributed 
processing’) rather than just sequential, multidirectional rather than unidirectional. 
 Connectionism takes a more vitalist than mechanist view in this respect. Its 
ideas are more inspired by living organisms than by mechanical instruments. The 
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whole is not just the sum of the parts. Further, the goal of each activity is for the 
entire system to attain stability or balance. To some extent, this way of thinking 
can therefore be characterised as teleological. Cybernetic ideas may come even 
closer, with a constant interplay between the whole and the parts. And this way of 
thinking also has much in common with the one I have mentioned in relation to 
hermeneutics: the interpretive process will always involve seeing the whole and the 
parts in the light of each other, and the process will continue for as long as there is 
a discordance between the parts and the whole. In a sense, this is a version of the 
hypothetico-deductive method, where hypotheses and empirical data mutually 
adjust each other (Føllesdal, 1979). 
 It is open to discussion whether, and in what sense or to what extent, cognitive 
psychology is based on teleological ‘explanations’. Aristotle’s distinction between 
goals that ‘pull’ (teleologically) and causes that ‘push’ (causally) has progressively 
become less pronounced. For example, cybernetics has contributed to their 
unification. In addition, it can be claimed that Karl Popper’s ideas, which are 
inspired by Darwinism, help to blur the line between the teleological and the 
causal. According to Popper, people solving problems – especially scientific ones – 
tend to build on spontaneity and creativity to a large extent. This corresponds to 
mutations in Darwin’s evolutionary theory: if ideas do not ‘collide’ with empirical 
data, they ‘survive’. In retrospect, it may seem that developments in a scientific 
field have had a goal (been teleological), but spontaneous and creative experiments 
or hypotheses are usually not the product of necessity or chance. They represent a 
combination that we do not yet have a good name for. 
 We need to search for new paradigms and hypotheses in order to make further 
progress in reading and dyslexia research. In the past forty years, cognitive 
psychology has become too dominant. In my opinion, that school of psychology 
must be combined with behaviourism and connectionism – but not eclectically, 
through more or less random choice of elements from each of these three schools. 
One way of doing this is by conceiving of reading as an interpretive or hermeneutic 
skill which can be described or studied from three different sides – similarly to 
how it is possible to approach a mountain-top from three sides. However, a number 
of theoretical and philosophical issues must be clarified in order for this to be 
possible. This book is intended as a contribution to those clarification efforts. 
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